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ABSTRACT 
 
Supply chain security has become relevant to both practitioners and academics 
for years, yet the understanding of this topic is still incomplete. The literature produces 
relatively few explanatory and confirmatory studies, offers ambiguous definitions and 
terminology and the theoretical development is inconsistent.  
In this dissertation, I review relevant research streams and employ four in-depth 
case studies to conceptualize supply chain security (SCS). I also utilize the principles of 
human immunology to propose a taxonomy of supply chain security management 
(SCSM) mechanisms. Building on institutional theory and the taxonomy, I further 
examine the antecedents as well as the consequences of SCSM mechanisms via a large 
empirical data set collected during 2011-2013. The sample includes responses from 462 
firms.  
Specifically, in my first model I draw on the institutional theory and posit that 
five institutional isomorphism pressures (i.e., government, customer, peer, normative, 
and performance pressure) impact four classes of SCSM mechanisms (i.e., prevention, 
detection, reaction, and restoration). In addition, shared SCS perception (SSP) and top 
management commitment (TMC) are hypothesized to moderate (strengthen) the 
relationships between institutional pressures and SCSM mechanisms. In my second 
model, I propose that the four classes of mechanisms explain five different supply chain 
performance dimensions (i.e., security performance, cost performance, supply chain 
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responsiveness, supply chain resilience, and supply chain visibility). I also specify 
differential effects for both models; some effects are more salient than others. 
The results suggest that not all institutional pressures motivate the 
implementation of SCSM mechanisms. While normative pressure and performance 
pressure act as predominantly powerful predictors of SCSM mechanisms, other 
pressures appear to have negligible or even adverse effects. Surprisingly, data analysis 
suggests that coercive institutional pressures (i.e., government pressure and customer 
pressure) do not exhibit the strongest effects on SCSM mechanisms as the literature 
would suggest. As far as the moderation effect is concerned, the results illustrate that 
neither SSP nor TMC interact with all institutional pressures to affect the employment of 
SCSM mechanisms. In addition, TMC can even impede the implementation of reaction- 
and restoration-oriented SCSM mechanisms when interacting with government pressure. 
Regarding supply chain performance, the results demonstrate that SCSM mechanisms 
have strong effects on multiple supply chain performance measures. Further assessments 
reveal that the effect of SCSM mechanisms on supply chain security performance is 
stronger than its effects on other performance dimensions.      
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The increasing occurrences of supply chain disruptions have continuously called 
for better supply chain risk management. With longer supply chain routes and shorter 
clock speeds, organizations are facing more disruptions in their global supply chains. 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks have disrupted the operations of many firms and cost the U.S. 
stock market $1.4 trillion in value during that week (Bob, 2001); the severe flooding of 
Thailand in 2011 temporally suspended 40 percent of the world's hard-disk drive 
production (Ladendorf, 2011); the August 14, 2003 blackout in the Northeastern U.S. 
resulted in loss of power for hundreds of factories in eight states in the U.S. and the 
Canadian province of Ontario (Moon, 2008). These are but a few recent reminders of the 
inherent vulnerability of the global supply networks. The economic impact of these 
disruptions is significant and potentially devastating for firms (Hendrick and Singhal, 
2003, 2005). As a result, many scholars have been seeking ways to help managers 
minimize risk and solve problems (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Helferich and Cook, 2002; 
Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Sheffi, 2007). 
Researchers have typically taken two interrelated routes to understanding supply 
chain risk. In one direction, researchers have built upon the classic stochastic modeling 
and simulation approaches (Haimes, 1998) to explore two critical risk-related factors: 
the probability of a risk and the magnitude of losses related to that risk (Shavell, 1984). 
Theoretical advances (e.g., Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Ritchie and Brindley, 2007; 
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Tang, 2006a) and ample numerical analyses (Djavanshir and Khorramshahgol, 2006; 
Faisal, Banwet, and Shankar, 2006; Gneezy, List, and Wu, 2006; Goh, Lim, and Meng, 
2007) have helped scholars gain an in-depth understanding of how firms can reduce the 
probability and/or the economic loss as related to supply chain disruptions and thereby 
improve firm performance. For example, several recent analytical studies have 
demonstrated that supply chain risk management strategies positively influence firm 
performance (e.g., Tang and Tomlin, 2008; Tomlin, 2006).   
Taking another approach, researchers have also sought to understand the root 
causes of supply chain risk so that firms can intentionally design strategies and 
implement practices to address potential supply chain disasters (Craighead, Blackhurst, 
Rungtusanatham, Handfield, 2007; Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009). Scholars have 
shown how to utilize the total quality management (TQM) philosophy to control risks 
(Lee and Whang, 2005), explored why some disruptions may be more severe than others 
(Craighead et al., 2007), categorized the sources of risk (Christopher and Peck, 2004; 
Wagner and Bode, 2006), and proposed a number of models to tackle salient supply 
chain risks (e.g., Elkins, Handfield, Blackhurst, and Craighead, 2005; Kleindorfer and 
Saad, 2005; Knemeyer, Zinn, and Eroglu, 2009; Tang, 2006b; Weiss and Maher, 2009). 
However, despite the fact that a number of empirical and analytical studies have 
demonstrated significant relationships between risk management and firm performance, 
supply chain security (SCS) breaches are largely ignored (Martens et al., 2011; Williams 
et al., 2008). The neglect of SCS breaches makes the understanding of supply chain risk 
incomplete at best: theft alone costs retailers and consumers $104 billion a year and is 
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the most common cause of inventory shrinkage (Retail Info Systems News, 2008). In 
addition, the nature of SCS has fundamentally changed since the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001 (Sheffi, 2001; Quinn, 2003). The scope of SCS has gone beyond 
simply preventing theft or other illegal access to supply chain assets to protecting the 
supply chain from any illicit use (e.g., smuggling weapons of mass destruction, 
counterfeit products, adulterated drugs) that could cause severe damage beyond the cost 
to human life (DHS report, 2007; Narasimhan and Talluri, 2009). Globalization, the 
threat of terrorism, and the increasingly complex nature of criminal activities have made 
the security of end-to-end supply chains much more salient.  
SCS breaches appear to be increasing in recent years and thus the threat to supply 
chains has gained momentum. Three out of the ten most devastating terrorist attacks 
registered in the last 100 years took place during the last few years (i.e., the September 
11 terrorist attacks, the 2005 Madrid Subway Explosion, the 2008 Mumbai attacks) They 
are events that arise havoc for supply chains. A report from the Department of 
Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) documented a significant growth in 
incidents of counterfeit parts across the electronics industry from 3,300 incidents in 2005 
to more than 8,000 incidents in 2008 (BIS report, 2010). Business data breaches 
increased from 116 cases in 2005 to 405 cases in 2011 (Chronology of Data Breaches, 
2011), including the SONY 2011 data breach which cost the company approximately 
$171.4 million due to the theft of 77 million customer records. These security breaches 
have generated tremendous direct and indirect expenditures for businesses and the 
economy. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimates counterfeit 
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merchandise alone costs U.S. businesses $200-$250 billion in revenue and results in 
losses of 750,000 jobs on an annual basis (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10423.pdf).  
Not only is the economy affected, but some studies illustrate that SCS breaches 
could also affect everyday life. Drugs have been smuggled in mediums such as toys, 
furniture, holiday candles, tennis shoes, and even statues of Jesus Christ via the global 
supply system (CNN, 2009). Drugs claim thousands of lives and millions of dollars each 
year and induce drug-fueled criminal behaviors. Based on the most recent survey, 38,371 
U.S. people died of drug-induced causes in 2007, and the country spent more than $20 
billion each year to control drug abuse in the last three years (i.e., 2009-2011, Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, see: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
ondcp/Fact_Sheets/consequences_of_illicit_drug_use.pdf). There is also evidence that 
“the illicit tobacco trade is carried out by transnational criminal groups and has been 
used to raise funds for terrorist organizations...If the global illicit trade were eliminated, 
governments would gain at least $31 billion [e.g., lost tax due to tobacco smuggling], 
and from 2030 onwards would save over 160,000 lives a year” (Joossens et al, 2011). 
Weapon smuggling is another major concern related to public safety. According to 
Stephen Flynn (2008), president of the Center for National Policy, the most probable 
way that the American people will become targets of a nuclear weapon would be for al-
Qaeda or a future adversary to smuggle it into the United States through global supply 
chains.  
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In summary, the hidden economic and political impacts of SCS breaches are 
tremendous and potentially devastating. Thus, it is of vital importance to understand the 
nature of SCS and how firms respond to SCS breaches.   
 
1.1 Research Question Statements 
The SCS literature has produced relatively few explanatory and confirmatory 
studies, offered ambiguous definitions and terminology; and theoretical development is 
lacking and can be characterized as inconsistent (Autry and Bobbitt, 2008). The topic of 
supply chain security is quite relevant, but there is no formal and widely accepted 
definition of SCS in the academic literature. A systematic classification of supply chain 
security management (SCSM) mechanisms is also absent. As a result, the scope of SCS 
appears to be rather broad and blurred. Empirical research on SCS is also scant (Martens 
et al., 2011). The antecedents of SCSM mechanisms have been generally ignored (one 
exception is Williams et al., 2009a). Due to the very nature of this topic being “security”, 
researchers struggle to access relevant information from practitioners. Many of the 
existing studies are conceptual in nature or based on a qualitative approach. Large-scale 
empirical research which can test propositions is quite rare.  
There are five unresolved issues: (1) the specification of the concept of SCS, 
which may potentially facilitate the development of this research stream, (2) the 
establishment of a systematic taxonomy of SCSM mechanisms that allow researchers to 
improve our understanding in this domain, (3) the identification of antecedents of SCSM 
mechanisms, which reflects a firm’s overall strategy against SCS challenges, (4) the 
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boundary conditions and organizational traits that shape the effects of these antecedents 
on SCSM mechanism, and (5) the large scale empirical tests that examine the effects of 
SCSM mechanisms on supply chain performance. This study aims at resolving these 
issues. The specific research questions this dissertation attempts to address are: 
(1) How do we define SCS (and correspondingly SCSM)?  
(2) How can we classify SCSM mechanisms into a conceptually sound but 
yet succinct taxonomy?  
(3) What are the underlying drivers for the implementation of SCSM 
mechanisms? 
(4) Are there any organizational factors that shape the relationships between 
these drivers and the SCSM mechanisms?  
(5) Do SCSM mechanisms substantively affect performance? 
The first research question relates to the conceptualization of SCS. It is 
unfortunate that no formal definition of SCS can be found in the academic literature. The 
lack of a clear and formal definition of SCS inhibits progress in the development of SCS 
research (Autry and Bobbitt, 2008). For example, without such a definition, how can 
researchers effectively distinguish between security oriented practices from non-security 
oriented (e.g. safety oriented) ones? Furthermore, SCSM mechanisms seem to span 
across many supply chain management subfields—from inventory management to 
customer relationships, from shipment arrangements to organizational culture. A broad 
scope may be advantageous as it stimulates diverse schools of thought. But “boundaries” 
should be established such that the research stream can maintain its focus and 
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relevance—an important benefit of having a clear definition of supply chain security. 
With a clear definition, scholars may further develop more accurate terminologies and 
reduce the ambiguity regarding the SCS vocabulary (Autry and Bobbitt, 2008). 
The second research question concerns the lack of a systematic taxonomy of 
SCSM mechanisms. The academic literature and industry reports alike have linked a 
number of SCSM mechanisms to firm performance. Yet these SCSM mechanisms are 
rather broad and bear various measures. Gutierrez and Hintsa (2006) studied nine 
voluntary SCSM programs initiated by governments or international organizations. 
Comparisons of these programs show that no two programs have exactly the same 
dimensions and measures, indicating that even governments and leading professional 
organizations have different perceptions of what constitutes best SCSM mechanisms. As 
a result, managers tend to be unsure about how to move forward with an appropriate 
security plan (Closs et al., 2008). There are many lists of what to do. But they are quite 
diverse. How do decision-makers decide which practices to adopt if they don't know the 
effects of these practices on performance? How can top managers promote effective 
supply chain security strategies if they cannot distinguish them from the less effective 
ones? Some managers may have the desire to secure their supply chain but may lack the 
understanding and guidelines needed to develop an effective program (Unisys, 2005).  
Although this study may not be able to explore all SCSM mechanisms and their 
respective effects, the more modest goal is to provide a means to systematically 
categorize SCSM mechanisms based on their purpose—developing a taxonomy. A 
taxonomy apportions SCSM mechanisms into different classes from which firms can 
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select when they need to enhance SCS performance. While a taxonomy is basic in its 
form, it is useful because, regardless of size, companies inevitably have limited 
resources and need to determine which class of SCSM mechanism will provide the most 
desirable outcomes for their specific needs. In other words, a taxonomy enables a firm to 
intentionally focus on one class of SCSM mechanism at a time according to its particular 
needs and resource constraints. A taxonomy can also be rather useful for academic 
research because it can help organize the literature and potentially identify areas which 
are understudied. 
The third research question pertains to the antecedents of SCSM mechanisms. 
Investing in supply chain security is to some extent analogous to buying insurance; as 
long as the SCS system is working, it appears to be worthless. The benefits and 
outcomes of SCSM can be latent but the costs of improving security are apparent: 
preventing SCS breaches costs money, detection devices (e.g., GPS based tracking 
devices) cost money, and coordination among supply chain partners to restore operations 
on the aftermath of SCS crises costs money. In addition, a supply chain is as secure as its 
weakest link. Just one supply chain partner’s irresponsible behavior or nonfeasance 
could nullify the security efforts of others. As a result, some firms may question why 
they should invest in supply chain security at all. They argue that these security 
investments hit their bottom lines and may lack financial justifications (Russell and 
Saldanha, 2003). These firms are inclined to implement security practices only in order 
to meet minimum legislative requirements (Thibault et al., 2006).  
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On the other hand, however, some companies have been proactive in their 
approach and have implemented a variety of security-focused initiatives and programs 
(Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Martha and 
Subbakrishna, 2002, Sheffi, 2007). These firms usually go above and beyond 
government mandates in implementing SCSM mechanisms. Why do firms have such 
differing attitudes toward SCS? What specifically motivates firms to adopt programs that 
go above and beyond government mandates? In order to understand why SCSM 
mechanisms have been adopted at differing levels we need to invoke theoretical 
arguments other than the ones that are conventionally used (e.g., economic theory which 
suggests that profitability is the driver of organization actions). This dissertation uses the 
theoretical lenses of the institutional theory to help address this problem. Detailed 
discussion about the theory and the institutional antecedents of SCSM mechanisms will 
be provided later. 
The fourth research question pertains to the lack of attention regarding the 
conditions shaping the effects of institutional antecedents on SCSM mechanisms. Firms 
vary in their perceptions of the need for better SCS and in their ability to implement SCS 
related initiatives (Williams et al., 2008). From one perspective, a number of firms are 
not—even partially—aware of the increasing importance of SCS (Rice and Spayd, 2005; 
Unisys 2005; Williams et al., 2008). This low level of sensitivity for SCS can perhaps be 
ascribed to supply chain security being inherently complex (Helferich and Cook, 2002; 
Williams et al., 2008). Specifically, each firm has different security needs. For instance, 
food and pharmaceutical firms may be highly sensitive to SCS breaches because 
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adulterated products can make thousands of people sick in a short period (Wein and Liu, 
2005). The shared SCS perception within these firms is likely to impact the attitude of 
employees toward the need for SCS to a point that internal resistance to change (i.e., 
implementation of SCSM mechanism) would be weakened. As a result, it may 
strengthen the relationship between the institutional antecedents and SCSM mechanisms, 
ceteris paribus. In a similar vein, top management commitment toward SCS may also 
strengthen such relationships, ceteris paribus. When top managers have an active 
oversight over SCSM, the firm is more likely to develop clear security related objectives 
and allocate proper levels of resources for securing supply chains.  
Finally, the last research question states that the substantive effects of SCSM 
mechanism on supply chain performance need more empirical validation. Little 
empirical research has been conducted regarding the relationship between supply chain 
security related activities and supply chain performance (Williams et al., 2008). For 
instance, it has been about twelve years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 but only 
15 empirical studies can be found in the literature. Few of them have appeared in leading 
operations and supply chain management (O&SCM) journals, indicating that SCS 
research is still in its infancy. In addition, seven out of the 15 studies do not test the 
effects of SCSM mechanisms on supply chain performance. For example, Williams et al. 
(2009b) develop and empirically validate the measurement scales of SCS culture but do 
not examine the effects of SCS culture on firm performance.  
Moreover, these empirical studies appear to generate mixed results. For example, 
Voss et al. (2009b) demonstrate that “information related” SCSM practices are 
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positively related to SCS performance. On the other hand, Sheu et al. (2006) posit that 
the value of Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program (C-TPAT, one of 
the most publicized supply chain security programs) as it relates to security is not clear. 
Thibault et al. (2006) suggest that firms that provide higher levels of SCS are likely to 
raise their prices, thus jeopardizing their relationships with customers. 
 
1.2 Research Model 
To address the aforementioned research questions, this dissertation first 
conceptualizes and defines supply chain security based on a thorough literature review. 
It then proposes a taxonomy which groups SCSM mechanisms into four classes and 
develops a model which links the institutional drivers of SCSM, SCSM mechanisms, 
organizational traits, and supply chain performance. Figure 1summarizes the overall 
research model. Each construct is briefly discussed below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Overall research model 
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1.2.1 The Conceptualization of SCS 
Based on a thorough literature review, supply chain security is defined as the 
absence of breaches in the supply chain. SCS breaches can include theft, product 
adulteration, smuggling, counterfeit products, sabotage, terrorist attacks, as well as the 
illicit acquisition and use of data. This definition is neat and specific in terms of sources 
of SCS breaches. In this sense, the definition eliminates unnecessary ambiguity and 
makes the concept easy to understand and measure. A thorough review of the supply 
chain security literature, the rules guiding construct definition, and examples of SCS 
breaches will be provided in detail in the next chapter. 
 
1.2.2 Antecedents of SCSM Mechanisms 
While defining SCS has important implications to academics, it is also relevant 
to understand the antecedents of SCS related mechanisms. The evidence has shown that 
some firms are very proactive in implementing SCSM mechanisms while others are 
lagging (Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Martha and 
Subbakrishna, 2002; Sheffi, 2007), suggesting that the underlying drivers of 
implementing SCSM mechanisms demands attention. Drawing on the institutional 
theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Powell, 1991; Scott and 
Meyer, 1983; Scott, 1987; Zucker 1987), this study proposes five underlying drivers that 
can induce the adoption of SCSM mechanisms, including government, customer, peer, 
normative, and performance.  
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From an institutional perspective, firms operate within a framework of rules, 
values, and taken-for-granted assumptions about what represents acceptable and 
appropriate social behaviors. The institutional view suggests that the drivers of 
organizational behaviors go beyond rational optimization (e.g., profit maximization) to 
social justifications and obligations (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). Organizations are 
assumed to be recognition seeking, subject to social influences and relatively intractable 
creatures of habits and traditions (Scott, 2001; Zucker, 1987). Conformity to social 
expectations (dubbed as legitimacy) contributes to firm success and survival because 
legitimate firms are more likely to gain social acceptance and thus reap societal 
resources (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Carroll and Hannan, 1989; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Oliver, 1991). Hence, in order to garner legitimacy firms are prone to adopt 
publically promoted practices (coined as isomorphism process), such as SCSM 
mechanisms in this case, even in the absence of empirical evidence demonstrating their 
financial soundness (Powell, 1991; Selznick, 1957; Suchman, 1995).  
The classical institutional theory and recent studies suggest four types of 
isomorphism pressures: coercive, mimetic, normative, and performance (Deephouse and 
Suchman, 2008; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Heugens and Lander, 2009; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Powell, 1991; Scott and Meyer, 1983; Scott, 1987; Zucker 1987). 
Coercive pressure results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on 
organizations by agencies which they are dependent upon. Coercive pressure may 
institutionalize strategies and practices where their appropriateness is taken-for-granted 
(Berger and Luckman, 1966) irrespective of their efficacy (e.g., the 10+2 rule issued by 
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the US Customs and Border Patrol in January 2009 for all importers to meet supply 
chain security requirements). In the context of SCS, coercive pressure is mainly 
manifested by government and customer demands to improve SCS.  
Mimetic pressure primarily derives from the uncertain nature of business 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001). Due to the inherent uncertainty of the 
business world, organizations are inclined to model after other organizations in order to 
avoid liability. Firms also imitate their competitors in order to provide similar services to 
customers and/or gain similar benefits that their rivals have experienced. This 
isomorphic pressure is mainly denoted as peer pressure and can motivate the adoption of 
SCSM mechanisms. 
Normative pressure stems from cultural expectations and professionalism which 
in turn guide decision-making (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Khalifa and Davison, 
2006). In essence, this argument posits that organizational choices are influenced by 
professional rules and moral and ethical obligations (Scott, 2001). These pressures 
usually result in “rules of thumb,” standard operating procedures, and occupational 
standards (Hoffman, 1999) and are typically reflected by professional, industry, and 
cultural norms. Though the pressure to comply can be subtle, firms understand that there 
is a need to conform to such norms.  
Finally, recent studies have illustrated that the need for better performance also 
generates isomorphic pressure (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Heugens and Lander, 
2009; Ketokivi and Schroeder, 2004). The cautionary note here is that institutional 
theorists rarely make an effort to disentangle institutional isomorphism from competitive 
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isomorphism. Compared to the classical institutional isomorphism processes (i.e., 
coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism), competitive isomorphism is more 
acceptable to economists and organizational sociologists alike. It emphasizes that market 
competition weeds out less efficient practices in favor of more efficient ones (Heugens 
and Lander, 2009; Scott, 2001). Its focus is notably clear on operational efficiency. In 
other words, the “performance pressure” argument suggests that firms may adopt SCSM 
mechanisms because they truly believe that such an adoption can improve efficiency and 
effectiveness, leading to competitive advantage or operational benefits.   
From these perspectives, the institutional theory can explain the adoption of 
SCSM mechanisms. Therefore, this thesis utilizes the institutional theory as a theoretical 
base and suggests that firms are prone to adopt SCSM mechanisms in order to gain 
legitimacy and improve performance. 
 
1.2.3 Taxonomy of SCSM Mechanisms  
To better understand the SCSM mechanisms, this study uses the principles of the 
human immune system as a metaphor to categorize SCSM mechanisms into four classes. 
The SCSM system and the human immune system are very similar. First of all, both 
systems are designed to protect the wellbeing of the organization. The immune system 
defends the body from invasions by outside organisms. The SCSM system defends the 
supply chain and its operations from SCS breaches. Second, both systems are complex 
and have a multi-layered architecture. The immune system has multiple layers of 
keratinized cells, with defenses at many levels. The SCSM system holds a clear 
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hierarchy where at each level (e.g., individual, team, firm, or supply chain level) there 
can be responses to SCS breaches. Third, both systems need to be tolerant. The immune 
system has a mechanism to tolerate itself (i.e., does not attack self—elements of the 
body). The SCSM system, while improving security, has to give considerations to 
efficiency such that SCS activities (e.g., additional inspections) would not impede 
normal operations. Fourth, malfunctions of both systems can have devastating 
consequences. A malfunctioning or a weakened human immune system makes the body 
vulnerable to attacks and thus the body may suffer serious and dire consequences. 
Similarly, if the SCSM system cannot respond to SCS breaches effectively, severe 
economic losses are likely to ensue. In a nutshell, these parallels make it appropriate and 
reasonable to use the human immune system as a metaphor of the SCSM system.  
The human immune system responses to pathogen invasions can be grouped into 
four classes: prevention, detection, reaction, and restoration (Kaufmann et al., 2004, 
Playfair and Bancroft, 2004; Segel and Cohen, 2001). The skin is the first line of defense 
against infection. It forms a tough impenetrable barrier of epithelium protected by 
keratinized cells. It prevents pathogens from entering the human body. However, if 
pathogens pass the first line of defense, then certain types of cells (e.g., lymphocytes; 
one type of white blood cells) can detect pathogens via their antennae. Once the 
intruders are detected, the immune system produces antimicrobial peptides that kill 
bacteria, fungi, and enveloped viruses. Finally, if these “intruders” do cause damage, the 
fluid layer of the immune system, which contains glycoproteins, proteoglycans, and 
enzymes starts the recovery process of internal tissues. In a similar vein, SCSM 
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mechanisms can also be grouped into these four classes. For instance, firms can prevent 
SCS breaches by putting safeguards at the entrances of manufacturing facilities. They 
can deploy detection mechanisms and utilize advanced technologies (e.g., GPS based 
tracking devices) to detect existing and potential SCS glitches. Moreover, firms can 
coordinate with supply chain partners and train their employees so that they can react to 
SCS breaches timely and effectively. Finally, firms utilize crisis management and 
disaster recovery plans to rehabilitate processes if SCS breaches do cause damage to the 
supply network. 
 
1.2.4 Boundary Conditions 
In addition to understanding how isomorphic drivers motivate SCSM 
mechanism, it is also theoretically relevant to consider organization traits that can shape 
the effects of these drivers on organizational activities. The extant conceptual literature 
has demonstrated that top management commitment toward SCS (TMC for short) and 
shared SCS perception within a firm (SSP for short) can serve as boundary conditions 
that impact the implementation of SCSM mechanisms (Autry and Bobbitt, 2008; Closs 
and McGarrell, 2004; Martens et al., 2011; Quinn, 2003; Sheffi, 2002; Whipple et al, 
2009; Williams et al, 2008). Essentially, TMC promotes the allocation of important 
resources for SCSM. If the top management treats SCS with respect, the firm is likely to 
adopt and implement SCSM mechanisms. In contrast, SSP mainly reflects the attitude of 
the employees toward SCS. Firms with high levels of SSP are likely to put security first. 
Employees are more likely to believe and accept that SCS is the responsibility of 
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everyone in the organization. They may be more proactive in implementing SCSM 
mechanisms and resolving related challenges. As a result, top management commitment 
and shared SCS perception may shape the relationship between isomorphic pressures 
and SCSM mechanisms such that the relationship is stronger as the level of top 
management commitment or shared SCS perception increases. 
 
1.2.5 Consequences of SCSM Mechanisms 
Finally, this thesis examines the effects of SCSM mechanisms on supply chain 
performance. Implementing security related strategies and practices is believed to not 
only improve security performance but also to generate an array of collateral benefits 
(Rice and Spayd, 2005; Lee and Wolfe, 2003, Lee and Whang, 2005; Sheffi, 2005; 
Peleg-Gillai et al., 2006). These collateral benefits include reduction in operating costs, 
supply chain responsiveness, supply chain resilience (the ability to survive, adapt, and 
grow in the face of turbulent change), and supply chain visibility among others. Yet, 
little empirical evidence exists to attest to the relationship between SCSM mechanisms 
and such collateral benefits (Williams et al., 2008). Given the resource constraints within 
which most firms have to operate today, it is meaningful, if not critical, to develop a 
good understanding of how SCSM mechanisms can substantively affect supply chain 
performance. Specifically, the present thesis examines five supply chain performance 
measures: SCS performance, supply chain cost performance, supply chain 
responsiveness, supply chain resilience, and supply chain visibility. The empirical 
evidence will inform the last research question of this study. 
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1.3 Research Design and Research Methods 
The institutional theory and the tenets of the human immune system are well 
developed in the literature (Heugens and Lander, 2009; Kaufmann, Medzhitov, and 
Gordon, 2004; Parham, 2005). As such I will test a variance theory model based on 
mature theories. The data collected needs to be primarily quantitative (Edmondson and 
McManus, 2007). A survey based research design is thus adopted. In addition, because 
of the nature of the topic being security, I will also employ a qualitative approach to 
gather data to (1) help justify the definition of SCS and (2) refine my hypotheses and 
enhance the research validity. Therefore, the research design and research methods 
include four tasks: (1) operationalization of constructs, (2) administration of qualitative 
interviews, (3) survey data collection, (4) tests of substantive hypotheses.  
This dissertation deployed existing manifest variables of institutional isomorphic 
drivers primarily from a recent literature review of the institutional theory by Heugens 
and Lander (2009) and several classic studies (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The 
measurement scales of (1) SCSM mechanisms and (2) supply chain performance 
measures were mainly created and/or adapted based on prior SCS research (e.g., Sheffi 
2001, 2005), industry-oriented reports (the IBM special report series of SCS), and a 
number of SCS programs developed by governments and international organizations 
(e.g., C-TPAT, AEO, etc.) The boundary condition variables were mainly adapted from 
the strategic management as well as the SCM literature (e.g., Barret et al., 2005; Closs 
and McGarrell, 2004; Floyd and Lane, 2000; Gutierrez and Hintsa, 2006; Hambrick and 
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Mason, 1984; Mangan and Christopher, 2005; Mena et al., 2009; Peleg-Gillai et al., 
2006; Rice and Spayd, 2005). 
The target population of the survey primarily includes manufacturing firms 
operating in the United States and Italy. Considering that I might have to test ten 
variables simultaneously, I need to have about 200 responses. For this, I need to target 
approximately 2,000 firms assuming an average response rate of 10% (which is normal 
in supply chain security and OM research).  Before delivering the survey, I conducted 15 
interviews with practitioners and academics in order to gather feedback on the survey 
questions and make sure the concept of each construct is clear to them (a.k.a., pilot test). 
The interviewees took the survey and provided their comments. This pre-test validated 
the survey and resulted in refinements of several questions. Paralleled with the survey 
administration, I further conducted an array of interviews and field tours based on a 
qualitative approach. The qualitative data allowed me to refine and clarify my 
propositions. The use of multiple methods also responds to the continuous calls for 
cross-validated studies by O&SCM scholars (Singhal and Singhal, 2012).  
The classic Q-Sort method (Stephenson, 1953) which has been widely used in the 
social sciences literature was employed to examine the efficacy of the four class 
taxonomy I developed. I used forced Q-sorting (i.e., I constrained the number of classes 
to be five: prevention, detection, reaction, restoration, and a N/A class for items that the 
Q-sorters believe does not belong to any of the four classes) because (1) unforced Q-
sorting provides a lower degree of discrimination and suffers from the Barnum effect 
(Meehl, 1956); (2) the unforced Q-sorting procedure is not more reliable than the forced 
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one (Block, 1961); and (3) finally the five-class setting is consistent with the arguments I 
provided in the second chapter.  
Finally I used Structural Equations Modeling (SEM) techniques to assess the 
measurement models and the structural models. Each construct I proposed included at 
least three manifest variables and had a reflective indicator orientation. All measurement 
items were measured on a seven point Likert type scale. The data analyses were 
performed via Mplus and SPSS. Common method bias, non-respondent bias, validity, 
and reliability were assessed prior to model testing.  
In summary, this chapter (1) identified and discussed five major gaps associated 
with the extant literature on SCS, (2) discussed the specific approach to address these 
gaps, and (3) proposed a research model linking all of the relevant constructs and 
elements. Specifically, building on the institutional theory and the metaphor of the 
human immune system, I posited that five institutional pressures would affect four 
classes of SCSM mechanisms and subsequently firm performance. In addition, two 
organizational traits were hypothesized to shape the effects of institutional pressures on 
SCSM mechanism. In particular, the two organizational traits were expected to amplify 
the effects on SCSM mechanisms. Finally the research design and research methods are 
briefly described. 
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CASE STUDIES 
 
Chapter I proposed research questions, briefly discussed the key constructs, and 
described the overall model of this thesis. In this chapter, I provide an extensive review 
of the supply chain security literature and respond to the first two research questions 
(i.e., defining supply chain security, and constructing a taxonomy of SCSM 
mechanisms). I then justify the definition and the taxonomy through four in-depth case 
studies. 
 
2.1 Review of Supply Chain Security Research 
I begin this section with an extensive review of the SCS literature. Because a 
sizable number of security related papers appears at journals which are dedicated to 
niche areas (e.g., transportation, physical distribution, product management), 
constraining the review to only leading Operations and Supply Chain Management 
(O&SCM) journals seems to be untenable. Therefore, both leading and other notable 
O&SCM outlets are reviewed. Eight key words—“security”, “safety”, “supply chain 
risk”, “supply chain disruption”, “terrorism”, “theft”, “smuggling”, “adulteration”—are 
used to help identify relevant papers published between 2000 and 2012. A total of 941 
papers were located (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Reviewed journals 
Journal No. of Papers Identified 
Leading O&SCM Journals  
Management Science (MS) 50 
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management (MSOM) 3 
Journal of Operations Management (JOM) 89 
Decision Sciences Journal (DSJ) 76 
Production and Operations Management (POM) 67 
Other Notable O&SCM Journals  
Journal of Business Logistics (JBL) 46 
Journal of Supply Chain Management (JSCM) 69 
International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management 
(IJPDLM) 
123 
International Journal of Productions Economies (IJPE) 135 
International Journal of Logistics Management (IJLM) 40 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management (IJOPM) 99 
Practitioner-oriented O&SCM Journals  
Supply Chain Management Review (SCMR) 40 
Harvard Business Review (HBR) 57 
Sloan Management Review (SMR) 40 
California Management Review (CMR) 7 
 Total: 941 
 
 
The use of the eight key words helps to minimize the probability that a relevant 
study will be excluded in the review. However the large number of key words also 
inevitably inflates the probability that an irrelevant study will be included. For example, 
a number of papers regarding financial investment decisions are identified by the key 
word “security” because “security” is used as a negotiable financial instrument 
representing financial value (see, Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Several additional 
criteria are then applied to filter out irrelevant papers.  
First, papers without a clear operations/supply chain-oriented focus were 
discarded. Second, some brief academic notes were also eliminated. These notes are 
usually very short (typically 2-3 pages) and appear in the format of interview records. 
These notes are primarily published in practitioner-oriented journals (e.g., Supply Chain 
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Management Review) and mainly illustrate that SCS is an important issue for 
practitioners.  
Third, SCS breaches represent a special type of supply chain risk. As Autry and 
Bobbitt (2008) state, supply chain security and risk have conceptual overlap but have 
different foci. Supply chain risk generally refers to any uncertainty arising from (1) 
problems of coordinating supply and demand or (2) disruptions to normal activities 
(Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). In contrast, supply chain security mainly refers to 
intentionally generated breaches in the supply chain which may include theft, smuggling, 
adulteration, counterfeit products, sabotage, illicit acquisition of data, or terrorist attacks 
(Speier et al., 2011). The focus of this thesis is on SCS breaches. 
Fourth, this thesis distinguishes between supply chain security and safety as well. 
ISO 28000 states that “a supply chain is secure when it can resist, fend off, or withstand 
unauthorized acts that are designed to cause intentional harm or damage”. Supply chain 
safety, on the other hand, can be affected by both intentional and unintentional acts 
which can compromise the integrity of a supply chain. For example, the accidental 
exposure of produce to bacteria through a polluted water source is an unintentional act. 
On the other hand, terrorists can intentionally introduce harmful pathogens in the supply 
chain via fresh produce. In both instances, the safety of the food supply chain is 
compromised. This review only includes studies that explore the processes/strategies to 
tackle supply chain security issues.  
Finally, in addition to academic studies, some relevant government, regional 
(e.g., the European Union), and international organization reports are also reviewed. A 
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typical example of this type of study is a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
report or a subsection of the ISO 28000 standard. These reports are not listed in the 
review table because of the fairly large number of these reports. Nevertheless, citations 
will be provided in the rest of the dissertation when a specific report is referenced.  
As a cross-check against potential subjective bias, a second reviewer who is 
familiar with the supply chain security literature filtered the 941 identified papers using 
the same criteria. His comments and suggestions resulted in minor revisions of the 
author’s results. Table 2 presents the 29 papers that will be further discussed next. 
This thesis organizes the review chronologically. Such organization allows for a 
bird’s-eye-view of how the supply chain security literature evolved over time. It is also 
helpful to identify the coherence as well as diversity within the literature and to capture 
any cumulative patterns. 
 
Table 2. Review of the supply chain security literature 
Study SCSM-
performance 
relation 
Drivers 
of 
SCSM 
Define 
SCS 
Nature of 
research  
 
Research 
method 
 
Sample size Journal 
Sheffi (2001) No No No Conceptual  N/A IJLM 
Lee & Wolfe 
(2003) 
Yes No No Conceptual  N/A SCMR 
Rice & Caniato 
(2003) 
No No No Conceptual  N/A SCMR 
Russell & 
Saldanha (2003) 
No No No Conceptual  N/A TJ 
Closs & 
McGarrell (2004) 
Yes No No Conceptual  N/A Industry 
Report 
Prokop (2004) No No No Analytical / 
descriptive 
Quantitative / 
game theory 
modeling 
 IJLM 
Kleindorfer & 
Saad (2005) 
No No No Conceptual  N/A POM 
Lee & Whang 
(2005) 
Yes No No Mixed Quantitative 
model + 1 case 
study 
1 IJPE 
Rice & Spayd 
(2005) 
Yes No No Conceptual  N/A Industry 
Report 
Peleg-Gillai et al. 
(2006) 
Yes N/A No Empirical / 
descriptive 
Quantitative / 
survey 
14 Industry 
Report 
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Table 2. continued 
Sarathy (2006) No No No Conceptual  N/A TJ 
Sheu et al. (2006) Yes No No Empirical / 
descriptive 
Mixed 5 cases SCM: a IJ 
Thibault et al. 
(2006) 
Yes No No Empirical / 
descriptive 
Qualitative / 
interviews 
24a TS 
Autry & Bobbitt 
(2008) 
Yes N/A No Empirical / 
descriptive 
Qualitative / 
structured 
interviews 
31a IJLM 
Closs et al. (2008) No No No Conceptual  N/A SCMR 
Chao & Lin 
(2009) 
No No No Empirical / 
explanatory 
Quantitative / 
survey 
161 IJPE 
Ekwall (2009) No No No Empirical / 
explanatory? 
Mixed 6 interviews; 4 
survey responses 
IJPDLM 
Reade (2009) No No No Empirical / 
descriptive 
Quantitative / 
survey 
898 IJPDLM 
Voss et al. 
(2009a)  
No No No Empirical / 
descriptive 
Quantitative / 
survey 
107 JBL 
Voss et al. 
(2009b)  
No No No Empirical / 
descriptive 
Mixed 199 TS 
Whipple et al. 
(2009) 
No No No Empirical / 
descriptive 
Mixed 50 interviews w/ 
15 firms; 195 
survey responses 
IJPDLM 
Williams et al. 
(2009a) 
No Yes No Empirical / 
descriptive 
Qualitative / 
interviews 
17a  IJPDLM 
Williams et al. 
(2009b) 
No No No Empirical / 
descriptive 
Quantitative / 
survey 
n1=62 (pretest) 
n2=102 
IJLM 
Atwater et al. 
(2010) 
Yes N/A No Empirical / 
descriptive 
Quantitative / 
panel data 
270 JBL 
Bakshi & Gans 
(2010) 
No No No Analytical / 
explanatory 
Quantitative / 
game theory 
modeling 
N/A MS 
Bakshi et al. 
(2011) 
No No No Analytical / 
explanatory 
Quantitative / 
queuing 
simulation 
N/A MS 
Martens et al. 
(2011) 
Yes No No Empirical / 
explanatory 
Quantitative / 
survey 
69 JBL 
Marucheck et al. 
(2011) 
No No No Conceptual  N/A JOM 
Speier et al. 
(2011) 
Yes No No Empirical / 
explanatory 
Mixed 75 interviews; 
199 survey 
responses 
JOM 
a: It refers to the number of interviews conducted. The authors did not report the number of firms involved. 
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Table 3. Rethinking supply chain security 
 Before 9/11terrorist attacks After 9/11terrorist attacks 
The changes in 
scale and scope of 
SCS challenges 
SCS is tasked to avert taking things “out of” the 
supply chain.  
e.g., employee theft.  
SCS also needs to prevent things from getting 
“into” the supply chain.  
e.g., weapon smuggling or drug smuggling 
 
The SCS war is a war against business 
organizations 
The SCS war is a war against the government, the 
people, and the business organizations 
 
SCS needs intensive attention from the focal 
firms 
SCS needs not only intensive attention from the 
focal firms but also intensive collaboration 
between public and private sectors 
 
The SCS war is fought by professionals 
(policemen or guards)   
The SCS war is fought by all affected parties 
(government, public and private firms, and even 
citizens), but most efforts are undertaken by 
private firms  
 
Security can be lax since its potential impact is 
limited. 
Security cannot be compromised because it impacts 
human lives as well as financial performance 
 
 
The early studies are primarily conceptual in nature and suggest that SCS is both 
important and relevant. Many early studies are exploratory and their perspective is 
broad. These papers are mainly motivated by a number of SCS breaches such as the 9/11 
terrorist attacks of the early 2000s’. They suggest that the scale and scope of SCS 
challenges have fundamentally changed (Table 3). Better SCS requires not only the 
extensive efforts from the focal firms but also collaboration among all related parties 
across the supply network. 
According to Sheffi (2001), the threat of terrorism is a continuous danger. The 
war against terrorists would be fought primarily not by a professional army but by 
business organizations and normal citizens. The importance of winning this battle goes 
beyond plain costs to human life. Consequently, to be actively prepared for the next 
attack firms would have to rethink their supply chain operations, adapting to increasing 
supply chain uncertainties, and building up public-private collaboration. 
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The business value of better SCS is also relevant. Rice and Caniato (2003) 
propose that global supply chains are inherently vulnerable to disruptions. The economic 
losses emanating from these disruptions are considerable and sometimes devastating 
(Hendricks and Singhal, 2003, 2005). To build a secure and resilient supply network, 
Russell and Saldanha (2003) discuss several tenets of security-sensitive logistics systems 
with the focus on partnership development and flexibility building.   
Adding to these studies, Lee and Wolfe (2003) and Lee and Whang (2005) 
explore the potential relationship between the Total Quality Management (TQM) 
philosophy and SCS. They view SCS breaches as analogous to quality defects. They 
suggest that the SCS purview no longer merely includes issues such as theft and 
contraband (of illegal drugs, illegal immigrants, and export of stolen goods). It also 
includes the protection of a supply chain against the threat of terrorist attacks. 
Governments and industry need to work with each other to build confidence—ensuring 
public safety while maintaining smooth flows of goods and services in the global supply 
system. One possible way to generate confidence is to apply the TQM principles in 
designing and operating supply chains to assure SCS. Several strategies, such as building 
the ability to detect a SCS breach as soon as it occurs, are suggested (Lee and Wolfe, 
2003) and a quantitative model is put forward to show that firms can achieve higher 
levels of SCS at lower cost (Lee and Whang, 2005).  
While no formal definition of supply chain security is provided, the early studies 
do provide innovative thinking and mixed evidence which are ample to motivate future 
research. Prokop (2004) constructs a game between shippers and carriers in the context 
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of inbound cargo security based on rules issued by the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP). The results imply that both players (i.e., the shipper and the buyer) 
may be active and take the first move depending on the requirements of the rules. For 
instance, the shippers will make the first move when the rule is compulsory (such as the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI)) because they have little choice but to comply. But 
when the rule is optional (such as FAST), both parties may become the first mover.  
Thibault et al. (2006) study the response of the U.S. maritime industry regarding 
the Container Security Initiative. The findings show that the regulation fostered a 
cooperative relationship between industry and government as it relates to supply chain 
security. This study seems to suggest that firms which are active in enhancing SCS and 
the adoption of SCSM mechanisms do garner collateral benefits such as sturdy industry-
government relationships. However, Sheu et al. (2006) demonstrate that because a given 
SCSM initiative (i.e., C-TPAT program in their study) is a means rather than an end, its 
value to SCS is, in fact, not clear.  
While it is possible that the short-term cost of SCSM mechanisms could be 
balanced out by long-term gains from improved supply chain performance (Sarathy, 
2006), what benefits firms can actually generate from better security is unclear. The 
exploration of firm strategies and actions targeting SCS breaches is also scant in these 
early studies. As Sarathy (2006) argues, firms should design security into the supply 
chain rather than seek solutions on the aftermath of SCS breaches. However, prior to 
investing in supply chain security, organizational actors need to justify their decisions.  
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Several industry-initiated and practitioner-oriented reports help address the 
concerns regarding benefits that can be generated via the implementation of SCSM 
mechanisms. The collateral benefits and implementation issues of SCSM mechanisms 
are the foci of these reports. Three reports (i.e., Closs and McGarrell, 2004; Rice and 
Spayd, 2005; and Peleg-Gillai et al., 2006) from the Special Report Series—Supply 
Chain Security, sponsored by the IBM Center for the Business of Government, are 
carefully reviewed here.    
In contrast to the early studies (published between 2001 and 2004), the 
perspective of these reports is exclusively practitioner-oriented. The questions these 
reports attempt to answer are (1) how can firms effectively implement SCSM 
mechanisms? (2) are these SCSM mechanisms really beneficial to firms?  
Closs and McGarrell (2004) argue that firms have to understand the key 
challenges (i.e., the five “Vs”: velocity, variability, value, vulnerability, and visibility) of 
supply chain security in order to effectively implement SCSM mechanisms. Building on 
prior research (e.g., Lee and Wolfe, 2003; Russell and Saldanha, 2003), Closs and 
McGarrel put forward several criteria that help to gauge the implementation of SCSM 
mechanisms. For instance, firms can assess their supply chain vulnerability in several 
ways. The authors suggest that a measure such as “report self-assessments of 
vulnerability” is an indicator of regular (i.e., low level) security evaluation, while a 
measure such as “performing unannounced inspections or validation by third parties 
firms to detect vulnerability” is an indicator of high level of security evaluation. These 
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criteria serve as a “checklist” that allows firms to assess their current SCS level and set 
up future SCS targets.  
Yet, the specific mechanics of implementing SCSM mechanisms is not the only 
concern of practitioners. Rice and Spayd (2005) address the industry wide concern that 
government actions to impose tougher security-related standards and processes erode 
trade efficiency by adding cost and complexity. The authors develop a framework for 
executives, researchers, and government officers to ask questions, conduct research, and 
make decisions about how to approach investments in SCS. They argue that there has 
been a great deal of speculation in this area, but very little data. The framework they 
provide facilitates communication among all related parties and therefore can lead to 
better collaboration. The report further illustrates that there is increasing evidence and 
rationale suggesting that meaningful benefits, including improved SCS performance, 
reduced overall cost, and improved efficiencies, are created from prudent SCS 
investments. 
Peleg-Gillai et al. (2006) further extend the findings of the first two reports and 
suggest that better security drives business value. They provide an overview of major 
existing SCSM initiatives/programs and their respective collateral benefits (Figure 2). In 
contrast to prior reports, the authors did collect data from both manufacturers and 
logistics service providers to support their core arguments (i.e., SCS investments are 
beneficial). Firms participating in the study do grab collateral benefits by implementing 
SCSM mechanisms. The findings clearly indicate that significant business value accrues 
from supply chain security investments. However, the limitation is that the sample size 
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was very small (n=14) and all companies involved were industry leaders. In other words, 
the findings may be atypical. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Collateral benefits of SCSM mechanisms 
 
 
While the endeavors of these reports are primarily to help practitioners, they 
contribute to the academic literature as well. One of the contributions is that they furnish 
a set of prototypical measurement scales that help scholars to develop robust SCSM 
constructs. Another important contribution of these reports is that they offer useful 
rationale and some empirical evidence to justify the value of SCS investments. 
Nevertheless, the narrow breadth of these studies undermines the contribution of these 
reports. For example, the collateral benefits proposed are primarily operational and the 
link between SCSM mechanism and real financial outcome is not empirically justified.  
To address these questions, the recent SCS literature (primarily papers published 
in 2007-2012) has moved forward to a number of empirical and analytical inquiries. 
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Compared to the early papers, the recent studies are more quantitative in nature. A 
number of relations which were conceptually proposed in the early papers are 
analytically modeled or empirically tested. The interaction between government 
authorities and business organizations (some authors refer this as public-private sector 
interaction, see Lee and Whang, 2004) is one of these conceptual relations. When 
studying the impact of the 100% inspection of U.S.-bound containers policy, Bakshi and 
Gans (2010) show that the C-TPAT program can shift some of the U.S. Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) burdens to trading firms. Their results suggest 
that that CBP may use strategic delays as an incentive for firms to join the C-TPAT 
program. The 100% inspection policy has been also critiqued since it is somewhat 
impractical and may impede global trade. As Bakshi et al. (2011) further highlight, CBP 
can only handle a small portion of the total load. Based on the data from two large 
international terminals, a simulation was performed and the results show that an 
alternative of the 100% inspection policy—a rapid primary scan of all containers, 
followed by a more careful secondary scan of only a few containers that failed the 
primary test—is more feasible (Bakshi et al., 2011).  
Other mandatory or voluntary government initiated SCSM initiatives also have 
strong effects on organizational behavior. Atwater et al. (2010) examine a five-year 
(1999-2003) panel data set and illustrate that almost 40% of motor carriers altered their 
strategies after 9/11 due to the changes of highway security requirements. Their analysis 
demonstrates that while both changed and non-changed firms suffered declines in 
operating income after 9/11, the non-changed group experienced a much steeper decline. 
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The impact of heightened SCS needs has generated a spillover effect on supply 
chain partners as well. Voss et al. (2009a) examined SCS related supplier selection 
criteria in the food industry. The authors argue that there are tradeoffs between SCS and 
other performance dimensions, such as delivery reliability. Their simulation results show 
that under some conditions (e.g., sourcing domestically) food processing firms are not 
willing to trade off operational benefits (e.g., delivery reliability) for better SCS when it 
comes to supplier selection. 
While acknowledging that external parties (e.g., government, customer) can 
shape a firm’s SCSM activities, some scholars have also paid great attention to internal 
factors that affect security-related organizational behaviors. Chao and Lin (2009) show 
that a firm’s attitude toward SCS has a significant impact on the intention to adopt 
container security services (i.e., hire a third party to secure containers). Voss et al. 
(2009b) demonstrate that firms that place a high strategic priority on SCS generally have 
a greater ability to detect and recover from SCS breaches compared to firms that place a 
low strategic priority on SCS. Similarly, Whipple et al. (2009) illustrate that firms 
operating globally placed more importance on SCS than firms operating domestically. 
These global firms are more likely to assess the SCSM procedures of their supply chain 
partners, and thus achieve better SCS performance. Their cluster analysis further 
validates the findings as the high performance group is dominated by international firms. 
Reade (2009) further moved the analysis from the firm level to the individual 
level. He suggests that SCS is also a concern of common employees. He examines the 
relationship between employee sensitivity to terrorism and attitude of employees toward 
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their job and organization in Sri Lanka, where terrorism is a societal problem. The 
author used correlation analysis to examine the proposed relationship and found a 
statistically significant negative correlation, indicating that the threat of terrorist attacks 
eroded the employees’ commitment to their organization. 
Results based on the aforementioned studies have enriched the supply chain 
security literature by providing analytical and empirical evidence. In the meanwhile, 
other scholars have recognized the lack of theoretical and conceptual development of the 
supply chain security research (Closs et al., 2008). The scope of SCS is broad and 
different aspects of SCS are rather scattered. For example, there is an abundance of 
“best” strategies and practices but few frameworks that link these strategies and 
practices together exist (Closs et al., 2008). In response to this, Autry and Bobbitt (2008) 
developed a framework of what the authors called supply chain security orientation 
(SCSO, “a firm-level construct addressing companies’ multiple approaches toward 
mitigation of supply chain security breaches and supply chain risk management”, p. 42) 
to categorize a firm’s SCSM efforts. Based on several interviews, they suggest that 
SCSO includes four dimensions: preparation and planning initiatives, supply chain 
security-related partnerships, organizational adaptation, and security-focused 
communications and technology. 
Speier et al. (2011) integrate three theoretical perspectives (i.e., normal accident 
theory, high reliability theory, and situational crime prevention) to develop a framework 
that examines the threat of potential disruptions on supply chain processes. Data 
collected from the food industry suggests that the depth and breadth of SCSM 
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mechanisms implemented depend on top management mindfulness (i.e., perception of 
the need of SCS), operational complexity, product risk, and coupling (i.e., complex 
interdependency). Nevertheless, Speier et al. (2011) discuss both safety and security in 
their study.  
In addition to the aforementioned papers, the literature has also seen the efforts to 
develop and validate the measurement scales of SCS-oriented culture (Williams et al., 
2009b); apply the crime displacement theory to explain why cargo theft continued to be 
a significant problem despite the implementation of various countermeasures (Ekwall, 
2009); and identify the antecedents of SCS effectiveness (Martens et al., 2011). Indeed, 
Marucheck et al. (2011) published an editorial essay which focuses on how the field of 
O&SCM can offer fresh insights to address supply chain safety and security challenges. 
Based on the examination of safety and security issues in five industries, they describe 
four areas where innovative solutions could be provided in addressing these problems: 
regulation and standards, product lifecycle management, traceability and recall 
management, and supplier relationships. Nevertheless, the authors do not formally 
distinguish safety from security in their work.  
One important observation in the literature is that the antecedents of SCSM 
mechanisms are by and large ignored. The only exception is Williams et al. (2009a). 
Based on 19 interviews, Williams and colleagues concluded that four drivers exist: 
government, customers, competitors, and society. However, they do not compare the 
relative power of these drivers nor do they include performance pressure as a potential 
and critical driver; both are major concerns of this thesis. 
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Another and probably more important observation is that the foci of the supply 
chain security studies appear to be very scattered. The concept of SCS seems to be very 
broad, and thereby unclear and hard to use. The absence of a formal definition of SCS 
may greatly jeopardize the development of this stream of research. Therefore this thesis 
moves forward to conceptualize SCS next. 
 
2.2 Conceptualization of Supply Chain Security 
2.2.1 A Review of the Concept of Security in Different Disciplines  
The ambiguity of the term supply chain security perhaps stems from the 
ambiguity of the term security, which has a wide range of meanings. Studies from 
multiple disciplines have suggested that security is multidimensional in nature and 
diverse in practice (Brooks, 2010). 
In the sociological literature where the concept of security originates, Fischer and 
Green (2004, p.21) suggest that security “implies a stable, relatively predictable 
environment in which an individual or group may pursue its ends without disruption or 
harm and without fear of disturbance or inquiry.” A more traditional and narrow 
definition conceptualizes security as the protection of information, assets, and people for 
individual safety and community wellness (Craighead, 2003).  Some scholars also 
suggest that security may be considered as the prevention of undesirable, unauthorized, 
and detrimental loss to an organization’s or individual’s assets (Post and Kingsbury, 
1991). Those definitions portray security as a private and/or commercial need as 
individuals and/or business assets are the subjects that need to be secured. However, the 
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sociology literature also expands to consider security at the national level. In this line of 
studies, security is linked to the defense of a nation through armed forces (Walt, 1991). 
Security is also associated with public policing and the use of armed forces to protect 
(sometimes even control) the citizens (Jones and Newburn, 1998). In all of those 
conceptualizations, security is described as either an ideal status (i.e., being secured) or a 
means to achieve that status, despite that the specific meaning of security may vary 
given the time, place, and context (Davidson, 2005). 
In the criminology literature, security is connected with the concept of law and 
order. Security emphasizes unlawful and anti-social events and their causes and 
consequences. A belief shared by many criminology scholars is that crime prevention 
and security always go together (Manunta, 1999). Security is desired, as it impedes 
crime. Security is valued for the role it plays to maintain the stability of the society. 
Some other scholars, however, argue that security is not always for the best and should 
not be considered free of dangers. The unconstrained achievement of one’s security may 
actually jeopardize that of others, by threatening them or by transferring threats onto 
them (Dillon, 1996). In this sense, security is driven by not law-abiding motives but self-
utility. On the whole in the criminology studies, security is either the means which helps 
to ensure law (or achieve self-utility) or the resulting condition. Nevertheless, a review 
by Zedner (2003) suggests that security is better considered a “state of being”. 
According to Zedner, the purported security ends are “either objective freedom from risk 
(protection, guard, or defense) or the subjective feeling of safety (or absence of fear or 
apprehension) (p.155)”; even some researchers propose that security could be the means 
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to that purported ends, “the pursuit of security may be something like an end in itself” 
(p.157). 
In the management literature, most scholars tend to treat security as an 
operational tool to prevent or reduce risks which cannot be accepted or transferred 
(Broder, 1984). This understanding is derived from the assumption that risks cannot be 
totally removed and therefore losses will anyway be suffered. In other words, the core 
idea is that reduction (of risks) is more important than removal. Therefore, security is 
usually defined by a standard (e.g., the acceptable level of losses) and the cost 
effectiveness of security measures which is to be judged against that standard. Under this 
condition, security and loss reduction are interchangeable. Nevertheless, some scholars 
believe that security is in principle risk-averse. Confining security to an acceptable level 
of losses makes it hard to explain voluntary risk-taking in practice. An alternative 
explanation is that some minor risks should be tolerated as scarce resources need to be 
channeled toward more important ones. By evaluating potential risks, limited resources 
can be used to achieve the best possible results. As such, the concept of security is 
broader than just loss prevention.  
In summary, the concept of security is capacious, dangerously capable of 
meaning quite a few things to different constituents. 
 
2.2.2 Supply Chain Security 
While the concept of security may be too broad to be practicable (Manunta and 
Manunta, 2006), meaningful definition could still be achieved when that definition is 
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dependent on a specific applied context (Brooks, 2010). The context of supply chain 
management thus allows me to provide a precise enough but yet practically applicable 
definition of supply chain security. 
 
2.2.2.1 Supply Chain Risk and Supply Chain Security 
Supply chain security issues are considered a special type of risk embedded in 
the supply chains; the supply chain management literature has a long history to deal with 
supply chain risks. Is it possible, however, for SCS to be effectively defined in terms of 
the classic risk notions of (1) the probability of a risk and (2) the magnitude losses 
related to that risk (Shavell, 1984; Saad and Kleindofer, 2005)? The answer is probably 
no. The probabilistic concept of risk is built upon the daring assumption that decision 
makers can possibly make informed choices about future events whose likelihood and 
outcomes are known, or at least assessable with a reasonable degree of reliability. The 
approach of utilizing event consequences and their associated probability to manage risk 
is widely endorsed for two reasons: its formal simplicity and its aid to rational decision-
making (Manunta, 2002). However, both reasons seem unsustainable for SCS. 
First, the analysis of SCS breaches cannot be reduced to simple mathematical 
formulas. SCS breaches are more complex than general supply chain risks, such as 
supply shortage and demand uncertainty. SCS breaches are very often characterized by 
their irregularity. They may occur suddenly and simultaneously; their outcomes are 
uncertain or even unthinkable (unknown probability from a mathematical perspective); 
they are sensitive to time, people, and environment; and finally they go beyond monetary 
 41 
 
considerations to human lives. SCS breaches depend on human actions (people who 
intentionally cause SCS problems), which should not be considered as errors, and 
reactions made by people in response to SCS breaches may prove right in some cases but 
wrong in others. Both conditions violate the basic assumptions made by mathematicians 
such as Bayes, von Leibniz, and Laplace, invalidating the statistical value of prediction.  
Second, the SCS assessment based on the probability approach may not provide a 
reliable account of reality. The probabilities associated with SCS breaches could be very 
subjective and thus are somewhat far away from objectivity and accuracy. As Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) suggest, decision makers tend to use their perceptions rather than 
“reliable numbers” to make choice. The fear of the so-called mad cow disease is an 
excellent example: extremely low probabilities of the most feared negative results—one 
person per year in the U.K. contracts the human-variant degenerative neurological 
disorder—outweigh much higher probabilities of less feared ones (e.g., poison outbreak, 
affecting one in 3,000 people per year) (Oxford statistics, 2001). In the SCS area, the 
fear of SCS disasters, such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, may lead to highly subjective and 
overestimated probabilities. As such, the probabilistic approach is hardly reliable in the 
SCS area and barely helpful in rational decision-making. 
Taken together, the arguments of simplicity and rationality hold little water when 
it comes to SCSM. The use of the classic risk notions to define SCS seems to be 
untenable. While SCS involves about a sub-group of supply chain risks, its unique 
attributes make it hard to be defined using general and simple risk management 
languages.  
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2.2.2.2 Supply Chain Safety and Supply Chain Security 
Supply chain safety and supply chain security are sometimes used 
interchangeably in the literature (Speier et al., 2011). The reason of this use is apparent 
and understandable. Both safety and security encompass the meaning of protection, 
harmlessness, reliability, free of danger, etc. Under the arena of supply chain 
management, both of them imply that the supply chain network has procedures to protect 
the supply chain assets from theft, damage, or terrorism. However, despite their 
conceptual overlaps, some scholars suggest that the two concepts are different. For 
example, supply chain safety leads to better product safety which refers to “the reduction 
in the probability that use of a product will result in illness, injury, death or negative 
consequences to people, property or equipment” (Marucheck et al., 2011, p. 708). 
Supply chain security, on the other hand, implies the delivery of a product is 
uncompromised within the supply chain (Marucheck et al., 2011). In this sense, 
improving SCS is one way to enhance supply chain safety. Safety is a broader concept 
with security embedded in it. Nevertheless, if safety comprises security, then anything 
that is safe must also be secure. Yet this is not always the case: a warehouse can be safe 
(i.e., no one wants to attack or steal from it) but not secure (e.g., not equipped with anti-
theft devices).     
Another view, which helps to remedy the aforementioned conflict, is that supply 
chain safety and security can be distinguished based on the intention of the source of the 
problems. Safety is concerned more with unintentional structural failures and “acts of 
God”, while security is dealing with intentional behaviors which result in harm or 
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damage (Zedner, 2003). This view is in line with the ISO-28000 standard, which states 
that “a supply chain is secure when it can resist, fend off, or withstand unauthorized acts 
that are designed to cause intentional harm or damage”. In this sense, SCS entails the 
efforts to avoid and respond to intentional acts, while supply chain safety concerns both 
intentional and unintentional acts which may compromise the integrity of a supply chain. 
For example, the accidental exposure of produce to bacteria through a polluted water 
source is an unintentional act (i.e., a supply chain safety issue). On the other hand, 
terrorists can intentionally introduce harmful pathogens in the supply chain via fresh 
produce (i.e., a supply chain security issue). In both instances, the integrity of a supply 
chain is compromised. This view is adopted in this thesis as it provides the opportunity 
to effectively differentiate supply chain security from supply chain safety, and therefore 
to accurately define SCS. 
 
2.2.2.3 Supply Chain Security: A Means or an End? 
In supply chain management, security is usually associated with negative 
nuances, a distinguishing feature of the criminology literature. SCS breaches such as 
theft, product adulteration, and smuggling imply the failure of anti-crime processes 
and/or the failure of penalties associated with those criminal and unethical activities (as 
specified in supply contracts). Given this negative connotation, it is hardly surprising 
that it is perhaps insecurity and the demand for better security that drive reactions to SCS 
breaches. Demands for better security against crimes reflect a managers’ subjective 
feeling of insecurity, regardless of whether this sense of insecurity is or is not well 
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founded in practice. Under such circumstances, SCS communicates an ideal status, 
absence of negative events. As Spitzer observed, “security…is said to exist when 
something does not occur rather than when it does…when stores are not robbed, 
pedestrians are not molested” (1996, p. 43). In other words, SCS should be portrayed as 
the expected outcome of an organization’s SCSM efforts.  
This end view is adopted by most SCS researchers. From this perspective, SCS 
refers to the extent to which the supply network can prevent (or withstand) any kind of 
SCS breaches. For example, by describing supply chain security management as “the 
application of policies, procedures, and technology to protect supply chain assets 
(product, facilities, equipment, information, and personnel) from theft, damage, or 
terrorism and to prevent the introduction of unauthorized contraband, people or weapons 
of mass destruction into the supply chain (2004, p.8)”, Closs and McGarrell indirectly 
imply that SCS is the outcome of an array of security related activities and mechanisms.  
Other researchers, however, suggest that SCS could be the means (actual 
activities and efforts) that aims at achieving high levels of security performance. For 
example, Sarathy (2006) argues that firms should design security into the supply chains, 
indicating that SCS is embedded within supply chain operations and processes. SCS 
combines traditional supply chain management practices with new security 
requirements. As Williams et al. conclude, supply chain security “is a means to regulate 
the movement of conflict goods (i.e., profitable but illegal products such as weapons) 
and the people associated with them.” (2008, p. 267)  
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While both views have their rationales, the end perspective is preferred. Under 
the means perspective, the broad scope of SCS activities has made the definition of SCS 
imprecise at best as the definition cannot capture all of the important SCSM measures. 
The imprecision not only means many divergent measures can be justified under the 
name of supply chain security, but also gives license to potential unusual measures that 
may otherwise appear indefensible. The expected outcome (the end) of these security 
means is, however, identical and consistent (i.e., better security). This end view is also 
consistent with the preferred criminological definitions of security as we reviewed in the 
previous section.  
 
2.2.2.4 Defining Supply Chain Security 
Having distinguished security from general risk and safety and proposed supply 
chain security as an end of SCSM efforts, I move to discuss the criteria of developing a 
good definition. Many scholars have provided several criteria of what constitutes a 
“good” definition (Kaplan, 1964; Dubin, 1978; Hunt, 1991). In general, their suggestions 
are similar to Hempel’s (1970) statement that “good conceptual definitions should 
exhibit inclusivity, exclusivity, differentiability, clarity, communicability, consistency, 
and parsimony” (p. 654). However, recent studies have argued that these suggestions are 
too abstract and do not provide examples of how they can be applied (Wacker, 2004). 
Instead, Wacker (2004) provides several specific rules of constructing a good definition 
which are tailored for the O&SCM research. This study follows these rules to 
conceptualize SCS. Nevertheless, one important note here is that not all rules Wacker 
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proposed are applicable in this study. For example, Wacker assumes that the concept 
which is to be formally defined has been somewhat developed in the literature, and 
therefore he suggests that the definition “should be as similar as possible between 
studies” (rule 5 in table 2, p. 638). In the context of my study, supply chain security 
research is however still in its infancy. As table 2 suggests, there are no existing studies, 
which provide the definition of supply chain security, to be consistent with. 
Six specific rules are then followed to define supply chain security (Wacker, 
2004, p. 634-637): (1) the concept is defined using primitive terms which are assumed to 
be known by the readers; (2) the definition should exclude shared terms with other 
definitions to reduce confusion; (3) the definitions should not use vague or ambiguous 
terms; (4) the definition should have as few as possible terms (i.e., parsimony); (5) the 
definition should not make any term broader (i.e., expanding the domain); (6) the 
definitions should not introduce any new hypotheses. 
Based on the review of the literature and following the rules proposed by Wacker 
(2004), this study defines supply chain security as the absence of breaches in the supply 
chain. The sources of breaches include theft, product adulteration, smuggling, 
counterfeit products, sabotage, terrorist attacks, as well as illicit acquisition and use of 
data. The definition communicates an ideal status of the supply chain, zero breaches. 
The definition is neat, parsimonious, and easy to understand (rule 1-4). By inventorying 
the sources of supply chain breaches it also offers a clear “content domain” to 
distinguish security from other similar concepts (rule 5). The list of breach sources also 
helps managers to facilitate the execution of security actions because it lists areas that 
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need to be dealt with. No hypotheses are introduced (e.g., security means better 
performance, rule 6). To further justify this definition, we provide examples of each 
source of breaches below. 
 Theft is one of the most common SCS breaches. Even well secured supply 
chains could be the targets of a heist. In a recent example, thieves broke into Eli Lilly 
and Co.'s warehouse located in Enfield, Connecticut in March, 2010. The thieves waged 
a high-tech assault as they cut a hole in the roof, rappelled inside, disabled the alarms, 
and removed enough drugs to fill a tractor trailer. They made away with approximately 
$75 million worth of prescription drugs (ABC News, 2010). As for product adulteration, 
one recent example is the failure of the gigantic Chinese milk producer Sanlu in 2008. 
The company failed to detect the use of melamine by its suppliers. The tainted product 
processed by Sanlu lead to the death of three babies and more than a thousand ill infants. 
The company went bankrupt and the milk industry lost approximately $5 billion in sales 
(A.T. Kearney Analysis, 2010).  
Smuggling has been a big concern to nations and firms for a long time. It 
includes not only smuggling of people and weapons, but also smuggling of high value 
illegal substances such as cocaine. Recently, police in Spain have recovered 162 kilos of 
cocaine with a street value of approximately $20 million, hidden inside plastic bananas. 
They were concealed in a 22-ton shipment of real fruit that arrived from Ecuador, “the 
imitated bananas, which were very similar to real bananas, were hidden amongst a 
shipment of real fruit,” the interior ministry said on Jan 13, 2011 (kyero.com, 2011).  
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Counterfeit products also present serious SCS challenges. For instance, while the 
Chinese authorities investigated 480,000 cases of counterfeit drugs worth $57 million 
and closed 1,300 factories in 2001, 192,000 deaths were attributed to counterfeit drugs in 
China in the same year (Wellcome Trust report, 2009). Accounts of counterfeit products 
abound (e.g., eggs, gum, airbags, etc.) Sabotage can generate serious consequences as 
well.  For example, Disney recalled 3.4 million videos of the animated film “The 
Rescuers” in 1999 because one “angry” employee tampered the video release versions 
by adding an obscene photograph in two frames (The New York Times, 1999). In 
another example of sabotage, Forbes' New York operations were shut down for two days 
as a former employee crashed five of the company's eight servers after being fired from a 
temporary position.  
Acts of terrorism can also be rather consequential and unfortunately there are 
many means that terrorists can use to inflict pain. Food poisoning could be one of the 
easiest and economically and psychologically most devastating. For example, in 1984, 
members of an Oregon religious commune tried to influence a local election by 
poisoning salad bars with salmonella bacteria to sicken voters. Although no one died, 
751 people became ill (Homeland Security Report, 2006). Lastly, SONY’s 2011 data 
breach is the most recent example of illicit use of data. The attack launched by a hacker 
cost the company approximately $171.4 million due to the theft of 77 million customer 
records. The company had to temporarily terminate its online services in order to locate 
the security breach. 
 49 
 
The list of possible sources of SCS breaches is current and rather exhaustive as it 
is based on a comprehensive review of the academic and practitioner literature. This 
thesis acknowledges however that the number of SCS breaches may increase in the 
future. Therefore, the definition is subject to refinements. Nevertheless Wacker (2004) 
and several other scholars (e.g., Hunt, 1991) suggest that definitions need to be improved 
as time passes by. In this sense, the proposed definition is advantageous because it can 
be easily expanded via adding new sources of SCS breaches.   
 
2.2.2.5 Supply Chain Security Management 
Beyond defining SCS, it is also critical that I define supply chain security 
management (SCSM). With SCS being defined as the outcome of security related 
activities, this thesis further defines SCSM as the collection of mechanisms 
organizations deploy to avert, cope, react to, and restore from breaches. The literature 
review has illustrated that the mechanisms deployed to improve supply chain security 
span the spectrum of O&SCM subareas—spanning from inventory management to 
customer relationships, from shipment management to organizational culture. Table 4 
summarizes these security efforts that have been explored in the supply chain security 
literature. 
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Table 4. Scope of SCSM 
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Atwater et 
al. (2010) 
                 
Autry & 
Bobbitt 
(2008) 
    √  √  √      √ √  
Bakshi & 
Gans 
(2010) 
√   √              
Bakshi et 
al. (2011) √   √              
Chao & 
Lin (2009) 
   √             √ 
Closs & 
McGarrell 
(2004) 
√ √ √ √ √ √  √  √ √  √   √  
Closs et al. 
(2008) 
      √     √      
Ekwall 
(2009) √     √            
Lee & 
Whang 
(2005) 
           √ √     
Lee & 
Wolfe 
(2003) 
            √     
Martens et 
al. (2011) 
              √   
Marucheck 
et al. 
(2011) 
           √    √  
Peleg-
Gillai et al. 
(2006) 
  √ √  √     √  √     
Prokop 
(2004) 
   √              
Reade 
(2009) 
         √        
Rice & 
Caniato 
(2003) 
√   √ √      √   √    
Rice & 
Spayd 
(2005) 
√ √ √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √  
Russell & 
Saldanha 
(2003) 
   √ √       √  √  √  
Sarathy 
(2006) 
           √    √  
Sheffi 
(2001) 
           √    √  
Sheu et al. 
(2006) 
   √        √    √  
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Table 4. continued 
Speier et 
al. (2011) 
       √          
Thibault et 
al. (2006) 
   √        √      
Voss et al. 
(2009a)  
               √  
Voss et al. 
(2009b)  
 √      √        √  
Whipple et 
al. (2009) 
       √        √  
Williams 
et al. 
(2009a) 
           √      
Williams 
et al. 
(2009b) 
        √         
 
 
 
Given the large scope of SCSM mechanisms, the definitions of SCS and SCSM 
alone may not be sufficient to help managers effectively organize their SCS related 
activities and implement appropriate SCS programs. For instance, the literature, industry 
reports, and professional standards (e.g., ISO 28000) have suggested a rather large 
number of SCSM mechanisms. These mechanisms sometimes require different levels of 
resources and varying managerial attention. For instance, additional security inspections 
could be easily achieved by adding technological devices and security staff, but the 
development of a security-oriented culture may demand intimate involvement from top 
management’s years of nurturing. As a result, managers may still have trouble about 
how to move forward with a comprehensive SCS plan given that clear definitions of 
SCS and SCSM are in place. A taxonomy of SCSM mechanisms can be instrumental in 
this regard: a taxonomy helps organize SCSM mechanisms into different classes such 
that managers may have a clear focus (e.g., implement one class of practices at a time) 
when it comes to SCS. A taxonomy would also benefit the academic community because 
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it allows for tests and comparisons of the effects of different classes of SCSM 
mechanism. Hence, I next propose an approach to develop a taxonomy of SCSM 
mechanisms. The fundamental rationale of this taxonomy lies in the similarities between 
a SCSM system and a human immune system. I start with a brief introduction of the 
human immune system.  
 
2.3 Linking the SCSM System to the Human Immune System: A Taxonomy 
This section provides a succinct account of the human immune system and its 
responses to infection caused by pathogens, bacteria, fungi, and other sources. The 
purpose of this section is to draw parallels between the human immune system and the 
SCSM system, and thus justify the use of the human immune system as a metaphor for 
the SCSM system. The review is by no means exhaustive. For more details about the 
human immune system, I refer the readers to Kaufmann, Medzhitov, and Gordon (2004), 
Parham (2005), Playfair and Bancroft (2004), and Segel and Cohen (2001). 
 
2.3.1 The Basics of the Human Immune System 
Immunology studies the physiological mechanisms that the human body uses to 
defend itself from invasion by other organisms. The immune system protects the body 
from threats (posed by, for example, pathogens) in a fashion that minimizes harm to the 
body and ensures its continued functioning. The origins of immunology studies reside in 
the practice of medicine and in historical observations that people who have survived the 
ravages of epidemic disease had become immune to infection. The human immune 
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system includes the innate immune system (part of the immune system which people are 
born with; it does not adapt to specific pathogens) and the adaptive immune system (part 
of the immune system that “learns” or adapts to recognize specific kinds of pathogens, 
and retains a “memory” of them to speed up future responses). The immune system is 
crucial to human survival. In the absence of a working immune system, even a grain of 
dust in the air can prove fatal.  
The human immune system and the SCSM system are alike. First of all, both 
systems are designed to secure the wellbeing of the entity that owns the system. The 
immune system defends the body from invasions by organisms. The SCSM system 
defends the supply chain and its operations from SCS breaches. Second, both systems 
are complex and display a multi-layered architecture. For instance, the immune system 
has multiple layers of keratinized cells, with defenses at many levels. The SCSM system 
holds a clear hierarchy where at each level (e.g., individual, team, firm, or chain level) 
there can be different responses to SCS breaches. Third, the two systems need to be 
tolerant. The immune system has a mechanism to tolerate itself (i.e., does not attack 
self—elements of the body). The SCSM system, while improving security, has to give 
considerations to efficiency such that SCSM mechanisms would not impede normal 
operations. Fourth, malfunctions of both systems can result in devastating consequences. 
A failure of the immune system can result in serious health problems and even death. 
Similarly if the SCSM system fails to respond to SCS breaches, severe operational and 
economic losses may ensue. Table 5 summarizes these similarities along with some 
other parallels between the human immune system and the SCSM system.  
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Table 5. Similarities between human immune system and SCSM system 
Similarities Human immune system SCSM system 
Purpose Defends the body from an invasion by other 
organisms. 
Defends the supply chain from disruptions caused by 
SCS breaches. 
Complexity The human immune system discriminates self 
(elements of the body) against non-self (foreign 
elements). Because there are so many patterns 
of these elements, the immune system has to 
distinguish a tremendous amount of patterns in 
non-self (on the order of 1016) to self patterns 
(on the order of 106).  
Firms sometimes have limited understanding of their 
own operations, let alone their supply chain. One 
firm usually serves multiple customers and 
connects with a huge number of suppliers. For 
example, HEB (the 7th largest grocery store 
chain in the U.S.) had more than 6,000 first-tier 
suppliers in 2012.  
Multi-layered The immune system has a multi-layered architecture, 
with defenses at many levels.  
Firms have a multi-layered architecture (i.e., 
individual, team, firm, or even supply chain 
level). Actions can be undertaken at each level.  
Tolerance The immune system has a mechanism to tolerate 
itself (i.e., does not attack self).  
Firms develop mechanisms such that SCSM 
mechanisms would not hurt the efficiency of 
operations.  
Severity Deficiencies of immune system can cause serious 
health problems and even death. 
SCS breaches can result in severe economic and 
operational losses. Some breaches may result in 
catastrophic failure.   
Learning & 
Memory 
The immune system can learn the structures of 
pathogens, and remember those structures, so 
that future responses to pathogens can be more 
efficient. 
Firms learn from previous experiences. They 
document how SCS breaches are detected and 
resolved such that they can react to similar 
breaches more effectively in the future. 
Swiftness The immune system must eliminate pathogens as 
quickly as possible so that the pathogens will 
not be able to replicate themselves and cause 
harm. 
Responses to new pathogens are slow, but to previous 
ones are fast. 
Firms have to resolve SCS breaches as soon as 
possible to ensure the business continuity and 
minimize potential economic losses. 
Responses to new challenges are slow, but to old ones 
are swift. 
“Intra-” issues Some pathogens live inside host cells and are not 
visible to white blood cells. The cells can collect 
fragments of proteins contained within the cell 
and transport them to the surface so that they are 
visible to the rest of the body. 
Firms promote management mechanisms such that 
“hidden”, internal security gaps such as 
employee sabotage can be prevented.   
 
 
In addition, the two systems are also akin to each other in terms of how they 
operate. 
 
2.3.1.1 Prevention 
First, the immune system is tailored to prevent invasion by foreign 
microorganisms. It generates a hostile environment, both physically and chemically, to 
deny access to most foreign microorganisms. For example, the skin can block most 
pathogens. If the pathogens break through the surface of the skin, layers of keratinized 
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cells under the surface of the skin form a tough impenetrable barrier of epithelium. In 
addition, physiological conditions, such as temperature, make the bodily environment 
notably hostile for “intruders.” These defensive actions are preventive in nature. The 
human immune system builds obstacles to prevent entry of outside microorganisms and 
thus inhibits bodily damage. Likewise, the SCSM system includes a number of 
preventive SCSM mechanisms to protect the supply chain. Firms hire guards and build 
fences around the facilities. They do background checks before hiring employees to 
assure that potential security glitches are minimized from the very beginning. They 
develop and publicize deterrence mechanisms whereby employees, supply chain 
partners, and the public at large may consider before they attempt to compromise the 
security of a supply chain system. In a nutshell, firms equip themselves with various 
preventive mechanisms in order to avert SCS breaches from emerging. 
 
2.3.1.2 Detection 
Second, the immune system actively detects “intruders” when toxic substances or 
pathogens evade the first layer of protection (i.e., prevention). The detection process is 
usually described as that of distinguishing “self” (elements of the body) from “nonself” 
(foreign microorganisms such as pathogens). Both the innate and adaptive immune 
systems can detect foreign microorganisms. The innate immune system consists of 
primarily a chemical response system called complement, and a phagocytic system 
involving roaming scavenger cells such as macrophages and phagocytes. These 
complement molecules and scavenger cells detect extracellular molecules and materials, 
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and thereby provide a quick response to infections: keep early infection in check. The 
adaptive immune system mainly consists of certain types of white blood cells (i.e., 
lymphocytes) which circulate around the body. A lymphocyte has on the order of 105 
receptors on its surface, which allow it to detect pathogens. A receptor can bind to 
pathogens whose epitope (which are locations on the surface of a pathogen) structures 
are complementary to the structure of the receptor. When the affinity (the strength of the 
bond between a receptor and an epitope) exceeds some threshold, a lymphocyte will be 
activated for further reaction (e.g., pathogen elimination). Similarly, the SCSM system 
must have detection mechanisms that can locate potential and existing SCS breaches, 
especially those intentionally conducted and carefully executed by, for example, 
terrorists. Firms may install surveillance equipment (e.g., cameras) at critical locations 
(e.g., warehouses) to detect illicit activities. They can utilize technologies to track the 
movement of products and materials. They can also establish a SCS review system such 
that they can regularly scrutinize the whole supply chain and subsequently detect 
anomalies. In some cases, firms even develop and cultivate a security-oriented 
organizational culture whereby employees can treat security as one of the top priorities 
and proactively detect supply chain security glitches. 
 
2.3.1.3 Reaction 
Third, once the invading pathogens, bacteria, and fungi are detected, the human 
immune system begins to react. For example, complement molecules of the innate 
immune system can help eliminate bacteria through lysis (the process whereby the 
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complement ruptures the bacterial membrane, resulting in the destruction of the 
bacterium) or opsonization (refers to the coating of bacteria with complement, enabling 
the bacteria to be detected by other cells such as macrophages). Macrophages also have 
receptors for certain kinds of bacteria and thus they detect and engulf those bacteria. The 
response of the adaptive system can be induced when the immune system detects a kind 
of pathogen it never encountered in the past. Once the adaptive immune system has 
identified an invader, the lymphocytes generate specific responses that are tailored to 
maximally eliminate the specific pathogens or pathogen infected cells. Specifically, B 
cells (one type of lymphocyte) respond to pathogens by producing large quantities of 
antibodies which then neutralize foreign objects. T cells (another type of lymphocyte, 
including helper T cells and cytotoxic T cells), on the other hand, produce (1) cytokines 
that direct the immune responses and (2) toxic granules that contain powerful enzymes 
which induce the death of pathogen infected cells. The innate immune responses are 
generally faster than adaptive immune responses as the adaptive immune system takes 
time to recognize “intruders” and organize defense. In the SCSM system, the reaction 
mechanism will be activated once SCS breaches are detected. Responses to some SCS 
breaches can be immediate while others may be slow. Responses to “typical” security 
challenges, such as the detection of illicit material loaded in a cargo container, are 
generally fast because there are well established procedures that handle cargo 
inspections. The reaction process is alike to the responses of the innate immune system 
which responds to pathogens it has seen before. Firms usually hold the cargo and 
conduct further inspection before releasing the cargo to a proven constituent. Responses 
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to “atypical” security challenges are, however, complicated. The reaction process to 
these problems is akin to the reaction of the adaptive immune system. Because these 
challenges are usually new and atypical to organizations, firms may lack experience and 
consequently need time to develop an effective response to these challenges. 
Nevertheless, firms document these SCS breaches such that future responses to similar 
breaches can be quite fast and effective.  
 
2.3.1.4 Restoration 
Lastly, the immune system promotes the restoration of the human body after 
infections have settled in the body. While detecting and destroying pathogens, 
components of both the innate and adaptive immune systems also assist other cells to 
recover from pathogen attacks. For example, the fluid layer of the immune system which 
contains glycoproteins, proteoglycans, and enzymes can help the internal tissues to 
recover. One of the functions of cytokines (signal molecules that transmit information 
between cells; also known as “hormones” of the immune system) is to stimulate the 
growth of surrounding cells when necessary.  Essentially, the immune system responses 
to foreign microorganisms are developed to restore the normal condition of the human 
physiological environment and ensure the continued functioning of the human body. 
Likewise the SCSM system has restoration mechanisms if SCS breaches do cause 
damage. A typical restoration mechanism is the so called disaster recovery plan which 
has been popularized in the last decade. For example, due to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, 
2001, the US government temporally closed the US-Canada border. Consequently, big 
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auto makers such as GM and Ford had to shut down some of their assembly lines due to 
material shortages. Nevertheless, their disaster recovery plans allowed them to quickly 
restore normal operations: Ford utilized air-freight to replenish inventories. GM, on 
other hand, shifted production from its Canadian plants to U.S. plants.  
Overall, both systems have to prevent, detect, and react to threats they face and 
help restore the functions to their original states. Yet, these parallels only partly illustrate 
the similarities between the two systems.  
 
2.3.2 Advanced Similarities between Human Immune System and SCSM System 
The human immune system and the SCSM system also share some advanced 
attributes. For example, both systems are not perfect and they need to evolve (adapt and 
learn) in order to keep functioning effectively. In addition, both systems do not simply 
respond to all threats but tend to be more attentive to those threats that can actually cause 
damage. These advanced similarities are summarized in table 6 and discussed below. 
 
 
Table 6. Advanced similarities between human immune system and SCSM system 
Similarities Human immune system SCSM system 
Evolution The human immune system evolves to generate a new 
lymphocyte repertoire in order to combat the 
large number of bacteria 
 
The SCSM system evolves to handle new SCS 
breaches.  
Selective 
Responses 
The human immune system only responds to harmful 
non-self. 
 
The SCSM system tends to respond to SCS breaches 
that can cause substantive disruptions. 
Latent Breaches Opportunistic pathogens hidden in the human body 
can cause serious health problems when the 
body is compromised. 
Many SCS breaches are latent and only present 
themselves under certain circumstances.  
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2.3.2.1 Evolution 
All humans are susceptible to a variety of infectious diseases, especially when 
young. This is because the immune system takes time to build its strongest responses to 
invading organisms. Even the strongest immune system cannot guarantee that all 
invading organisms can be effectively eliminated. Likewise, a supply chain is also 
always “vulnerable” even when its SCSM system is functioning. Firms generally face 
new SCS challenges whenever they change their supply chain configurations due to 
business needs. For example, adding or eliminating a warehouse can result in significant 
rerouting of shipments. The logistics managers have to consider if the new routes will 
pass through regions where security is a big threat (e.g., northern Mexico) and 
consequently prepare to face new SCS challenges. To solve this problem, both systems 
have to evolve. 
The immune system is a highly evolved biological system. Because detection is 
carried out by binding with foreign molecules, the immune system must have a 
sufficiently large number of diverse lymphocyte receptors to ensure that at least some 
lymphocytes bind to any given pathogen. Generating a sufficiently diverse repertoire is 
however a problem. Tonegawa (1983) has estimated that there are at most 10
8
 different 
varieties of lymphocyte receptors. Yet there can be over 10
16
 different pathogen 
epitopes. There will be insufficient repertoire diversity to bind to every single possible 
pathogen. This problem is exacerbated as pathogens are likely to evolve to evade 
detection from the existing repertoire. For example, there are many cases where 
pathogens have developed molecules that fool the immune system by binding to 
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endogenous receptors (Matzinger, 1998). In an attempt to address this problem, the 
immune system conducts continual turnover of lymphocytes: each day approximately 
10
7
 new lymphocytes are generated (Osmond, 1993). It takes only 10 days to generate a 
completely new lymphocyte repertoire. Over time, this turnover of lymphocytes along 
with immune memory enhances the protection provided by the human immune system. 
The SCSM system adapts to changing SCS threats through dynamic protection. 
Firms usually conduct regular training in order to keep up with the state-of-the-art SCS 
techniques and knowledge. They also learn from other firms located in the same industry 
via continuous benchmarking. Professional organizations, such as ISO, and many 
security service providers, launch guidelines and reports of best SCSM mechanisms. 
Firms can actively update their SCSM knowledge and skills such that they may 
effectively respond to SCS breaches they’ve never met before. Moreover, firms can also 
document historical security events and maintain a database for learning purposes. These 
actions allow them to initiate fast responses to SCS breaches if similar breaches have 
occurred before. Firms are able to “refresh” the SCSM system periodically and thus 
provide dynamic protection for the supply chain.  
 
2.3.2.2 Selective Responses 
The human immune system also responds to threats selectively. In order to 
eliminate foreign organisms, the immune system must be able to distinguish between 
foreign molecules (or antigens) and the molecules that constitute self. In immunology, 
this capability is described through the classic expanded self-nonself (SNS) model 
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(Janeway, 1989, 1992).  The Expanded-SNS model assumes that the immune system is 
turned outward, responding to exogenous signals that represent one or another form of 
non-self. However, evidence has been accumulating that many foreign microorganisms 
are not harmful. The immunology response to eliminate them may actually cause 
damage to the body (Segel and Cohen, 2001). Under such conditions, it would be 
healthier not to respond. Thereby, it would be more accurate to say that the immune 
system is actually distinguishing between harmful non-self and everything else. 
Consequently, a complementary and competing model—the Danger model—was 
developed. In contrast to the expanded SNS model, the Danger model holds that the 
immune system is governed from within, responding to endogenous signals that 
originate from stressed or injured cells (Matzinger, 1994, 1998). In other words, the 
Danger model assumes that what really matters, from an evolutionary point of view, is 
whether the entity causes damage or not.  
In some cases, the Danger model can effectively explain certain phenomena that 
the Expanded-SNS model cannot. For example, the Expanded-SNS model predicts that 
all foreign organisms will be eliminated by the human immune system. In reality, for 
example, transplants are usually rejected (by the human immune system) while tumors 
are not. A skin graft administered to a burn patient, for example, is an attempt to help, 
not cause injury. However, the injury is unavoidable. The process of transplanting a 
tissue involves surgical procedures that result in tissue damage and ischemic cell death 
and such damage will generate alarm signals that activate immune responses. Tumors, 
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on the other hand, do not cause damage (at least in the short term), and thus are tolerated 
by the body. 
This logic also applies in the SCSM arena. The general purpose of SCSM 
mechanisms is to deny all kinds of SCS breaches. But some breaches, while hurtful, may 
not really affect firm performance—materially cause “damage”. For example, firms 
purchase insurance policies to protect their assets. When damaged assets are insured, 
firms barely suffer losses. Launching SCS initiatives to respond to these breaches may 
actually cost them more. Consequently, it is more efficient not to respond. This logic is 
further supported when I interviewed a supply chain manager from a Fortune 500 
electronics manufacturer: “We know that some of our trucks were stolen in Mexico. But 
the insurance covers these losses. As long as the number of lost trucks is below a certain 
number, we do nothing and let it go.”  In other words, the SCSM system (in many cases) 
is designed to respond to only threats that can cause substantive damage. 
 
2.3.2.3 Sleeping and Latent Breaches 
While the human immune system proactively detects threats, certain types of 
pathogens can actively avoid detection and elimination because they are conditionally 
harmless. For example, some pathogens do not harm its host (e.g., the human body) 
under normal conditions but can cause illness when the host’s resistance is low. These 
pathogens are called opportunistic pathogens because a compromised human immune 
system presents "opportunities" for these pathogens to infect. Examples of opportunistic 
pathogens include candida albicans, staphylococcus aureus, and pseudomonas 
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aeruginosa. They are analogous to “sleeping bombs.” If a healthy host becomes sick, 
these opportunistic pathogens can be triggered and worsen the health problem the host 
faces. In a similar vein, some SCSM breaches are “sleeping” and only present 
themselves under certain circumstances. For example, a theft of a truckload of raw 
material may cause temporal disruption of material supplies. When firms operate under 
normal conditions, they usually have inventory buffers and thus they may not even 
acknowledge the seriousness of these temporal SCS breaches due to the minor impact 
these breaches have. When the inventory level is low or the manufacturing system is 
lumpish (i.e., low flexibility), however, these SCS breaches may cause devastating 
results, leading to shortages of major products during their growth windows (Norrman 
and Jansson, 2004).  
Some other types of pathogens, on the other hand, are able to actively hide 
themselves. These pathogens are intracellular pathogens which live inside the host cells. 
They are not “visible” to lymphocyte B cells because all that the B cells can observe is 
the outside of the host cell. The intracellular pathogens force the human immune system 
to look inside host cells through MHC molecules (which function like transporters that 
can carry the fragments of viral proteins to the cell surface). Likewise, the SCSM system 
also faces several hidden SCS breaches and needs to look inside. For example, most 
thieves are either employees or conspire with employees (Walsh, 2000). Those 
employees are usually familiar with their firms’ security systems thereby may be able to 
cover their crimes effectively. In short, both the human immune system and the SCSM 
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system face latent threats which are difficult to detect and identify. These threats may be 
harmless in normal conditions but can potentially generate serious problems.  
Admittedly, I cannot illustrate all aspects of the two systems in detail. The human 
immune system is vastly more complex than portrayed so far. So is the SCSM system. 
Nevertheless their similarities are apparent. Both systems have the same goal and share 
the same responding and operating principles. Therefore, it is safe to bring the 
classification of immunological responses (Kaufmann, Medzhitov, and Gordon, 2004; 
Parham, 2005; Playfair and Bancroft, 2004) to the purview of SCSM. This study thereby 
proposes a taxonomy of SCSM mechanisms that apportions these mechanisms into four 
classes: prevention, detection, reaction, and restoration (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. A taxonomy of SCSM mechanisms 
 
 
One caveat worth noting is that these four classes of SCSM mechanism are not 
independent. Rather, they are highly intertwined and function simultaneously. For 
example, while detecting and eliminating (i.e., reacting) foreign microorganisms, the 
innate immune system also produces certain proteins, called interferons, to inhibit viral 
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replication, which is a typical preventive action. Likewise, in the SCSM system, the 
employee who detects a SCS breach could also be the first one who reacts to that breach. 
The taxonomy proposed here is one of the possible ways to organize SCSM 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, this four-class taxonomy appears to be a valid and efficient 
approach to categorize the scattered SCSM mechanisms. It allows the thesis to develop a 
set of testable hypotheses that address the rest of the research questions which may 
eventually advance our understanding and help managers resolve SCS breaches. 
 
2.4 Four Cases Studies 
 In order to further justify the definition of SCS and the taxonomy of SCSM 
mechanisms, four in-depth case studies were undertaken. The four case studies allowed 
me to learn, from a practitioner’s perspective, what SCS meant and whether or not the 
proposed taxonomy was a valid representation. These case studies also enabled me to 
build a better understanding of what SCSM mechanisms firms implement to prevent 
(detect, react to, or restore from) SCS breaches and what performance dimensions firms 
cared about most. The findings of the case studies were used to help develop testable 
hypotheses in the next chapter. 
 
2.4.1 Sampling, Data Collection, and Analysis 
 This dissertation adopted a grounded theory building approach (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990). Specifically, the principles of theory building based on case studies were 
adopted (Eisenhardt, 1989; McCutcheon and Meridith, 1993; Yin, 1994). Case studies 
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are appropriate as supply chain security is a relatively new research area (McCutcheon 
and Meridith, 1993; Yin, 1994).  
I took a theoretical sampling approach to identify companies for this study. The 
initial list included companies from four different industries: Food and Beverage, IT & 
Electronics, Manufacturing, and Retailing. Food and Beverage producers may be quite 
sensitive to SCS breaches because their products can directly affect the public health. 
The retailing industry is also of interest because firms in this industry directly interact 
with consumers. IT & Electronics companies signify the high-tech industry while 
manufacturing companies represent firms in the traditional manufacturing sectors. Such 
selection of firms was meant to go beyond the analysis of “low hanging fruit” (i.e., 
something that everyone does; Walley and Whiehead, 1994) and acknowledge that 
companies in certain industries are more vulnerable to different SCS breaches than 
others and, therefore, those companies may have implemented SCSM mechanisms at 
greater levels. In addition, selecting firms across various industries helped me to create a 
more representative sample from which I can generalize findings. The literature also 
suggests that firm size may have rather strong effects on organizational behaviors (e.g., 
Pagell et al., 2004). Therefore, I purposefully selected companies with various sizes. The 
sample includes large multinational companies with global supply chains and 
small/middle size local companies. This mix allowed me to examine the research 
questions from a broad spectrum of settings. 
Ten companies were initially invited to participate in this study. Not all of them 
agreed to participate in part because security matters are considered confidential and 
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their policies do not allow employees to divulge any useful information. Nevertheless, I 
secured one company from each of the four industries to participate in the study. Data 
from the four companies were eventually collected and analyzed. One additional 
company was willing to provide us access and in fact we conducted interviews with 
several executives. However, that company is a logistics security service provider and 
does not do any production itself. Therefore, I opted not to include the findings in this 
study as the company may not be comparable to the rest of the participants.  
Eisenhardt (1989) suggested that neither too few nor too many cases were 
conducive to good qualitative research. A number of four to ten companies is generally 
appropriate. A sample of four companies allows me to generalize the findings while 
keeping the data analysis cognitively manageable. Table 7 provides the profiles of 
participating companies. At the request of the participants, I used fictitious names to 
assure anonymity. Data were collected during 2011 and 2013. 
 
Table 7. Sampled companies 
Company Industry Interviewee Size Ownership Major Business 
Master Baker Food & Beverage General manager & quality 
assurance manager 
 
Small Private Produces bakery items 
for over 2,500 fast 
food outlets 
Seal Maker Manufacturing Plant manager Medium Public Manufactures remote 
seals for the oil 
and gas industry  
 
Electronics Savvy IT & Electronics Global supply chain 
security manager 
Very 
Large 
Public Manufactures electronic 
products for the 
consumer market 
 
Retail Guru Retailing A group of eight 
managers/directors 
Large Private Sells national brand and 
private label 
products to 
consumers 
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To answer the research questions, a semi-structured interview protocol was 
developed (see Appendix A). The protocol called for multiple respondents who had 
responsibility of SCS from multiple functional areas. Therefore, whenever possible, a 
group of managers were interviewed. Interviewing multiple respondents allowed me to 
triangulate the data. In general, each interview lasted about 2-3 hours. To understand the 
role of institutional pressures to adopt SCSM mechanisms, I examined relevant 
legislation regarding SCS for each industry I investigated. I also gathered information 
about the history as well as the evolution of SCSM in these companies. The information 
I collected shed light on managerial motives and company strategy. Interviewees were 
asked, whenever possible, to provide real examples regarding SCSM in their companies.
 Data were collected by at least two researchers at all four companies (two at Seal 
Maker and Electronics Savvy; three at Master Baker and Retail Guru). Except for the 
Master Baker, the interviews were recorded and later transcribed. While Master Baker’s 
policy did not all me to record the interviews, detailed notes were taken by three 
researchers. I also collected archival data from company websites and reports published 
by government agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration. Data collection did 
not stop until I reached a saturation point where additional data would not help answer 
the research questions (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
I first performed within-case analysis following the procedures advocated by 
Miles and Huberman (1984). The coding was conducted iteratively. First, all 
interviewers individually coded the data. We then compared the coded data to assure 
consistency. Disagreements were identified. Discussions followed in order to resolve 
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these disagreements. This process led to clarification of the constructs and assured that 
the inter-rater reliability between the two coders was 100%. The within-case analysis 
allowed me to gain a broad understanding of the operations of each company’s supply 
chain. I then determined how each company generates revenue and the impact of SCS 
breaches on their operational/financial performance. I also explored how companies 
incorporate SCSM mechanisms into their decision-making through within-case analysis. 
Interviewees were probed specifically about which performance dimensions their 
company cared about most, when SCS breaches could significantly affect their 
company’s performance, and what benefits their company has experienced by 
implementing SCSM mechanisms. I further asked managers how they managed trade-
offs to make decisions. Analysis of multiple examples provided by managers shed light 
on decision patterns within each firm. Finally, cross-case analysis was conducted to 
identify common themes as to how firms handle SCS breaches, evaluate performance, 
and balance the potentially competing needs to be profitable and secure. The findings are 
presented in the next section. 
 
2.4.2 Findings 
2.4.2.1 The Definition of SCS 
 Three out of four companies (Seal Maker, Electronics Savvy, and Retail Guru) 
explicitly state that supply chain security and supply chain safety are different concepts. 
For them, supply chain safety mainly refers to accidents that are related to Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) recordables. The safety issue is narrowly 
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defined as production safety and prevention of injuries. Safety management is primarily 
about activities which can avert accidents that are proven detrimental to employee 
health. The fourth company, Master Baker, considers that food security and food safety 
are highly intertwined with each other. The managers expressed that they implemented 
practices to improve both food security and food safety. Nonetheless, all managers in my 
sample share the opinion that the concept of supply chain security is more complicated 
than supply chain safety. 
The Electronics Savvy global supply chain security manager stated that: “in our 
industry, company from company is different. For some competitors security is nothing 
but physical security. At Electronics Savvy, we have a chief security officer … within 
his chief security officer’s responsibilities is physical security, IT security, executive 
protection, and federal security. Here at Electronics Savvy we have to exhibit 
compliance with all responsibilities. We do the physical aspect of it, which is buildings, 
processes, and people. The federal security crosses lots of the assurances, quality 
assurance, the contamination, and our government customer’s [requirement of 
assurance] because we are providing them pretty sophisticated machineries for their, you 
know, processes. When XXX (the chief security officer) comes here, because he comes 
from very IT savvy background, we have this IT security…”  At Retail Guru, the 
procurement director of own brand products stated that “in our cases all of the world is 
adulterated. There is lots of food adulteration, economic adulteration…at Retail Guru, 
we have food, we have consumer products, that makes it more even challenging to be 
able to manage both (i.e., food and consumer products) to meet the [legislative] 
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regulations… we also have thefts and counterfeit products…” Indeed, all managers in 
the sample concur that SCS is not something that can be easily described. 
After soliciting the managers’ description of SCS, I also provided my definition 
and probed their opinions about it. I find that managers acknowledge that they do face 
various SCS breaches from different sources. There is no single “correct path” for them 
to deal with all SCS breaches. Instead of extracting common attributes among a variety 
of SCS breaches in order to decipher what SCS is, borrowing the concept of “zero 
defects” from Total Quality Management and defining SCS as “zero defense breaches” 
is efficient and valid to them.  
As far as the sources of SCS breaches are concerned, I find that some sources are 
common to companies irrespective of their industry membership (see table 8). Theft and 
counterfeit product are common SCS challenges for all companies in the sample. For 
example, Electronics Savvy had three large cargo thefts recorded in the last 12 months. 
Master Baker and Seal Maker both experienced employee theft. Retail Master stated that 
theft was one of the most important reasons of inventory write-off. On the other hand, 
companies in the sample also experienced unique SCS challenges. For instance, Retail 
Guru reported that they received adulterated tomato sauce in the past. Investigation of 
that problem revealed that it was caused by a supplier’s double sourcing activity. Seal 
Maker stated that the company had confidential data stolen in their Beijing branch. Seal 
Maker also indicated that the company experienced employee sabotage in the past. 
Companies in the sample never experienced smuggling or terrorist attack problems. But 
all the managers agree that the two are potential sources of SCS breaches. Three 
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companies explained that they never encountered a smuggling problem partly because 
their supply contracts stipulated controls over smuggling. The fourth company, Master 
Baker, purchased raw materials mainly from local suppliers.  
Overall, the analysis demonstrates that the definition of SCS I proposed is valid 
to practitioners. The sources of SCS breaches are rather comprehensive. All potential 
sources managers in my sample experienced or they could think of are included in the 
list of sources I provided.    
 
Table 8. SCS breaches encountered by each company 
Company Theft Adulteration Smuggling Counterfeit 
products 
Sabotage Terrorist 
attacks 
Illicit data 
acquisition 
Master Baker √ √ N/A √ N/A N/A N/A 
Seal Maker √ N/A N/A √ √ N/A √ 
Electronics 
Savvy 
√ N/A N/A √ N/A N/A N/A 
Retailing Guru √ √ N/A √ N/A N/A N/A 
 
 
2.4.2.2 The Institutional Antecedents of SCSM Mechanisms 
 Managers in the sample share the sentiment that their companies have to deal 
with institutional pressures as it relates to supply chain security. Within-case analysis 
suggests that an individual firm may not experience all five institutional pressures 
simultaneously. Cross-case analysis, on the other hand, demonstrates that each 
institutional pressure is present in at least one of the four cases. The five institutional 
pressures appear to capture a board spectrum of factors that motivate companies to 
adopt/implement SCSM mechanisms.  
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Master Baker 
Master Baker states that customer pressure is the most impactful institutional 
pressure to them. Over 90% of its business comes from a single customer which is a 
large fast food chain. That customer requires Master Baker to implement a number of 
SCS related practices in order to protect the entire chain. For example, the Master Baker 
had to implement Global Food Security Initiatives developed by the specific customer 
by the end of 2012 otherwise the customer would disrupt the relationship which was 
built for several years. As the general manager of Master Baker put it, “we do whatever 
they ask us to do.” Nevertheless, customer pressure is not the only institutional pressure 
they experience. The quality assurance manager from Master Baker stated that “Now, 
almost all firms [in my industry] do pretty much the same thing [as it relates to SCS] 
because of competition.” Master Baker continuously monitors its competitors and 
implements what the industry labels as “best practices”. Legislative requirements issued 
by government authorities, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), are also adhered to closely at Master Baker. As the 
same quality assurance manager stated, “technically, USDA can send an inspector to our 
facility any time during operations.”   
Normative pressure appears to be trivial for Master Baker. Master Baker does 
implement SCSM standards/programs. They developed and implemented a Food 
Defense Program which is an initiative that coordinates all safety and security related 
activities within the organization. However, this program is not developed based on 
industry or professional norms but rather is adapted from the major customer’s supplier 
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requirements. Master Baker is also concerned about financial/operational performance 
as it relates to SCS. Yet performance pressure is not a strong motivator for the company 
to implement SCSM mechanisms. The general manager agreed that SCSM mechanisms 
may help improve efficiency, but stated: “we usually adopt security related practices 
because XXX (the major customer) asks for it. We do it even when it will hurt our 
efficiency.”  
 
Seal Maker 
Seal Maker faces little institutional pressure. The company was acquired by a 
large strategic business unit (SBU) of a Fortune 500 company in the early 1990s. Seal 
Maker used to be a major supplier of that SBU. After acquisition, Seal Maker switched 
from an external supplier to an internal supplier. All major customers of Seal Maker are 
100% owned by the same SBU. While the company still sells products to trade 
customers, over 90% of its business comes from sister companies. Consequently, Seal 
Maker has very stable customer demand. The company does not experience strong peer 
pressure primarily because there is literally no competition at all. In-depth discussions 
further revealed that the company faces little competition in part because they are one of 
the two leading companies in that particular industry segment, and in part because a 
sizeable number of large firms produce remote seals in house, and, therefore, the market 
demand can only sustain a relatively small number of suppliers.  
Customer pressure is relatively weak for Seal Maker. The impact from customers 
appears to be inconsequential because most customers are internal. The parent company 
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also coordinates the supply and demand between Seal Maker and its sister companies, 
which further weakens the customer’s ability to impact Seal Maker. The manager at Seal 
Maker expresses no concern about performance outcomes as well. The parent company 
entitles Seal Maker to set prices for its products as long as these prices fall into a 
reasonable range. As mentioned before, there are only a small number of players in the 
remote seal production segment. Therefore, few norms exist. The only salient 
institutional pressure for Seal Maker is from government. Nevertheless, the parent 
company has a well-constructed compliance program and all Seal Maker needs to do is 
to fulfill those requirements listed in that program. In short, Seal Maker perceives little 
institutional pressure to improve SCS. This finding is consistent to another finding that 
the company implemented fewer SCSM mechanisms when compared with other 
companies in my sample, which will be discussed in section 2.4.2.3 and 2.4.2.4. 
 
Electronics Savvy 
  Electronics Savvy is one of the largest consumer electronics manufacturers in 
the world. It produces a variety of consumer electronic devices with global presence. As 
an industry leader who explores new technologies and manufactures state-of-the-art 
devices, Electronics Savvy is quite cognizant of legislation regarding supply chain 
security. Electronics Savvy is one of the first companies who adopted the C-TPAT 
program when it was introduced in 2001 right after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It is also 
among the first companies who earned a C-TPAT tier-3 certification (the highest level). 
The global SCS manager at Electronics Savvy explained that his company implemented 
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all necessary practices to assure every single governmental regulation regarding supply 
chain security was fulfilled. 
Electronics Savvy perceives rather strong customer pressure. A large portion of 
Electronics Savvy’s business is government (federal state). These customers require high 
levels of IT security because a sizable volume of privilege information is stored in their 
electronic devices. In order to enhance IT security, these customers pressure Electronics 
Savvy to manage its supply chain to avert potential SCS breaches such as “pre-
installation” of phishing software or counterfeit parts. The company has been working 
closely with its customers to ensure SCS. The global SCS manager explicitly stated that 
the company had to do a good job in order to satisfy its customers.  
While competition in the consumer electronics market is intense, Electronics 
Savvy surprisingly faces relatively little peer pressure as it relates to SCS. Detailed 
discussions with the global SCS manager from this company revealed that competition 
in the consumer electronics market is primarily driven by price and innovation. How 
peers revamp their SCS related operations is less impactful to the company. Electronics 
Savvy rarely implements SCSM mechanisms simply because its competitors have done 
so. As an industry leader, Electronics Savvy is not only a pioneer adopter of 
occupational standards but also a drafter of those standards. Owing to its active role in 
developing industry and professional norms, the company does not feel obligated to 
abide by normative pressure.  
The global SCS manager at Electronics Savvy suggests that the company 
implements SCSM mechanisms in order to reduce losses. The company recorded three 
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cargo thefts in the last fiscal year. Due to the high average value of its products, any 
cargo theft can easily cost Electronics Savvy millions of dollars. In order to reduce theft, 
the company installed advanced tracking devices on its products during shipment. On 
top of reduction of losses, Electronics Savvy experienced several collateral benefits. For 
example, those advanced devices can tell exactly how many items in a container were 
touched by outsiders, if that container was stolen. Electronics Savvy has taken advantage 
of this technology and shipped a recovered container (about half of the items in that 
container were gone) to a customer to partly fulfill customer demand.  
 
Retail Guru 
 Retail Guru is one of the top food/department store chains in the United States. 
The company has been in operation for more than 100 years. Besides selling national 
brand products, Retail Guru has more than ten manufacturing plants producing close to 
15,000 own brand items. The company also has its own fleet, consisting of hundreds of 
tractors and trailers. Since a significant volume of business involves food and drugs, the 
company is very sensitive to SCS breaches. Retail Guru is also one of the earliest 
adopters of the C-TPAT programs. In 2005, the company earned C-TPAT tier-3 
certification. It even has a designated C-TPAT compliance manager who specifically 
handles issues regarding the implementation of that program. The interviews with eight 
managers in the company indicate that, owing to its proactive strategy toward 
compliance, the company does not perceive government pressure as a headache as many 
other companies do. 
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 Retail Guru’s customers are final consumers. These consumers may directly 
affect Retail Guru’s reputation by expressing their opinions through social media (e.g., 
posting reviews on Facebook about product quality) either in favor of or against the firm. 
Managers at Retail Guru care about their company’s brand equity more than anything 
else. To them, the company earns its current reputation through more than 100 year’s 
hard work. To protect their brand equity, they deployed very strict SCS standards 
throughout the supply chain, even when these standards may hurt the delivery 
performance. As the director of global sourcing stated, the company had delays in cargo 
shipments every month due to extensive security inspections. 
 Competition is rather intense in the retail industry because customers can easily 
find the same or almost identical products from competing retail chains. The profit 
margin could be as low as 1% and hovers around 2-3%. Owing to such thin margins, 
Retail Guru never treats supply chain security lightly. For example, if Retail Guru could 
successfully reduce losses caused by SCS security breaches (e.g., employee theft) by one 
cent for each dollar of sales, the company would have doubled its profit margin. To 
demonstrate their SCSM efforts, the sourcing director of own brand products shared with 
us a long list of detailed SCSM requirements demanded of their suppliers. He further 
explained that the company was willing to learn from outside sources to improve SCS. 
Best practices invented by competitors would be introduced to the company periodically. 
For example, Retail Guru developed an internal, web-based training system called 
“Retail Guru” University. Employees are required to take training on the system in order 
to keep their skills up-to-date. Such information suggests that Retail Guru is affected by 
 80 
 
both performance pressure and peer pressure. Nevertheless, learning from peers is meant 
to improve performance at Retail Guru.  
 Managers at Retail Guru do not perceive norms as a pressure for them to 
implement SCSM mechanisms. Discussion among several Retail Guru managers 
demonstrates that because the company has been in operation for more than 100 years, it 
is well embedded in the environment and adopted various norms in the past. One 
intriguing finding related to its long history of operation is that the company cares about 
its reputation so seriously such that the company sometimes sacrifices its profit to 
enhance SCS. One example was provided by the director of global sourcing. A shipping 
container of Retail Guru’s branded ketchup usually costs the company less than $5,000. 
It is not financially justified to install any form of security device to protect such 
products. However, the company employs advanced tracking devices on all shipments of 
such products simply because such items are vulnerable to a variety of SCS breaches 
which can be rather consequential to the brand equity of the firm. This finding indicates 
that Retail Guru believes SCS is critical to the company’s sustainability, which is usually 
considered as a performance measure from a long term perspective. 
 
2.4.2.3 The Taxonomy of SCSM Mechanisms 
The managers from all four companies agree that a taxonomy is a novel tool to 
help manage SCS breaches and believe the taxonomy I proposed provides them with a 
new perspective to review their SCSM efforts. Having said that, managers in my sample 
rarely thought about which taxon a given SCSM mechanism should be attributed to. 
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Therefore, clarification questions were asked when discussing specific SCSM 
mechanisms in order to ensure that the researchers and the managers share the same 
opinion with respect to a given mechanism’s ascription.  
In addition, many SCSM mechanisms were embedded in higher level SCSM 
programs (e.g., the Global Food Security Initiatives at Master Baker) and managers 
tended to communicate their SCSM efforts through these programs rather than specific 
mechanisms. In order to uncover which SCSM mechanism was implemented at each 
firm and thus allow for cross-case analysis, I prepared a list of SCSM mechanisms 
extracted from the literature (Lee and Whang, 2005; Mena et al., 2009; Williams et al., 
2009a), industry reports (Closs and McGarrell, 2004; Peleg-Gillai and Bhat, 2006; Rice 
and Spay, 2005), and professional certifications (e.g., ISO 2800; ISO 31000). Whenever 
I felt a mechanism listed was implemented by a firm but the manager(s) from that firm 
never mentioned it, I would point it out in order to attain clarification. Such list was 
deemed helpful. Typical responses after my question were: “Yes, we did it. It (the 
practice) is part of our XXX program/initiative.” or “We did not do the same thing, but it 
is very similar to our XXX.” 
Table 9 summarizes the SCSM mechanisms the four companies have 
implemented organized by class. I find that neither do companies treat all SCSM 
mechanisms equally nor do those SCSM mechanisms contribute to performance equally. 
Each company has its own focus regarding the implementation of SCSM mechanisms. 
These SCSM mechanisms are discussed below.  
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Table 9. SCSM mechanisms implemented by the four companies 
 Master Baker Seal Maker Electronics Savvy Retail Guru 
Prevention Developed a proactive 
strategy  
Selected only pre-
approved suppliers 
Secured containers at 
manufacturing area 
Selected only pre-
approved suppliers 
Developed a proactive 
strategy  
Selected qualified 
suppliers 
Conducted background 
checks before hiring 
employees  
Developed a proactive 
strategy  
Selected qualified 
suppliers 
Conducted background 
checks before hiring 
employees 
Developed supplier code 
of conduct with respect 
to SCS 
 
Detection Monitored 
loading/unloading 
process 
Conducted processes to 
notify supply chain 
partners in times of 
crisis 
Notified supply chain 
partners about SCS 
breaches 
Developed internal 
quality management 
standards 
Installed surveillance 
systems 
Notified supply chain 
partners about SCS 
breaches 
Used sophisticated 
detection technologies  
Conducted periodic 
assessment of suppliers 
Monitored 
loading/unloading 
process 
Installed a surveillance 
system 
Monitored suppliers across 
tiers 
Notified supply chain 
partners about SCS 
breaches 
Synthesized information 
regarding SCS breaches 
Conducted periodic 
assessments of suppliers 
 
Reaction Cross-trained employees 
Established 
communication 
channels with suppliers 
Maintained backup 
machines and 
inventories (primarily 
raw material) 
Cross-trained employees 
Developed multiple 
supply sources 
Established 
communication 
channels with suppliers 
and 3rd party security 
service providers 
Designated a quick 
reaction force for SCS 
breaches 
Used interchangeable 
parts as a strategy to 
deal with SCS breaches 
Designed flexible 
contracts with suppliers 
 
Cross-trained employees 
Developed multiple supply 
sources 
Specified reaction code 
when a SCS crisis 
emerges 
Established 
communication 
channels with suppliers 
and 3rd party security 
service providers 
Designated top manager(s) 
/ a group of employees 
to manage SCS 
breaches 
Cultivated a culture that 
rewards SCSM efforts 
Restoration Maintained strategic 
inventory (primarily 
raw material) 
Learned from mistakes 
Developed a recovery plan 
for potential SCS 
breaches 
[The parent company] 
developed a recovery 
plan for potential SCS 
breaches 
Developed a recovery 
plan for potential SCS 
breaches 
Developed a business 
continuity plan 
Pre-arranged restoration 
processes 
Utilized alternative supply 
sources 
Used standard parts 
Developed a recovery plan 
for potential SCS 
breaches 
Pre-arranged restoration 
processes 
Utilized alternative supply 
sources 
 
Note:  Information sources: interviews and archive data. 
 
At Master Baker, the company has a very proactive strategy toward SCS 
breaches. The general manager at Master Baker possesses a rather strong perception that 
 83 
 
“security (i.e., raw material/product protection) overrides quality (i.e., taste of the 
product).” He has been working with the company for 30 years and he claimed “we 
cannot afford security problems anymore.” He led the implementation of the Food 
Defense Program initiative at Master Baker which coordinates almost all SCS related 
activities. Under this proactive strategy, Master Baker has deployed a very strict supplier 
selection system that allows them to select only qualified suppliers, which averts the 
company sourcing from unreliable material sources. Master Baker requires staff to have 
security codes in order to access its manufacturing/warehousing facilities. The company 
also has surveillance systems and actively monitors the entire manufacturing and 
warehousing area. Outsiders (e.g., representatives from suppliers) have to wear red hats 
such that they can be easily identified. In order to effectively react to SCS breaches, 
Master Baker cross-trains its employees so that they can operate different machines for 
different product lines. The company also established a communication system to ensure 
commands/instructions from the top are clear when a crisis emerges. Master Baker 
maintains a 3.5 million dollar strategic inventory of raw materials. It allows the company 
to restore operations on the aftermath of a SCS disruption. Learning from previous SCS 
breaches enhances the company’s ability to reinstate operations as well. 
Seal Maker considers material quality management the most critical component 
of their SCSM system. Defective raw material is the only reason that the company 
suffered from substantive losses in the last few years. While defective parts were not 
exclusively caused by SCS breaches such as counterfeit products, Seal Maker 
established very strict supplier selection criteria and performed material screening 
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processes to ensure all materials received were authentic. The company also installed 
redundant equipment as a mechanism to deal with supply chain disruptions caused by 
SCS breaches. Nevertheless, due to little perceived institutional pressure and few SCS 
breaches encountered in the past, Seal Maker has implemented a very limited set of 
SCSM mechanisms as compared to the other companies I studied. 
Electronics Savvy is well-known in the industry owing to its very success on 
inventory management. However, this does not imply that the company is immune from 
losses caused by SCS breaches such as cargo theft. Electronics Savvy has a well-
established surveillance system installed around its plants and warehouses. Advanced 
technologies, such as metal detectors, are also installed at entries and exits of 
manufacturing facilities. Tracking devices are also installed on all cargo shipments. 
Electronics Savvy is aiming to detect SCS breaches effectively but also to deter them.  
In order to react to SCS breaches, communication is vital for Electronics Savvy. 
A SCS breach must be reported to a responsible regional SCS manager within an hour. 
That manager will then provide a brief report to the global security officer within four 
hours. After that, a final and formal report will be prepared by both the global SCS 
manager and other parties involved in that SCS breach. The final report must be 
submitted within 24 hours along with detailed damage estimation and activities 
undertaken to deal with the SCS breach. Such communication mechanism allows 
Electronics Savvy to swiftly respond to SCS breaches and mitigate potential losses. The 
company also develops multiple supply sources and uses interchangeable parts as a 
strategy to deal with SCS breaches. The flexible contracts between Electronics Savvy 
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and its suppliers ensure the company can reinstate operations quickly if a SCS breach 
emerges. 
Retail Guru primarily sells food and drug store products. The company believes 
it is a big challenge to protect its supply chain from SCS breaches. Every day there is a 
recorded disruption somehow in their supply chain. All managers I interviewed stated 
that they needed to know more about their suppliers across tiers. The procurement 
director of own brand products stated that “we see the need to be able to know more 
about our supply chain, and much further down the supply chain than we have been 
before. Just a challenge of doing that with a hundred thousand products and thousands of 
suppliers.” Their top leaders shared the same opinion and provided full support for their 
SCSM efforts. As one manager stated, “my boss is there from day one.” All Retail Guru 
suppliers must develop their own product security plan utilizing the FDA Food Security 
Preventive Measures Guidelines. International suppliers must develop a global SCS plan 
utilizing the U.S. Customs & Border Patrol Guidelines. International suppliers must also 
participate in and collaborate with Retail Guru’s C-TPAT compliance. Retail Guru has 
more than six thousand suppliers. Yet the company reviews every single supplier’s 
product defense and facility security plan at least once a year. Even for suppliers who 
have worked with the company for decades, they still conduct the reviews and verify the 
integrity of their processes and products. When talking about their supplier management 
with respect to security, one manager stated “[our policy is to ensure] they (suppliers) do 
what they said they will do.”   
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Retail Guru has a designated chief security officer and an emergency reaction 
team. The company also has a “war room” where pertinent people/parties can meet in 
response to a SCS breach. After each SCS breach, corrective action procedures are 
recorded and knowledge is preserved for the future. In-house training and online courses 
are offered to employees. Instead of using third party logistics service providers, the 
company also maintains its own fleet. Those endeavors help Retail Guru successfully 
respond to SCS breaches effectively.  
The key and commonly shared tenets of SCSM mechanisms implemented by the 
companies are further extracted and presented in table 10. Because two SCSM 
mechanisms could be essentially referring to the same task but named differently by 
different companies (e.g., “we only use pre-approved suppliers” v.s. “we only use 
qualified suppliers”), I use general statements to describe those tenets. Such tenets allow 
me to select the most representative SCSM mechanisms for hypotheses testing in chapter 
IV.  
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Table 10. Key SCSM tenets by class 
 Key SCSM tenets 
 
Prevention Develops a proactive strategy to deal with SCS breaches 
Holds suppliers accountable for SCS breaches 
Educates employees/suppliers about SCS breaches 
Selects only qualified suppliers 
Secures physical locations (e.g., manufacturing facilities and warehouses) 
Sets high priority for SCS 
 
Detection Monitors physical movement of raw materials and products 
Detects existing SCS breaches and near SCS breaches 
Synthesizes information regarding SCS breaches 
Monitors supply network instead of focusing only on first tier suppliers 
Conducts periodic reviews both internally and externally about SCS  
Notifies supply chain partners about SCS breaches 
 
Reaction Cross-trains employees 
Builds backup processes 
Designates a group of employees as the first respondents to SCS breaches 
Develops flexible contracts with suppliers 
Develops a clear chain of command 
Establishes effective communication channels with both suppliers and internal security staff 
Utilizes product design to react to SCS breaches 
 
Restoration Develops recovery plans 
Develops alternative material sources 
Maintains redundancy (e.g., strategic inventory of raw materials, machinery, etc.) 
Learns from mistakes 
 
 
 
2.4.2.4 The Outcomes of SCSM Mechanisms 
Overall, the managers I interviewed agree that their respective company benefits 
from SCSM mechanisms. However, the magnitude of benefit is hard to estimate as 
managers also agree that it is not easy to quantify losses that have been prevented. The 
global supply chain security manager at Electronics Savvy explicitly stated: “it is very 
hard to calculate the gains.” Sometimes the process of managing SCS breaches is like 
“peeling an onion”, in the process of addressing one SCS breach, additional, unexpected 
ones come up. Essentially, “what I do is to save money [from improved SCS] to re-
spend them [for better SCS].” At Electronics Savvy, managers understand the 
importance of SCS but they expect that there is little consensus as to how the benefits 
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can be systematically estimated. Such an idea was embraced by managers from Retail 
Guru as well. Although Retail Guru records inventory shrinkage due to employee theft 
or cargo theft, these “hard” numbers shed little light on the costs associated with their 
SCSM inputs. The “net return” is unclear to the managers. One director put it, “We do 
not have ‘soft’ numbers to measure cost. How many hours I spent should be billed 
toward SCSM? I do lots of work and it [security management] is just part of my job.”  
The findings from the four cases suggest that companies only look at overall cost 
but do not have a well-established matrix to measure the value of SCSM mechanisms. It 
is surprising that managers in my sample concur that SCSM mechanisms may result in 
collateral benefits (e.g., better supply chain visibility), but none of them use these 
collateral benefits as a measure of SCSM success. Nonetheless, due to the limited 
understanding about the value of SCSM mechanisms, it is highly warranted to 
empirically examine the effects of SCSM mechanisms on various performance 
dimensions as this study does. 
One intriguing finding is that, while managers agree each class of SCSM 
mechanisms can affect supply chain performance, they suggest that it is the synergy of 
the four classes of SCSM mechanisms that actually plays a pivotal role. Theoretically, 
the four classes of SCSM mechanisms may either enhance each other or sometimes 
substitute each other. On the one hand, improvement in one class may lead to 
improvement in another class. For example, high levels of detection ability provide more 
time for a company to effectively react to SCS breaches. On the other hand, excellence 
in one class reduces the need of excellence in other classes. For example, superior 
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prevention ability may avert potential SCS breaches and therefore companies may not 
have to invest heavily for the other three classes. 
However, discussions with managers demonstrate that excellence in only one 
class of SCSM mechanisms is not sufficient to protect the supply chain. A real example 
shared by the Retail Guru’s supply chain security manager perhaps can help us to better 
understand the “synergy” idea managers proposed. Retail Guru used to face frequent 
cargo theft attributed to a gang on the Texas/Mexico border area. At the beginning, 
Retail Guru focused on reaction and restoration when dealing with the thefts. The 
company’s strategy aimed to reduce overall losses. However, the number of cargo thefts 
remained high. Having realized that, Retail Guru attempted to solve the problem by 
shifting its focus toward detection and prevention. They actively detected stolen 
products. Whenever they found suspect containers that may be used to carry stolen 
products, they called the police to investigate those containers. If the owner(s) of the 
containers could not show the receipt of purchase, then police would take possession of 
these products. In such cases, Retail Guru did not get its lost products back, but the gang 
did not gain anything either. By doing so, Retail Guru sent out the “I am watching you” 
message in order to deter the gang from stealing its cargo. After that, the gang became 
more careful and the number of cargo thefts went down dramatically. However, the 
remaining small number of thefts generated substantive losses to Retail Guru because 
the company was no longer well-prepared to deal with this type of SCS breach (as it 
shifted its focus to prevention and reaction). The lessons drove Retail Guru to rethink its 
SCSM strategy. They balanced their efforts and gave consideration to both prevention 
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and reaction. The new strategy was deemed successful as the company experienced 
fewer thefts after that and the overall losses went down significantly.  
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CHAPTER III  
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
In the previous chapter, I reviewed the literature, defined SCS and SCSM, and 
categorized SCSM mechanisms into four classes in order to address the first two 
research questions. In this chapter, I develop a set of testable hypotheses that inform 
research questions 3-5. Specifically, I adopt an institutional perspective and the tenets of 
the human immunology research to explore the underpinning logic that explains the 
effects of institutional pressures on SCSM mechanisms and then SCSM mechanisms on 
supply chain performance respectively.  
 
3.1 Institutional Theory 
The institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott and Meyer, 1983; 
Scott, 1987; Zucker 1987; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Powell, 1991) has captured the 
attention of researchers and scholars across the social sciences. It has been employed to 
examine systems ranging from micro interpersonal relationships to macro societal 
frameworks.  
“It considers the processes by which structures, including schemas, rules, 
norms, and practices, become established as authoritative guidelines for 
social behaviors… It inquires into how these elements are created, 
diffused, adopted, and then adapted over time and space; and how they 
may fall into decline and disuse” (Scott, 2004, p. 460). 
 92 
 
In contrast to traditional rational theories (e.g., economic theories), the 
institutional theory emphasizes social effects rather than just economic outcomes (Zukin 
and DiMaggio, 1990). Individuals and organizations are assumed to be recognition 
seeking, subject to social influences and relatively intractable creatures of habits and 
traditions (Scott, 2001; Zucker, 1987). Conformity to social expectations (dubbed as 
legitimacy by institutional theorists) contributes to firm success and survival because 
legitimate firms are expected to gain social acceptance, and thus reap societal resources 
(Baum and Oliver, 1991; Carroll and Hannan, 1989; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Oliver, 1991). Hence, in order to garner legitimacy, firms facing similar environmental 
effects are prone to operate in similar ways and adopt the same practices/strategies, 
demonstrating the attribute termed as isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Because recent articles have provided a comprehensive review of the institutional 
theory literature (see Heugens and Lander, 2009), the present dissertation only reviews 
papers that are pertinent to the proposed model. I focus on several classic studies which 
illustrate the mechanisms by which institutional theory can explain the adoption of 
certain strategies and practices (SCSM mechanisms in my case). 
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) seminal work and recent studies of the 
institutional theory (Heugens and Lander, 2009; Lounsbury, 2007) propose that four 
institutional isomorphism pressures explain why firms in the same industry would adopt 
the same/similar strategies and practices: coercive, mimetic, normative, and 
performance.  
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3.1.1 Coercive Pressure 
The coercive institutional pressure is forceful in nature. It derives from powerful 
agencies that can exert pressure on their business partners or related parties. Such 
pressure may be felt as mandates, as drivers, as persuasions, or even as invitations to join 
in collusion (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). For example, according to the Importer 
Security Filing (ISF) program (a.k.a., the 10+2 rule), importers and international carriers 
need to report trade data (10 files from the importer and 2 files from the carrier) to the 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for non-bulk cargo shipments arriving into the 
United States by vessel. The installation of the reporting system (or commercial ISF 
software) is then institutionalized as a mandatory industry standard. As long as a firm 
wants to legally operate in the market, it has to have the reporting system in hand. In 
other words, the existence of coercive pressure affects many aspects of an organization's 
behaviors such that certain strategies and practices would be adopted irrespective of their 
efficiency or financial implications. Indeed, the literature suggests that a complex system 
of laws has profoundly moved the coercive isomorphism forward: the effects of coercive 
pressure emanating from the government are often applied to the entire population of 
organizations, thus making the adoption decisions less adaptive and less flexible (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978).  
Coercive isomorphic process is also manifesting outside the governmental arena. 
Customers (if not specified, customers are mainly referring to buying firms hereafter) 
can also develop forceful rules for other firms to abide by. Customer pressure is referred 
to as a force, persuasion, or invitation that is applied both implicitly and explicitly by 
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customers to which other firms must respond (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Customers 
are the sources of business. In this sense, they may impact their supply chain partners to 
a great extent. For instance, IBM has embraced the C-TPAT program and expressed 
coercive pressures for its suppliers to adopt the same program. One memorandum signed 
by IBM’s top procurement officer stated:  
“C-TPAT efforts are underway today. IBM has pledged full cooperation 
with this initiative. As a C-TPAT participant, IBM is assessing its own 
security practices. As an IBM supplier, you also have a role to play in 
ensuring the security of the supply chain…Adherence to the C-TPAT 
security recommendations is critical to strengthening security for all 
supply chain members. Your assistance in this endeavor is 
required…Global Procurement, in conjunction with the IBM Import 
Compliance office, will be monitoring the supply chain security issue and 
will advise our suppliers of any new developments in this area.” (see, 
www-03.ibm.com/procurement).  
The government and customer pressures are likely to surface in the field of SCS. 
Nations have a habit of legislating strict SCS requirements in order to protect their 
countries, their people, and the flow of global commerce. That is why countries, such as 
the United States of America, require containers be screened by security personnel, 
machines, or specially trained dogs at international ports or borders to prevent weapon 
and drug smuggling. Governments request better SCS and they can achieve it partly by 
imposing specific security requirements on business organizations. Customers also need 
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better SCS to assure the integrity of their products and protect their intangible assets 
(e.g., reputation). They implement SCSM standards (e.g., ISO 28000); they benchmark 
against their peers in term of SCSM strategies; they also adopt “best SCSM practices”. 
However, those effects are likely to be nullified if their supply chain partners are 
unwilling to invest in SCS as a supply chain is as secure as its weakest link. Thus 
customers have the motivation to place forceful pressure on their suppliers for better 
SCS.  
 
3.1.2 Mimetic Pressure 
The second institutional isomorphism pressure refers to mimetic pressure. It 
derives from uncertainty and competition (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001). 
When the technologies are poorly understood, when the goals are ambiguous, or when 
the environment creates systematic uncertainty, organizations are prone to model 
themselves after other successful organizations (March and Olsen, 1976). The 
advantages of mimetic behaviors are considerable; when an organization faces a problem 
with ambiguous causes or unclear solutions, mimicking may be a viable solution with 
little expense (Cyert and March, 1963). The “models” may be diffused explicitly by 
organizations such as consulting firms or industry trade associations, or unintentionally, 
indirectly through reports from leading firms or employee mobility. One of the most 
dramatic instances of modeling was the effort of Japanese revolutionaries in the late 
nineteenth century to model new governmental initiatives on successful western nations 
(Westney, 1982). Western organizations are now returning the compliment by 
 96 
 
implementing Japanese JIT and quality management models to cope with thorny 
productivity and personnel challenges in their own firms.  
The literature suggests that the effects of SCSM mechanisms can be uncertain 
and thus the mimetic pressure is likely to gain momentum. For example, Sheu et al. 
(2006) demonstrate that because SCSM initiatives (the C-TPAT program in their study) 
are a means rather than an end, their value to supply chain security performance is, in 
fact, not clear. A study by Gutierrez and Hintsa (2006) provides support for this 
argument. They compare nine SCSM programs and show that no two programs share 
exactly the same measures, indicating that even leading professional organizations and 
governments have different perceptions of what constitutes best SCSM practices. The 
situation gets even worse as SCSM mechanisms are usually supplemented with 
convoluted regulations. Top managers may neither be confident on how to implement 
SCSM mechanisms, nor do they understand the expected outcomes of these strategies 
and practices. Hence mimicking successful peers who are socially praised by industry 
members may isolate firms from criticism and avoid unnecessary losses (King and 
Lennox, 2001).  
 
3.1.3 Normative Pressure 
The third institutional isomorphism pressure is normative in nature. It stems 
primarily from professional, cultural, and ethical expectations, which in turn guide 
decision-making (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Khalifa and Davison, 2006; Scott, 2001). 
It captures the effects of typically less visible social obligations and cultural patterns on 
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firm activities. The normative pressure usually results in professional, industry, or 
cultural norms (e.g., rules of thumb, standard operating procedures, occupational 
standards) (Hoffman, 1999). The normative pressure is able to regulate or mobilize 
industry wide opinion in favor of, or in opposition to, an organization’s operational 
practices (Sarkis et al., 2010). According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) normative 
pressure is primarily diffused through the growth of professionalization. The major 
recent growth in the profession has been among organizational professionals, 
particularly managers and specialized staff of large organizations (e.g., Certified 
Professional in Supply Management, CPSM). While various professionals within an 
organization may differ from one another, they exhibit much similarity to their 
professional counterparts in other organizations. These professionals are likely to share 
the same opinion on how work should be done, what ethics to stick to, how to train 
future professionals, and how to establish a professional basis for their occupational 
autonomy. Indeed, it is argued that a pool of almost interchangeable employees (for a 
specialized job) is created through formal education and professional networks (Scott 
1983, 2001). By occupying similar positions across a range of organizations, these 
professionals who share a similar orientation and disposition override the control 
mechanisms which shape organizational behaviors (Liang et al., 2007). Consequently, 
the strategies and practices these professionals and the professional organizations they 
belong to (e.g., Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals, Institute of Supply 
Management, etc.) promote are likely to become norms and thus be widely adopted in an 
industry (Liang et al., 2007).  
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In reference to SCS, the norms can be formed through several means. For 
example, trading and professional organizations are not just working with their supply 
chain partners to improve SCS, they are also promoting common, global SCSM 
standards. Such standards may reduce the burden of dealing with multiple, potentially 
conflicting regulations between countries, thus enabling companies to develop internal 
processes that are truly global (Flitch, 2007). The World Customs Organization (WCO) 
members have adopted the SAFE framework of standards for securing and facilitating 
global trade (WCO report, 2007). Many firms around the world have adopted the ISO 
28000 standards regarding SCS. Bit by bit, as more and more firms start to adopt these 
SCSM standards and programs, the strategies and practices involved in these standards 
and programs gradually become occupational norms that firms would have to comply 
with. Consequently, firms under normative pressure need to take action to assure they 
can meet these SCS related professional, industry, or cultural norms.  
 
3.1.4 Competitive Pressure 
Lastly, some institutional theory scholars have drawn attention to performance 
pressure as well. Unlike the first three classic pressures that are dubbed as institutional 
isomorphism, the effect of performance demands as a pressure mechanism is portrayed 
as competitive isomorphism. Lounsbury (2007) argued that segregating economic and 
social logics is problematic, since the distinction between technical and social benefits is 
itself embedded in institutions (Lounsbury, 2002; Thornton, 2004). The cautionary note 
here is that institutional theorists rarely make an effort to disentangle institutional 
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isomorphism from competitive isomorphism. Compared to the classic institutional 
isomorphic processes (i.e., coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism), competitive 
isomorphism is more acceptable to organizational economists and organizational 
sociologists alike. It emphasizes that market competition weeds out less efficient 
strategies and practices in favor of more efficient ones (Heugens and Lander, 2009; Scott, 
2001). Its focus is notably favoring performance.  
Indeed, institutional theorists have proposed at least three reasons why the 
adoption of (new) strategies and practices may result in better performance (a practice 
can be considered new if the firm has never adopted it before, irrespective of its 
longevity). First, the newly adopted strategies and practices may simply represent a 
better way of organizing and managing resources than extant alternatives. Pioneers often 
adopt these strategies and practices because of substantive efficiency and quality gains 
(Westphal et al., 1997). Second, as the strategies and practices prove themselves (as 
manifested by pioneers’ competitive advantage), late adopters may benefit substantively 
from adopting them as well: (1) late adopters can learn from early adopters so that the 
implementation becomes smooth and cost-efficient; (2) late adopters also stand in a good 
position to gain symbolic benefits since the strategies and practices may have been 
somewhat institutionalized and thus have legitimacy. Third, resource providers opt for 
socially acceptable organizations that (1) do not threaten their reputation, (2) have 
strategies and practices the providers recognize as “rational,” and (3) are less likely to 
fail because of unanticipated events (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Deephouse, 1999). Firms 
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that adopt socially promising strategies and practices are thus more likely than their non-
participating peers to attract resources of higher quality at favorable terms.  
The adoption of SCSM mechanisms can lead to performance improvements 
(Rice and Spayd, 2005; Peleg-Gillai et al., 2006). These performance gains are mainly 
reflected by collateral benefits such as reduced cost, better supply chain responsiveness, 
improved supply chain resilience, as well as improved supply chain visibility, (Rice and 
Spayd, 2005; Closs and McGarrell, 2004; Lee and Whang, 2005; Peleg-Gillai and Bhat, 
2006; Mena et al., 2009). For example, due to the highly negative impact that SCS 
breaches present, customers increasingly value the care that suppliers undertake with 
their supply chains (Whipple et al., 2009; Goldberg and Herman, 2006). As a 
consequence, firms well equipped with SCSM mechanisms are likely to gain better 
reputation than their counterparts. In addition, Kennedy and Fiss (2009) illustrated that 
organizations are indeed affected by the rationale of both efficiency and legitimacy, 
because efficiency and legitimacy complement rather than conflict with each other. In 
other words, the “performance pressure” argument suggests that firms may adopt SCSM 
mechanisms because they truly believe that such adoptions can improve efficiency and 
effectiveness, leading to competitive advantage or operational benefits. 
 
3.2 Hypotheses Development  
3.2.1 Antecedents of SCSM Mechanisms 
Institutional pressures can play an important role regarding the implementation 
of SCSM mechanisms. Specifically, I argue that all institutional pressures (government, 
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customer, peer, normative, and performance) would positively affect prevention, 
detection, reaction, and restoration-oriented SCSM mechanisms respectively. 
 
3.2.1.1 Institutional Pressures  Prevention-oriented SCSM Mechanisms 
In regards to SCS, a government holds great responsibility to avert SCS breaches 
from happening, because the losses resulting from these supply chain incidents can be 
devastating and may affect the lives of many people. For example, in early 2012 a 
counterfeit version of the widely used cancer treatment medicine Avastin was found 
circulating in the United States (USA Today, 2012). About 70 people died because of 
the use of such counterfeit drugs over that time period (Perrone, 2012). In the same year, 
hundreds of thousands of counterfeit airbags were found installed in cars in the United 
States. Those airbags cannot protect passengers during car accidents and can kill them 
even under normal conditions because they may explode for no apparent reason, putting 
innocent people's lives at enormous risk (Foxnews, 2012). Governments cannot treat 
these types of SCS breaches lightly as public health and human life come into play. 
Meanwhile, there is little a government can do to make up for the damages sustained on 
the aftermath of SCS breaches. As a result, many countries and regional unions (e.g., the 
E.U.) have recently undertaken security initiatives and passed laws which demand 
necessary organizational controls to prevent SCS breaches. Harsh punishments for 
violating SCS related laws are too high for firms to afford. Under such circumstances, 
firms have to act preventively when dealing with SCS threats.     
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Customers also play an important role in the adoption of prevention-oriented 
SCSM mechanisms. Following the increasing trend of globalization, firms utilize 
offshore suppliers to mitigate their operational bottlenecks and achieve competitive 
advantage. When firms work with their offshore suppliers, supply chains become more 
complex than ever before. However, many SCS issues which could be easily addressed 
in the past can now generate big headaches as many more parties are involved and the 
focal firm may not have effective control over them. A recent example is the failure of 
the gigantic Chinese milk producer Sanlu in 2008. The company failed to prevent its 
suppliers from using adulterated raw materials. The tainted milk products led to the 
death of three infants and more than a thousand ill children. The company went bankrupt 
and the milk industry lost approximately $5 billion in sales due to their damaged public 
image (A.T. Kearney Analysis, 2010). The costs of a SCS incident that stems from 
upstream suppliers can be devastating. Thus, customers have strong motivations to 
educate their suppliers and enforce their suppliers to achieve better SCS by preventing 
any possible security incidents from happening.  
Firms are also subject to peer pressure. Many firms have rankled their peers by 
offering superior SCS performance with lower costs. While there are many ways to 
achieve better SCS, the implementation of preventive routines is always one of the best 
choices. In general, prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms focus on internal education, 
organizational collaboration, and supply chain re-configuration in order to identify 
potential SCS breaches and address them before they materialize. As Lee and Whang 
(2004) pointed out, investments in preventative mechanisms would pay off handsomely 
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as the effort required to solve problems on the aftermath of a SCS disruption would be 
drastically reduced. Consequently, the adoption of preventive mechanisms has become a 
ubiquitous phenomenon in various industries and is considered an indispensable element 
of a company’s multilayered approach toward mitigation of SCS breaches (Autry and 
Bobbitt, 2008). As more and more firms across industries begin to realize the importance 
of SCS and understand the power of a preventative orientation, prevention-oriented 
mechanisms garner more and more prevalence and legitimacy. Consequently, firms are 
likely to model after their successful peers and adopt prevention-oriented SCSM 
mechanisms in order to reap the benefits that their peers have gained and to stand in 
competition with those peers. 
Of great importance to prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms is normative 
pressure. Norms generally take the form of rules of thumbs, standard operating 
procedures, and occupational standards (Hoffman, 1999). Ignoring these norms may lead 
to being overlooked by other firms in the same industry and may diminish the focal 
firm’s ability to obtain societal resources and avoid questioning (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). In the context of SCS, the normative pressure is primarily reflected as 
professional norms. Many professional organizations (e.g., ISO) and international bodies 
alike have developed SCS standards and programs. The standards and programs help 
reduce the burden and complexity of dealing with multiple, potentially conflicting, 
regulations between countries, enabling companies to develop internal processes based 
on a global basis. As such, those standards and programs are likely to be institutionalized 
as professional norms and widely embraced by firms across different industries. Typical 
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examples of these standards and programs include, but are not limited to, Business 
Alliance for Secure Commerce rules (BASC rules), ISO 22000, ISO 28000, ISO 31000, 
Transported Asset Protection Association’s Trucking Security Requirements (TAPA’s 
TSR), and the WCO-SAFE framework (see table 11). These standards and programs all 
place high priority on preventive practices such as conducting unannounced security 
assessments of logistics providers and developing visibility of supplier practices across 
all tiers. Consequently, the diffusion of these standards and programs has shaped the 
operating environment and resulted in several preventive-in-nature professional norms 
that firms need to conform to. 
 
Table 11. Major voluntary security programs facts comparison 
Program Operational 
since 
Geography Tenets or Key Elements 
ISO22000  
(ISO standards for food 
safety) 
1993 Any to any, 
global coverage 
States requirements in terms of results rather than means 
for SCS. 
Introduces innovations in (1) Prerequisite programs, (2) 
Hazard identification and determination of acceptable 
levels, (3) Selection and assessment of control 
measures, (4) Evaluation of individual verification 
results, (5) Analysis of results of verification activities. 
    
ISO28000  
(ISO standards for supply 
chain security) 
2008 Any to any, 
global coverage 
Specification for security management systems for the 
supply chain. 
Assists in implementing governmental and international 
customs agency security initiatives, including the 
WCO's Framework of Standards to Secure and 
Facilitate Global Trade, the EU AEC Program, the US 
C-TPAT, and the International Maritime Organization’s 
(IMO) ISPS Code. 
    
ISO31000 
(ISO standards for risk 
management) 
2009 Any to any, 
global coverage 
The focus of ISO 31000 programs is centered on: (1) 
Transferring accountability gaps in enterprise risk 
management, (2) Aligning objectives of the governance 
frameworks with ISO 31000, (3) Embedding 
management system reporting mechanisms, (4) 
Creating uniform risk criteria and evaluation metrics. 
    
AEO 
(authorized economic 
operator, the WCO 
framework of standards to 
secure global trade) 
2005 Any to any, 
global coverage 
AEO designates the status that customs authorities from 
European member states should grant to reliable traders 
established in the European Community.  
AEO traders will be able to obtain one or both of the 
following certificates: i) Simplification for Customs 
procedures ii) Facilitation for security and safety. 
European Commission (2005). 
    
 105 
 
Table 11. continued 
TAPA TSR 
(TAPA’s security 
requirements to fight crime 
on international highways) 
 
1992 Any to any, 
global coverage 
Specifies the minimum acceptable standards for security 
throughout supply chains utilizing trucking and 
associated operations, including the methods to be used 
in maintaining those standards. 
BASC Standards 
(Business Alliance for 
Secure Commerce 
Standards, a set of 
international business 
standards created to promote 
secure international trade) 
1996 Region to 
region (Latin 
American to 
North 
American/Euro
pe) 
Examines the entire process of manufacturing and shipping 
of merchandise, emphasizing the creation of a more 
security-conscious environment throughout the supply 
chain. 
 
 
Finally, performance pressure also drives the adoption of prevention-oriented 
SCSM mechanisms. The literature suggests that performance improvements can be 
achieved by implementing preventive SCSM mechanisms (Rice and Spayd, 2005; Peleg-
Gillai et al., 2006). These performance gains are mainly reflected by collateral benefits 
such as reduced cost, better supply chain responsiveness, better supply chain resiliency, 
and improved supply chain visibility (Rice and Spayd, 2005; Closs and McGarrell, 2004; 
Lee and Whang, 2005; Peleg-Gillai and Bhat, 2006; Mena et al., 2009). An example of 
these collateral benefits arising from SCSM mechanisms are the results attributed to the 
adoption of the concept of the Authorized Economic Operator (AEO). AEOs are parties 
involved in international trade (such as importers and carriers) that have implemented 
SCSM standards and preventative practices in order to effectively manage SCS threats. 
In return for their SCS investments, firms with AEO status do receive benefits from 
governments such as expedited processing of their goods by customs authorities. In 
addition, there is strong evidence that active prevention results in lower overall costs in 
quality management (Lee and Whang, 2005). Many preventive SCSM mechanisms can 
help firms avoid operational errors and unnecessary accidents. Indeed, a number of 
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preventive-in-nature SCSM mechanisms share the same concepts with the TQM 
strategies and practices, which can effectively prevent quality defects (Lee and Whang, 
2005). Rice and Spayd (2005) also illustrate that prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms 
allow firms to quickly respond to SCS breaches and thus reduce the potential damages 
caused by these breaches. Therefore, firms driven by their desire to improve substantive 
performance are likely to implement prevention-orientated SCSM mechanisms.  
Overall, all institutional pressures may positively affect the implementation of 
preventive SCSM mechanisms. Hence, 
H1: Institutional pressures are positively related to the level of the deployment of 
prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms. 
 
3.2.1.2 Institutional Pressures  Detection-oriented SCSM Mechanisms 
The human skin cannot block all pathogens from gaining access to the human 
body and cannot defeat bacteria that make it pass its layers. Similarly preventive SCSM 
activities cannot resolve all SCS challenges. As Efrain Perez, a program manager with 
CBP, said, “patrol officers are vigilant about looking for suspicious behavior (such as 
smuggling at the U.S.-Mexico borders), but it's impossible to catch every single person.” 
(www.daily-jeff.com, 11 Feb 2012, available at: http://www.daily-
jeff.com/ap%20washington/2012/02/11/us-faces-tough-fight-in-cash-smuggling-
crackdown). Even when firms have high preventative ability, SCS breaches can still 
occur because many of them are intentionally designed and are unpredictable (Speier et 
al., 2011). Therefore, governments require firms to develop the ability to detect potential 
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security breaches in their supply chains. For instance, the government obliges airlines to 
keep flying safely and demands that cargo shipments be inspected. Yet achieving smooth 
implementation of the additional cargo screening measures will require significant 
resources to build detection capabilities. As Lichtenstein (2010) described, “The only 
way to achieve that is by ensuring a thorough but efficient detection process that 
maintains the flow of goods, not just in the United States but around the globe.” 
(available at: www.supplychainquarterly.com/columns/scq201001monetarymatters/). In 
fact, numerous government-imposed SCS initiatives are composed of detection-oriented 
practices, such as inspection of cargo shipments and screening of mail packages at 
international ports. It is rather common that firms pursue detection-oriented SCSM 
mechanisms due to government pressure.   
Detection ability is also pertinent for customers (buying firms). Early detection 
ability afforded by suppliers offers buying firms significant leeway to analyze potential 
SCS breaches and thus allows for an effective action to control or even address these 
breaches before they materialize and cause damage to the supply chain. In addition, 
various SCS breaches, such as smuggling of cigarettes or people, are intentionally 
planned and carefully executed and are thus neither visible nor easy to detect. Their 
direct impact to the firm may be minor as these activities do not necessarily slow down 
the movement of products or increase operating costs. However, their indirect influence 
can be overwhelming (e.g., smuggled weapons of mass destruction can be used by 
terrorists). While the potential negative results are affected by many factors (e.g., how 
smart the bootleggers are or the extent to which suppliers cooperate with buying firms to 
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secure the supply chain), final consumers generally hold the buying firms accountable 
for the consequences. To avert such issues, buying firms need to work closely with their 
supply chain partners to detect illicit conduct.  
In addition, mimicking peers, which demonstrate strong detection ability, may be 
helpful. In general, firms with better detection ability are likely to be stronger 
competitors. Early detection implies that firms can either respond to SCS breaches in a 
timely manner or may have more time to deal with these breaches that may result in 
supply chain disruptions. The flow of products in the supply chain would thus be 
expected to be more stable when an effective detection system exists. Stable product 
flow may lead to operational benefits for both the focal firm and its customers as they 
face less uncertainty that needs streamlining. Consequently, firms are inclined to mimic 
detection-oriented SCSM mechanisms from successful companies. Many SCSM 
programs such as the C-TPAT and CSI (container security initiative) have highlighted 
the needs as well as the benefits of detection activities. The U.S. government explicitly 
states that the development and deployment of sophisticated detection technology is 
essential for SCS (www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/mission/cbp.xml). Leading 
organizations, such as Walmart, have been using GPS and RFID technologies to detect 
deviations in their supply networks for many years and have reported substantial gains 
(Williams, 2004). As a result, firms facing peer pressure to achieve better SCS are 
motivated to model their actions after firms with superior detection abilities.  
Further, detection ability has been gradually normalized in the last decade. The 
fundamental reason is that detection-oriented SCSM mechanisms not only provide better 
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SCS performance but also better supply chain visibility that firms need in order to 
succeed. For example, firms can utilize real time information gathered from detection-
based technologies to offer better services to customers. RFID and GPS tracking devices, 
which are used to detect illicit activities (e.g., theft/misuse of transportation vehicles), 
also enable firms to provide more accurate delivery schedules and thus improve 
customer satisfaction. Professional organizations, such as the Transported Asset 
Protection Association (TAPA), also fuel the formation of these norms. For example, 
each year TAPA holds three meetings with executives from a variety of industries, 
which allow these practitioners to share knowledge and develop professional norms. As 
more and more firms learn and start to take advantage of what detection capabilities 
offer, buying firms now treat high supply chain visibility as a taken-for-granted benefit 
that their suppliers should provide.  While such changes occur almost imperceptibly, bit 
by bit, they have become the industry norms (i.e., occupational standards) and thus drive 
organizational behaviors. In this sense, normative pressure will motivate firms to adopt 
detection-oriented SCSM mechanisms. 
In a similar vein, detection orientated SCSM activities often lead to operational 
and financial benefits. For example, continuous monitoring enables firms to have a 
better sense over their key assets, such as high value inventory, and thus may reduce 
employee theft and inventory shrinkage. Periodic evaluation of suppliers to detect 
potential security glitches gives firms an opportunity to assess the vulnerabilities of their 
supply chains. It may also help firms build a sturdy relationship with their suppliers 
though meaningful communications. The active oversight over supply chain operations 
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could result in better understanding of the supply chain and thus lead to potential 
exploitative improvements. In short, detection-oriented SCSM mechanisms may result in 
improved performance. Hence, the desire to improve performance is likely to be one 
reason why firms want to adopt detection-oriented SCSM mechanisms. Taken together, I 
propose: 
H2: Institutional pressures are positively related to the level of the deployment of 
detection-oriented SCSM mechanisms. 
 
3.2.1.3 Institutional Pressures  Reaction-oriented SCSM Mechanisms 
When a SCS breach does occur, the government may require firms to react 
effectively in order to assure that the public is safe. For example, cargo theft in Mexico 
has increased 20%-40% per year from 2006 to 2010 (Truckinginfo, 2012). Food and 
drink products were most targeted by cargo thieves. These thefts carry with them great 
potential to hurt the public, because contaminated food and drink products can easily 
result in thousands of ill people in a short period of time (Wein and Liu, 2005). Mexico’s 
National Chamber of Freight and Auto Transport has urged firms operating in Mexico to 
adopt SCSM measures so that they can react to truck thefts more effectively 
(Truckinginfo, 2012). Another example is the theft of 128,000 vials of Levemir in 2009. 
Levemir is a long-acting insulin type that requires constant refrigeration to preserve its 
potency. However, the stolen vials were not kept in cold storage and were sold to clinics. 
A patient at the M.D. Anderson Cancer Center in Houston used Levemir from the stolen 
batch and his blood sugar level spiked uncontrollably. Later, the patient died from 
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cancer-related causes triggered by the use of the tainted Levemir (CNN, 2011). The FDA 
put out nationwide alerts and made Novo Nordisk (the Levemir manufacturer) 
accountable to control the spread of the vials. The company quickly sent alerts to all of 
its authorized distributors and retail pharmacies. Levemir vials which shared the same lot 
size with the stolen ones were recalled. Additional security measures were also 
undertaken in order to avoid future thefts. Hence, it is not uncommon that a government 
would push firms to implement reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms.  
From a customer’s perspective, appropriate reaction on the aftermath of SCS 
events is an imperative. Continuous product flow is critical to buying firms. Consumers 
cannot wait. Business opportunities will never come back especially when a product is in 
its growth window. As such, maintaining normal operations or returning to the state quo 
after a SCS crisis becomes an essential ability that firms must attain. In order to comfort 
their customers, firms must react to SCS breaches effectively to a point such that the 
normal operations would not be significantly affected and thus the delivery of products 
would not be compromised. Otherwise, economic losses are likely to follow. For 
example, metal theft is a vexing problem for Network Rail, a company that operates 
Britain's rail infrastructure. In the 2011 financial year, metal theft alone resulted in more 
than 360 hours of disruptions. Ineffective responses to those thefts lead to numerous 
supply delays. Network Rail estimated that it spent £689,000 (approximately $882,847), 
an increase of almost 50 percent compared to the previous year, to compensate 
customers for the delays (Pol-PRIMETT, 2011; http://www.pol-primett.org/cable-theft-
causes-more-360-hours-disruption-north-east-passengers). Later, strong customer 
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pressure has forced Network Rail to conduct a thorough evaluation of its SCSM system 
and improve its reaction ability in order to effectively manage SCS disruptions. 
Customer pressure is rather conducive to reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms.  
Not only do government pressure and customer pressure motivate firms to 
implement reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms, firms also model after successful firms 
as it relates to reaction because of peer pressure. Simply put it, quick reaction to SCS 
breaches is always preferred over slow reaction in the business world. Through rapid 
reaction, firms can minimize, contain, or even control the magnitude of damages caused 
by SCS breaches. As a result, many firms have recently equipped themselves with 
disaster recovery plans or back up processes that can assist them at times of a SCS crisis 
(Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). They pre-position resources and build up “strategic 
redundancy”. Employees are also cross-trained so that they can handle multiple tasks 
when needed. While these practices are employed to respond to SCS breaches, they also 
result in an array of collateral benefits such as improved supply chain responsiveness as 
firms can effectively solve supply chain problems. As such, reactive SCSM mechanisms 
have generated competitive advantage for the adopting firms. In order to garner these 
benefits and be competitive, firms are prone to mimic their peers that are successful in 
reacting to SCS breaches.  
 Quick reaction is also in line with a firm’s social obligations. Effective reaction 
to SCS breaches is expected by a firm’s supply chain partners and its social audience. If 
a SCS breach cannot be controlled, chances are it will generate serious issues with a 
potential to put firms along its value chain in trouble. In this sense, the implementation 
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of reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms is a social norm that firms would endorse. The 
adoption of these mechanisms also helps generate positive publicity, rendering adopting 
firms better positioned to compete. In addition, many reaction-oriented SCSM 
mechanisms are embedded in professional SCS standards and programs. For instance, 
the ISO 28000 standards have specific requirements with respect to the development of 
protocols for communication when a SCS crisis arises. The ISO 28000 standards also set 
up guidelines regarding the deployment of well-defined contingency plans as well as the 
collaboration mechanisms among supply chain partners as a response to a SCS crisis. As 
these professional SCS standards and programs gain popularity, many reaction-oriented 
SCSM mechanisms gradually become part of the industry/professional norms that firms 
should follow. In other words, normative pressure is an important reason that firms carry 
out reactive SCSM mechanisms. 
On top of the abovementioned pressures, the need for better performance is 
always a motive for a firm to put forward a plan for reaction-oriented SCSM 
mechanisms. Effective reaction to SCS breaches is usually associated with better 
performance as this action may minimize the potential adverse effects caused by SCS 
breaches. Active response during a breach reduces the effort needed to solve problems 
later. On the other hand, sloppy reaction could generate economic seriousness for many 
companies. For example, when the SONY’s PlayStation Network was turned off due to 
hacker attacks between April 17 and April 19, 2011, the company claimed that it would 
resume online services within a week (Thorsen, 2011). However, it turned out that 
SONY was not prepared for that type of SCS breach and overestimated its reaction 
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capability. It took the company 24 days to get its online services running again. The 
unsuccessful responses cost the company approximately $171.4 million and the costs to 
the industry associated with it could be as high as $24 billion dollars (Thorsen, 2011). As 
reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms are well accommodated with a firm’s need to 
respond to accidents and enhance performance, it is suggested that firms may adopt 
reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms in order to improve performance. 
Taken together, I propose:  
H3: Institutional pressures are positively related to the level of the deployment of 
reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms. 
 
3.2.1.4 Institutional Pressures  Restoration-oriented SCSM Mechanisms 
Governments may want firms to recover from SCS breaches as soon as possible 
such that those breaches won’t generate further hardship. The logic here is analogous to 
the recovery of the human body from diseases. A body which cannot effectively recover 
from pathogen attacks would remain sick. This in turn provides opportunities for latent 
threats (e.g., the opportunistic pathogens) to become effective, which may further 
worsen the situation. Similarly, supply chains which cannot recover quickly from serious 
SCS breaches may suffer from a compromised SCSM system and therefore bear more 
risks of being targeted again. Governments are quite sensitive to SCS breaches in this 
respect. They need to keep a close eye on the aftermath of a SCS crisis. For example, the 
U.S. government has been actively involved in helping airlines to recover and rebuild 
their security management systems such that passenger aircrafts won’t be used again to 
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create another 9/11 attack. In other words, governments are likely to require firms to 
have well established restoration plans.  
Similarly, customers also need their supply chain partners to have disaster 
recovery plans in order to reinstate operations efficiently. Buying firms are aware that 
uncertainty can never be completely eliminated. Thus, they invest toward recovery 
mechanisms. Generally, buying firms can handle temporary supply shortages from their 
major suppliers by (1) purchasing from high cost alternative suppliers, (2) building up 
safety inventories, or (3) utilizing express shipments via more efficient transportation 
mediums such as airfreight. However, these short term solutions may not be viable at the 
time of a SCS crisis as many suppliers could be impacted by the same crisis 
simultaneously. In addition, the alternative suppliers may have capacity constraints at the 
time of a crisis and not be able to fulfill customer needs even when a premium price is 
paid. Moreover, even when capacity is not an issue, these urgent orders usually come 
with a stiff price to the buyers. Buying firms still need their major suppliers to recover 
quickly. In some cases, buying firms practice single-sourcing (e.g. purchasing CPUs 
only from Intel). Under such circumstances, they have no choice by rely on the supplier 
to restore its operations. In this sense, buying firms will push their major suppliers to 
build up necessary restoration ability. 
Restoration on the aftermath of a SCS crisis is also associated with peer pressure. 
Firms are expected to benchmark and learn from others in order to build restoration 
ability. Usually, firms may encounter ongoing and obtrusive attention from the 
authorities (e.g., regulators) and the media (e.g., the newspapers) after a major crisis 
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(Sutton and Galunic, 1996). Firms that cannot swiftly restore operations are thus likely 
to be considered as incapable to handle SCS breaches. Such “lack of capability” hurts 
not only a firm’s immediate market share but also could significantly jeopardize its 
future business as the firm’s reputation is eroded. In this sense, effective restoration from 
SCS breaches has great performance implications. Rapid and efficient restoration may 
allow firms to outmaneuver their peers and create competitive advantage. As such, 
companies are likely to model after their successful peers who have exhibited excellence 
in restoration ability. 
Restorative SCSM mechanisms are associated with SCS norms as well. Before 
the emergence of serious SCS breaches in recent years, firms used to overlook their 
supply chain restoration ability. Some of them only had a very brief and crude plan and 
most of them did not even have an executive officer dedicated to restoration/recovery 
management. Disaster recovery, however, began to gain currency in recent years and 
became an industry norm due to an array of natural and man-made disasters (Knemeyer 
et al., 2009). A few organizations started to pay attention to SCS breaches such that they 
created a dedicated office for SCSM and developed a clear chain of command to make 
sure effective restoration will be in place when SCS breaches occur. Many SCSM 
programs, including the Free and Secure Trade program (FAST), Internal Security 
Assessor (ISA) program, and the C-TPAT program, have clear focus on strategies and 
practices that aim to provide quick recovery after SCS breaches. Consequently, 
restoration ability has become a “must-meet” norm as perceived by firms across 
industries.  
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Finally, post-incident restoration is also critical as some SCS incidents (e.g., the 
9/11 terrorist attacks) may have significant and long lasting effects on global supply 
chains. Successful restoration may help firms avoid continuous public scrutiny on the 
aftermath of a SCS breach and thus lower the administration cost to manage public 
relations. In addition, it is in their best interest for companies to implement restoration-
oriented SCSM mechanisms. Just as the human immune system needs the blood platelet 
to promote blood clotting and wound repair (Parham, 2005), companies need restoration 
ability to heal their “wounded” operations. For example, Republic Bank of Fort 
Lauderdale, a local bank in the state of Florida, was recently attacked by a hacker who 
stole the personal data of 3,600 online-banking customers. The bank has hired a team of 
IT professionals and spent significant financial resources to improve IT security before it 
can re-open its online services (BankersOnline.com, 2013). However, this damaged 
customer trust and shareholder confidence would be difficult to recover. Many more 
efforts have been undertaken by the bank in order to repair its eroded reputation. The 
story suggests that if companies do not invest in restoration before a SCS breach 
happens, they will be paying a lot on the aftermath of the SCS breach. Therefore, it is 
quite reasonable to expect that firms will consider performance pressure when adopting 
restoration-oriented SCSM mechanisms.  
H4: Institutional pressures are positively related to the level of the deployment of 
restoration-oriented SCSM mechanisms. 
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3.2.2 Relative Power of Antecedents 
Supply chain security and trade facilitation are not mutually exclusive, but it is 
not easy to support both equally. Institutional stakeholders (e.g., the government versus 
the buying firms) may have conflicting interests when it comes to SCS. While better 
SCS is generally a desirable outcome for all parties, each constituent is driven perhaps 
by different motives. For example, governments need better SCS at the firm level to 
ensure or enhance security at the national level. They want to protect the country and the 
people. Because of the significance of human life, SCS requirements originating from 
government directives cannot be compromised. From a government’s perspective, the 
profitability of an organization is secondary. The obligation to provide reasonable 
protection overrides the need for firm profitability. To achieve necessary or expected 
levels of SCS, legislation is usually ratified without consideration for firm profitability. 
For instance, the 100% inspection of U.S.-bound containers policy mandates 
nonintrusive imaging and radiation detection for 100% of U.S.-bound containers at 
international ports. While enhancing national security, the resulting congestion hinders 
international trade significantly (Bakshi et al., 2011). As an executive from a global 
electronics manufacturer that operates in more 150 countries put it recently: “We can 
have the most incredible manufacturing, and the supply chain dies as soon as it hits the 
border” (Thomas, 2010).   
Customers, predominantly comprising buying firms, also require superior SCS. 
But their intents are quite different from those of a government. Governments promote 
SCSM mechanisms primarily for sole security purposes. Buying firms, however, 
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advocate SCSM mechanisms not only to ensure the security of their products but also to 
protect their reputation and public image. The onerous government mandates that are 
likely to follow a SCS attack (e.g., the 100% inspection of U.S.-bound containers policy 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks) will generally slow down the supply chain. Buying firms, 
on the other hand, want fast movement of products because they need the right products 
in the right place at the right time with low cost. Buying firms are profit driven. They 
may not be willing to compromise some aspects of their supply chain performance (e.g., 
fast/on-time delivery) for better SCS in all cases (Voss et al., 2009a). Consequently, 
firms must carefully consider whether or not the implementation of SCSM mechanisms 
will compromise other supply chain performance measures, especially when these 
implementations may result in unsatisfied customers. Hence, there is likely to be a 
balance between SCS and operational efficiency if customer pressure is the primary 
driver of SCSM mechanisms. The SCSM mechanisms are apt to be executed to a point 
such that the operational outcomes would not be significantly and negatively influenced 
by security related actions. As an IBM top security executive said, “both SCS and trade 
facilitation are necessary to keep the global economy running efficiently and effectively” 
(Fletcher, 2007). 
Due to the different intents of these institutional stakeholders, their influences on 
each class of SCSM mechanisms may vary. For example, government pressure would be 
stronger on prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms than on restoration-oriented ones 
because governments generally do not care as much about how firms recover from a 
SCS crisis as long as the national security goals are achieved. Therefore, it is 
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theoretically and practically relevant to explore the relative power of different 
institutional pressures on each class of SCSM mechanisms respectively.  
Preventing SCS attributed tragedies in the first place is critical to the 
governments. This is the case not only because prevention is a cost-efficient way to 
achieve better SCS but also because the results of SCS breaches can be devastating. The 
9/11 terrorist attacks left 2973 victims, with more than 6000 injured people. The U.S. 
stocks alone lost $1.4 trillion in value during that week (Bob, 2001). The negative effects 
of those attacks went further than economic losses to human life and beyond. The losses 
caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks are not something a country can afford to repeat. If 
any party would promote prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms, government would be 
one of the first advocators.  
Customers prefer better prevention as well. However, as I elaborated earlier, their 
actions are largely profit-driven. As long as the suppliers can control the impacts of SCS 
breaches on their customers to a reasonable level, relatively low levels of prevention are 
somewhat acceptable to customers. Similarly, firms would mimic peers in the same 
industry or follow industry norms to improve prevention ability. They may also adopt it 
because of performance concerns. Yet these drivers would not appear to be as strong as 
government mandates. While all institutional stakeholders want high levels of prevention, 
no one comes as strongly and forcefully as government pressure.  
H5: Government pressure is the strongest institutional predictor of prevention-
oriented SCSM mechanisms. 
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Government pressure is likely to be the strongest predictor for detection-oriented 
SCSM mechanisms as well. Nations want to keep supply chain related security problems 
outside their borders and therefore launch very strict detection processes at their national 
boundaries and international ports. They want firms to provide necessary cooperation 
and implement detection processes to accommodate government legislation. U.S. 
mandates, such as the 100% inspection of containers at international ports and the 10+2 
rules designed for international carriers and importers, attest to these interests. These 
government-mandated programs have placed considerable pressures on organizations 
that operate globally. Without solid detection ability in hand, firms are likely to face 
sanctions.  
Customers would also benefit if their suppliers have better detection ability 
toward SCS. Detection-oriented SCSM mechanisms, such as the installation of RFID or 
other technology-based solutions, improve supply chain visibility that provides time 
sensitive information regarding delivery schedule. Utilizing such information, customers 
can coordinate their own manufacturing activities or manage their inventory levels more 
efficiently. Besides, better detection carries with it the opportunity to better respond to 
potential SCS breaches. For example, early detection gives firms the leeway to deploy 
effective action in order to reduce losses and maintain normal operations. Nevertheless, 
nothing comes without a price. Effective detection requires not only state-of-the-art 
equipment but also collaboration among different parties along the supply chain. The 
costs of building superior detection ability include but are not limited to administrative 
costs, the cost to deploy advanced tracking systems, and the cost to develop an effective 
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communication channel, both within and outside a firm’s boundaries. While large firms 
may already invest in those areas, it may not be the case for small to medium size firms, 
which have limited resources to invest toward SCS. In other words, government pressure 
applies to all kinds of firms irrespective of their size whereas customer pressure may 
only effectively affect large firms that have the resources to implement detective 
mechanisms. As such, customer pressure would not to be as strong as government 
pressure.  
In the same vein, normative pressure and peer pressure are unlikely to have a 
stronger impact than government pressure. Norms are generally “rule of thumbs” and 
lack effective legal binding. Peer pressure motivates the adoption of SCSM mechanisms 
that have been widely implemented by peers. However, firms still have the right to either 
respond or not respond to peer pressure. On the other hand, performance pressure may 
have a rather strong effect on the implementation of detection-oriented SCSM 
mechanisms. High detection ability may lead to a number of collateral benefits such as 
improved supply chain responsiveness and supply chain visibility (Closs and McGarrell, 
2004; Peleg-Gillai and Bhat, 2006). Better detection ability enables quick and early 
reaction to SCS breaches. Owing to early detection, firms can save significantly as less 
effort is needed to resolve problems later. High supply chain visibility, obtained via 
detection processes, also prevents theft and therefore cuts inventory shrinkage related 
costs. However, due to idiosyncratic situations firms are facing, they may or may not 
fully redeem those collateral benefits. For instance, better customer satisfaction comes 
only when buyers desperately require timely product information. In other words, there 
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is some level of “uncertainty” regarding potential outcomes, which impedes firms from 
harvesting collateral benefits associated with superior detection ability. Firms may still 
hesitate to invest in detection-oriented SCSM mechanisms even when they know they 
may benefit from the investment. In this sense, performance needs would not affect 
organizational actions as strongly as government pressure does. Hence, I argue that: 
H6: Government pressure is the strongest institutional predictor of detection-
oriented SCSM mechanisms. 
 
So far my arguments have shown that government pressure is rather strong when 
it comes to SCS. However, government pressure cannot forcefully influence all aspects 
of organizational life. While governments may have a strong interest in preventing and 
detecting SCS breaches, they might not be very interested in the internal processes firms 
undertake to react to and/or recover from SCS breaches. The rationale lies in that 
governments do not care as much whether or not a firm can successfully survive a SCS 
breach. Consider the 2011 customer data loss at SONY. It was one of the largest data 
security breaches in history (see, http://news.sky.com/story/850949/hackers-steal-
playstation-gamers-details). The costs associated with it could top $24 billion (Thorsen, 
2011). But the U.S. government neither had the legitimacy nor the interests to push 
SONY to improve its IT security since it was more of a business crisis. Although some 
government officials voiced concern over the theft, no substantial action was taken 
(Thorsen, 2011). This SCS breach did not significantly jeopardize national security and 
therefore how SONY reacted on the aftermath of the disaster should not be a big concern 
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of the government. In this sense, the government would have diminishing interests in 
promoting reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms compared to in promoting prevention 
and detection-oriented ones. 
Customers, on the other hand, have significant concerns regarding a supplier’s 
reaction ability. Supply chain continuity is very important to them. If a SCS breach 
disrupted the supply chain, the economic losses could be very high; buying firms may 
have to discount their products to comfort their unsatisfied customers due to delayed 
shipments; they may also suffer additional expenditures and administrative costs because 
of the need to tackle abnormal operations (e.g., shortage of supply). In some cases, there 
is little the buying firms can do to make up for the disruptions without impacting their 
own customers (Croxton, 2003). As such, customers have rather strong interest to assure 
supplier’s reaction capability. They need their suppliers to solve SCS problems in a 
timely manner such that their own operations would not be significantly affected. 
Therefore, while somewhat negotiable, customer pressure is likely to be greater than the 
government pressure when it comes to reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms (Williams 
et al., 2008).  
Peer pressure is also potent as it relates to reaction. If firms cannot react to SCS 
breaches as well as their peers, they may gradually lose their ground against competitors. 
In extreme cases, their survival will come under question. As such, firms are prone to 
mimic their peers to implement reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms in order to remain 
competitive. While both customer and peer pressure could be strong, I argue that 
customer pressure will generally be more salient than peer pressure for three reasons. 
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First, firms model after their peers to either match the services other peers have provided 
or reap benefits other firms have experienced. No matter which is the case, eventually 
firms may utilize what they gain from mimicking to win more customers. In this sense, 
competition among peers is customer-driven. Firms may naturally give customer 
requirements higher priority. When facing pressures from both the customers and the 
peers, they are likely to go with the customer pressure first. Second, customers are the 
sources of business. Outmaneuvering competitors is likely to help firms generate new 
customers. But the possibility of failing to capture new customers while defeating 
competitors still exists. Under such circumstances, satisfying (and thus keeping) existing 
customers is arguably a more pragmatic option for firms. Therefore, firms would give 
customer pressure more weight when compared to peer pressure. Finally, while 
negotiable, customer pressure is more coercive than peer pressure. Peer pressure is 
relatively less influential as rivals cannot force the focal firm to adopt a certain type of 
SCSM mechanisms. 
The impact of normative pressure and performance pressure are unlikely to 
exceed customer pressure as well. Norms are naturally embedded in cultural traditions 
and developed as industry professionalism moves forward. For a new norm to gain 
popularity, pioneering firms would have to adopt the norms-to-be first and demonstrate 
that they indeed reap the benefits from the adoption of these norms. In addition, the 
benefits also need to be substantive so that the norms would be touted as “best 
strategies/practices” and thus be widely diffused and adopted by firms. In other words, 
norms-to-be need to be examined and scrutinized repeatedly before they can actually 
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become norms. Unlike norms, customer pressure is straight forward, immediate, and 
vigorous. Suppliers often do not have the option to assess whether the reaction-oriented 
SCSM mechanisms required by customers are beneficial or not before implementing 
them. These reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms must be adopted no matter whether 
they are norms or not. As for performance pressure, reactive SCSM mechanisms 
generally serve as necessary responses to SCS disruptions. They are associated with the 
potential of fewer losses in case of a crisis. However, the realization of such potential 
depends on several factors such as the managerial efforts the firms invested. Maybe 
some firms can effectively grab the benefits of effective reaction to SCS breaches. But 
not all firms benefit fundamentally and equally. As the results of the case studies suggest, 
companies do not have reliable data to measure the performance gains from SCSM 
mechanisms. It would be difficult to persuade top managers to invest in reaction-oriented 
SCSM mechanisms solely based on expected financial outcomes. In this sense, customer 
pressure is likely to be more salient than performance pressure.   
H7: Customer pressure is the strongest institutional predictor of reaction-
oriented SCSM mechanisms. 
 
Primarily building on similar reasons elaborated for the reaction-oriented SCSM 
mechanisms, I argue that customers are the strongest advocates for restorative SCSM 
mechanisms. As I indicated previously, governments have limited incentives to care 
about how firms recover from a SCS beach unless it is a catastrophic disaster like the 
9/11 Terrorist Attacks. Peer pressure is pushing restoration ability to a high bar but such 
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effects are unlikely to exceed those from customers. In essence, outperforming peers is 
meant to win more customers. Customer pressure appears to have higher priority than 
peer pressure. Norms are important but they will not be as straight-forward and forceful 
as customer pressure because it takes time for norms to materialize. Finally, because of 
the low probability of catastrophic failures, it is hard to quantify the benefits of 
restoration-oriented SCSM mechanisms. Firms therefore may not have very strong 
momentum to improve restoration ability. Plus, they may believe that devastating 
breaches are every unlikely to happen to them and thereby lack interests in building up 
restoration ability. Nevertheless, customer pressure is rather salient. As the global supply 
chain manager from Electronics Savvy stated, “we have to work closely with our 
customers and fulfill their requirements.” The company invests so aggressively in SCSM 
technologies which allow it to quickly assess recovered products (i.e., stolen products 
that are found) and determine whether or not these products can be shipped to customers 
on the aftermath of a SCS breach—it wants to recover from SCS breaches and satisfy 
customer demand as soon as possible. As such, customers are likely to have the strongest 
impact on restoration ability and push their suppliers to improve it. 
H8: Customer pressure is the strongest institutional predictor of restoration-
oriented SCSM mechanisms. 
 
3.2.3 Moderation Effects—Boundary Conditions 
Next, I articulate how two boundary conditions can shape the aforementioned 
relationships. Shared supply chain security perception within an organization (shared 
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SCS perception hereafter) refers to the extent to which employees perceive SCS 
breaches as potential threats to their firm. When the shared SCS perception is high, 
employees are likely to embrace the idea that there are considerable SCS threats that can 
impact the firm. The ability to successfully overcome SCS challenges is critical to firm 
survival. Therefore, emergency preparedness is likely to be widely endorsed by 
organizational members. There would be little resistance to changes for security 
purposes (i.e., the implementation of SCSM mechanisms). Employees are ready to 
perform necessary SCSM practices as their daily tasks (Autry and Bobbitt, 2008). 
Further, when employees believe that serious SCS breaches in their supply chain are 
imminent and even minor SCS breaches in the supply chain can be devastating to their 
firm, they will exert efforts to be more prepared to respond to those breaches because 
their jobs may be on the line. For example, IHS Global Insight's analysis (2009) shows 
that a disruption caused by SCS breaches of only one percent in total industry output in 
the United States would result in a loss of approximately 1,250 jobs directly tied to the 
air cargo shipping industry. 
Therefore, when the shared SCS perception is high, putting SCS first becomes a 
sentiment widely shared within the organization. Employees may do more than required 
because they know SCS is critical to the firm and their own well-being. They would 
have the momentum to resolve SCS related problems. They are prone to be more active 
to identify SCS breaches as well. In some cases, they may even get proactively involved 
in SCSM mechanisms which allow them to keep a close eye not only on their own 
operations but also on the status of their supply chain partners. These ideas are consistent 
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with the findings from the Retail Guru case. The Retail Guru’s procurement director of 
own brand products stated that “in our cases all of the world is adulterated. There is lots 
of food adulteration, economic adulteration…we (employees) must be prepared for it 
and we know a minor SCS issue can ruin all our hard work.” To the Retail Guru 
employees, the company earns its current reputation through more than 100 year’s hard 
work and the brand equity can be easily ruined by even minor SCS breaches. Therefore, 
the same director also stated that “we see the need to be able to know more about our 
supply chain, and much further down the supply chain than we have been before.” The 
employees at Retail Guru are willing to go beyond normal requirements and proactively 
implement SCSM mechanisms owing to their shared SCS perception. Hence, I argue 
that shared SCS perception is likely to make firms more willing to conform to 
institutional drivers that call for better SCS.  
H9: Shared SCS perception moderates the relationships between institutional 
pressures and SCSM mechanisms such that these relationships are strengthened 
at high levels of shared SCS perception. 
 
Top management commitment for supply chain security management (top 
management commitment hereafter) refers to the extent to which top managers are 
active in managing supply chain security. High level of top management commitment 
suggests that top managers are actively engaged and demonstrate interest to become 
aware of the risks and consequences associated with SCS breaches. Top managers 
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usually assume a leadership role in SCSM when they sense that their supply chains are 
under threat. As Theo Fletcher, VP of import compliance & SCS for IBM, said: 
“We are all responsible for securing global supply chains…As a large, 
globally integrated enterprise doing business in more than 170 countries. 
IBM values a secure, compliant, and efficient supply chain. That's why at 
IBM supply chain security begins with executive commitment and 
extends throughout our global processes. It affects not only 
manufacturing, fulfillment, and logistics but also information 
management, procurement, and even employee education and human 
resources.” (Theo Fletcher, VP of import compliance & SCS for IBM, 
2007). 
Several reasons are linking top management commitment to effective 
implementation of SCSM mechanism. First, the literature suggests that top management 
commitment is rather influential as top managers are in a unique position to have most 
impact on organizational behaviors (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Different 
organizational functions treat the tasks with clear top management commitment as more 
important and critical to the well-being of the firm when compared with others tasks 
(Raes et al., 2011). As a result, these functions (e.g., finance department which reviews 
the proposal of security investments) tend to be more responsive to those tasks. Multiple 
organizational functions would work collectively as a whole to fulfill the organizational 
goals, as opposed to act independently based on functional interests which are 
sometimes in conflict with organizational goals. In this sense, top management 
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commitment results in effective coordination in the implementation of SCSM 
mechanisms. 
Second, strong top management commitment is expected to negate 
organizational resistance to change and thus lead to superior conversion effectiveness 
(Thong et al., 1996). A firm’s existing internal structures often create inertia that 
impedes the implementation of new practices (Normann, 1977; Tushman and Romanelli, 
1985). Such inertia results in disturbances in practice implementations, and can 
potentially nullify the intended positive effects of the implemented practices (Nord and 
Jermier, 1994). Nevertheless, top management commitment can lead employees away 
from denying changes and foster an acceptable attitude toward changes (Piderit, 2000). 
Because of the active involvement of top managers, the SCS efforts (the intent to 
implement SCSM mechanisms) are thus likely to better convert into productive outputs. 
Third, because top managers are in charge of the use of organizational resources 
(Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008 a, b), supply chain managers may have more resources 
to accomplish jobs which have top management endorsement. As discussed in the Retail 
Guru case, the company devoted resources to hire a manager who exclusively deals with 
C-TPAT compliance. Finally, the unambiguous objectives established by the top 
managers put forward a clear guideline for supply chain managers and employees, which 
in turn make the implementation of SCSM mechanisms easier (Ahire and 
O’Shaughnessy, 1998). Target clarity allows supply chain managers to set appropriate 
goals and measure their achievements effectively. It also speeds up decision-making at 
lower operation levels and reduces the need of consulting superiors frequently. Clear 
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objectives designed at the top thus puts forward a shield against potential interventions 
which may slow down the implementation of SCSM mechanisms (Senge, 1990). Based 
on this reasoning, I propose that top management commitment will enhance the effects 
of institutional pressures on SCSM mechanisms:  
H10: Top management commitment moderates the relationships between 
institutional pressures and SCSM mechanisms such that these relationships are 
strengthened at high levels of top management commitment. 
 
3.2.4 Differential Effects of SCSM Mechanisms 
Relying on the principles of the human immune system, I further explore which 
classes of SCSM mechanisms are most conducive to a specific performance dimension. 
Human bodies do not rely on a single simple immune system that always works the same 
way every time the body is threatened by foreign invaders. In truth, the entire human 
immune system is made up of several different and highly complex sub-systems, each 
designed to protect the body in a different way. When an invasion takes place, all of the 
systems work together, but the particular sub-system that will predominate in any given 
case will depend on the nature of the invading viruses (or bacteria, etc.). In other words, 
one sub-system would play a prevailing role under some circumstances but just assume a 
supporting role under other circumstances.   
The four classes of SCSM mechanisms operate similarly. They have their 
idiosyncratic “talent” in handling some specific aspects of a SCS threat. At the same 
time they have to be implemented together to solve the SCS issues because any single 
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class may not be capable to protect the supply chain. For example, detection-oriented 
mechanisms, as suggested by the name, are designed to detect SCS threats and gaps. 
Compared to other classes of mechanisms, their role is primarily monitoring the supply 
chain so that firms can be warned when SCS problems surface. However, detection 
alone cannot ensure the security of the supply chain. At least, effective reaction must 
follow. In this sense, the four classes of routines are naturally bounded and all are 
needed in combating SCS breaches.  
In this effort, their impact on performance is diverse partly due to their different 
orientation as well as the multidimensional essence of supply chain performance. As I 
mentioned in the previous chapter, SCSM mechanisms may lead to not only better SCS 
performance (e.g., lower supply chain security risk, low levels of theft, less potential 
losses due to security problems) but also to a number of collateral benefits which are 
essentially different performance dimensions. These dimensions encompass supply chain 
cost performance, supply chain responsiveness, supply chain resilience, and supply chain 
visibility among others. Supply chain cost performance measures the extent to which the 
adoption of SCSM mechanisms results in reductions in overall cost, excess inventory, 
insurance premiums, or costs associated with SCS disruptions. Supply chain 
responsiveness measures the extent to which firms gain an improved ability for early 
intervention, faster response to problems, and efficient problem resolution. Supply chain 
resilience is operationalized as the extent to which firms are capable of withstanding 
serious SCS breaches and capable of restoring normal operations. Finally, supply chain 
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visibility denotes the extent to which firms obtain better access to supply chain data such 
as timely shipping information or tracking the location of cargo at any given time. 
Like each sub-systems of the human immune system would dominate the battle 
against antigens given certain conditions, each class of SCSM mechanisms is likely to 
have differential effects on performance dimensions. They may have rather strong 
effects on some dimensions but weak impacts on others. Given the fact that few firms 
can implement all desirable SCSM mechanisms at a time, it is quite relevant to 
understand which class of mechanisms should be implemented to improve a specific 
performance dimension.  
 
3.2.4.1 Prevention-oriented SCSM MechanismsSupply Chain Performance  
As far as the preventative mechanisms are concerned, I argue that (1) they will 
positively affect supply chain performance dimensions and (2) they will have stronger 
effects on supply chain security performance than on other performance dimensions. 
Prevention-oriented mechanisms target breach avoidance. The human skin is a fair 
analogy to preventative practices. Skin is a formidable barrier that prevents infection. 
Not only does the skin function as an impressive physical obstacle like the walls of a 
castle, it is also an unfriendly environment for many microbes. The skin is slightly acidic 
and some areas are quite dry; neither conditions suit many microbes, which makes it a 
deterrent to bacteria. In addition, it secrets sebum which helps coat the skin and block 
out antigens, effectively handing out a “No Trespassing” sign for bacteria. Because of 
those “actions”, the skin can block 95% of invading antigens (Parham, 2005). Without it, 
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the human immune system would have to deal with many more challenges and is likely 
to be fatigued easily. In this sense, the skin absorbs a significant burden and provides 
other human immune system components the opportunity to focus their effects on a 
small number of antigens.  
Similarly, when firms have high prevention ability, they will endure lower levels 
of pain because many of the breaches are averted to begin with. Naturally, supply chain 
security risk is lowered and therefore better SCS performance can be achieved. The need 
for these firms to amass excessive reaction and restoration mechanisms would be 
relatively low. In other words, firms do not need to invest aggressively in the other 
classes, if breaches can be averted. Thus, firms can minimize the cost to address 
extensive SCS breaches. A typical example of such savings is the cost associated with 
expediting freight on the aftermath of a disaster. In addition, high prevention ability 
makes the supply chain more stable. In this sense, firms along the supply chain may 
effectively predict potential disruptions and thus respond to these abnormal conditions 
swiftly. Further, when a sizable number of potential SCS breaches are prevented, the 
variety of SCS breaches a firm will face would become narrower. This makes it possible 
for firms to amass pre-planned activities in order to survive SCS breaches. Finally, to 
effectively avert SCS breaches, firms need to first identify the potential sources of SCS 
breaches in their supply chains. As such, a number of prevention-oriented mechanisms 
can be attributed as detective purposes as well, which leads to improved supply chain 
visibility. Hence, I propose:  
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H11a: Prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms are positively associated with 
supply chain security performance, supply chain cost performance, supply chain 
responsiveness, supply chain resilience, and supply chain visibility. 
 
Following the logic applied in the TQM literature, it is reasonable to argue that 
prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms have rather strong effects on supply chain 
security performance (Lee and Whang, 2005). For example, firms with pretention-
oriented practices collect relevant data, analyze and identify potential SCS breaches, and 
then design processes and train employees to achieve zero SCS breaches. These actions 
reduce the probability that potential SCS threats are under-identified or ignored. For 
instance, employees are involved in detecting theft because they are trained to do so. 
SCS breaches such as smuggling and counterfeit products can be minimized as there is a 
clear chain of command to counteract these issues. Both internal and external SCS 
failures can be diminished and therefore better SCS would be achieved. 
While prevention ability is conducive to SCS performance, its effects on other 
performance dimensions would be relatively marginal when compared to its effects on 
SCS performance. Prevention mechanisms, such as supplier education about SCS, are 
unlikely to reveal a strong direct effect on cost performance. Cost reduction is primarily 
achieved because SCS breaches are averted. Further, in order to effectively prevent SCS 
breaches, firms may attempt to reduce the complexity of its supply chain by nurturing 
sturdy relationship with only a small number of suppliers. However, such strategy 
renders a focal firm’s ability to respond to and recover from SCS breaches more 
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ineffective because it will have fewer alternative suppliers to select from at times of 
crises. Moreover, although in order to prevent SCS breaches firms need to uncover them 
first, the effect of prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms on supply chain visibility is 
unlikely to be stronger than their effect on SCS performance. While detection activities 
are an imperative part of the SCS breach prevention system, some preventive 
mechanisms, such as selection of qualified suppliers, would prevent security incidents 
but not increase supply chain visibility. Hence, 
H11b: The effects of prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms on supply chain 
security performance will be stronger than those on supply chain cost 
performance, supply chain responsiveness, supply chain resilience, and supply 
chain visibility. 
 
3.2.4.2 Detection-oriented SCSM MechanismsSupply Chain Performance 
Firms use sophisticated technologies or other processes to detect whether or not 
their containers have been compromised during shipment. For instance, firms utilize live 
time tracking of cargo offered by RFID techniques. They also actively monitor the 
loading/unloading processes to identify potential SCS breaches. Such actions allow firms 
to synthesize information regarding supply chain operations in real time and achieve 
better SCS. Besides the installation of the state-of-the-art equipment, the detection-
oriented SCSM mechanisms also involve practices such as conducting periodic SCS 
assessments of suppliers across tiers. Such mechanisms enable organizations to detect 
“near” SCS breaches and notify supply chain partners across tiers if the supply chain is 
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threatened. It helps to establish an effective and clear communication channel among 
supply chain partners, leading to high supply chain visibility which eventually results in 
better SCS performance.  
On top of SCS performance and supply chain visibility, detection-oriented SCSM 
mechanisms contribute to other performance dimensions as well. Such mechanisms are 
conducive to superior cost performance. Many detection-oriented practices can be used 
not only to boost SCS performance but also to enhance operational efficiency. For 
example, the ability to track and trace cargo shipments in real time permits firms to 
adjust their manufacturing plans in a way such that the costs associated with excessive 
waiting time and redundant inventory can be minimized. In addition, early detection 
permits firms to undertake actions systematically and thus enhances effective reaction to 
emerging SCS breaches. High detection capability also makes quick resolution of 
security problems possible and thus increases the possibility that firms can withstand 
SCS crises. In other words, the implementation of detection-oriented SCSM mechanisms 
would promote supply chain responsiveness and supply chain resilience. Hence, 
H12a: Detection-oriented SCSM mechanisms are positively associated with 
supply chain security performance, supply chain cost performance, supply chain 
responsiveness, supply chain resilience, and supply chain visibility. 
  
Arguably, successful detection is a prerequisite of many other SCS related 
practices. Only when SCS breaches are detected can other responses be carried out. The 
treatment of cancer is a good example to illustrate the instrumental role of detection-
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oriented SCSM mechanisms. When normal cells turn into cancer cells, the detection 
mechanisms of the human immune system would cause some of the tumor antigens on 
their surface to change (Schindler, 1991). These new or altered antigens flag the immune 
system defenders, including lymphocyte-T cells, natural killer cells, and macrophages, to 
conduct the foremost responses to infectious cancer cells. Since quite a few types of 
cancer can only be cured or contained when they are diagnosed at early stages (Nourse, 
1982), failure of early detection would imply that human life is compromised.  
In the context of SCSM, detection-oriented SCSM mechanisms play a similar 
role as the cancer treatment example demonstrates. They provide synthesized 
information for other SCSM mechanisms to effectively function. The information 
detection-oriented mechanisms offer enables multiple functional departments within an 
organization to coordinate their efforts to react to SCS breaches and thus reduce 
operational costs. Even when the type of SCS breaches that is identified cannot be fully 
addressed immediately, effective detection still allows companies to develop a 
sophisticated treatment plan than may mitigate the impact of the SCS breaches and 
sustain operations. In this sense, detection ability is the foundation for other SCSM 
mechanisms. Nonetheless, except for supply chain visibility, it affects other performance 
dimensions only indirectly and instrumentally by delivering timely information. 
Therefore, I propose:  
H12b: The effects of detection-oriented SCSM mechanisms on supply chain 
visibility will be stronger than those on supply chain cost performance, supply 
chain responsiveness, supply chain resilience, and supply chain visibility. 
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3.2.4.3 Reaction-oriented SCSM MechanismsSupply Chain Performance 
Reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms involve activities that are designed as a 
response to SCS breaches. This class of SCSM mechanisms aims to correct and remove 
SCS perils. Typical reactive mechanisms include but are not limited to developing 
protocols for communication when a crisis arises, delegating authority so that 
teams/individuals can take necessary action in case of a crisis, and cross-training 
employees as a mechanism to deal with potential SCS breaches. These mechanisms 
ensure firms can launch an early intervention in case of a SCS breach and make efficient 
and fast problem resolution possible. In other words, reactive SCSM mechanisms lead to 
better SCS performance and supply chain responsiveness.  
Rapid reaction results in better cost performance as well because a quick 
response may contain the magnitude of a SCS breach and reduce potential losses. It also 
gives the firm an immediate and probably important taste of what the problem is and 
how the firm can resolve it. Consequently, the damage due to a SCS breach can be 
minimized. Effective reaction also conjures successful restoration. Firms employ several 
strategies and practices at the product design and manufacturing stages in order to 
improve efficient problem resolution. For instance, many manufacturers use 
interchangeable or generic parts for their major product lines and negotiate flexible 
capacity contracts with suppliers. By doing so, they build flexibility in their supply 
chains and can quickly assume normal operations in case of a security crisis. Finally, 
some firms go beyond “common” reaction activities. They designate a quick reaction 
force as first respondents in case of a crisis and equip those employees with a specific 
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crisis management room. Such action keeps all relevant individuals/parties better 
informed about the status of the supply chain and makes the details of SCS breaches 
more visible to managers. Taken together, I propose: 
H13a: Reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms are positively associated with 
supply chain security performance, supply chain cost performance, supply chain 
responsiveness, supply chain resilience, and supply chain visibility. 
 
While reaction SCSM mechanisms are postulated to positively affect supply 
chain performance, their effects on these performance dimensions could be different in 
terms of magnitude of impact. Specifically, I argue that the effect of reaction 
mechanisms on supply chain responsiveness would be stronger than their effects on 
other four performance dimensions. This idea can be better explained by looking at the 
example of lymphocyte-T cell in the human immune system. Lymphocyte-T cells are a 
special group of small white cells that directly participate in the immune defense 
(Schindler, 1991). While they can detect viruses through the receptors on their surface, 
the principle role played by Lymphocyte-T cells is to eliminate pathogens (Schwartz, 
1980). Indeed, they are evolved to be able to detect viruses without the help of other 
cells simply because they need to effectively destroy these viruses: if the lymphocyte-T 
cells cannot effectively engaged in pathogen elimination, the human life would likely 
come under question (Schwartz, 1980). Similarly, reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms 
are, by their very nature, designed to facility fast responses to SCS breaches. The 
reactive mechanisms may advance other four performance measures primarily because 
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they enable firms to react to SCS breaches more effectively. In this sense, the effects of 
reaction mechanisms on other performance dimensions are essentially “by-products” of 
better supply chain responsiveness. As such, I propose:  
H13b: The effects of reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms on supply chain 
responsiveness will be stronger than those on supply chain security performance, 
supply chain cost performance, supply chain resilience, and supply chain 
visibility. 
 
3.2.4.4 Restoration-oriented SCSM MechanismsSupply Chain Performance 
Even when firms have high reaction ability to respond to SCS disruptions, they 
cannot overlook the need for restoration-oriented SCSM mechanisms (Sheffi, 2005). 
They have to quickly resume normal operations because any breakdown caused by SCS 
breaches can be very costly. For example, as the managers I interviewed suggested, a 
SCS related crisis may compel their firm to adjust their pre-set manufacturing plans 
which can significantly affect material supplies and inventory, product lead time, and 
product quality. In an endeavor to deal with such a crisis, firms institute disaster 
recovery plans (Rice and Spayd, 2005). For instance, they maintain strategic inventories 
(both raw material and machinery) (Peleg-Gillai and Bhat, 2006). Their strategy also 
specifies the selective use of slack resources in anticipation of SCS disruptions (Peleg-
Gillai and Bhat, 2006). All these strategies and practices enhance the ability of firms to 
withstand a SCS disruption and reinstate operations on the aftermath of a disruption, 
leading to better supply chain resilience.    
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Besides supply chain resilience, restoration-oriented SCSM mechanisms are 
related to other performance dimensions as well. As the results of the case studies reveal, 
restoration-oriented mechanisms overlap with reaction-oriented mechanisms. For 
instance, restorative practices, such as the development of alternative material sources in 
case of a supply chain disruption, are also helpful to build supply chain responsiveness 
and thus enhance SCS performance. Quick responses, in turn, cut operational costs and 
ease the need to tackle abnormal conditions caused by SCS disruptions because these 
abnormal conditions are unlikely to be lasting when quick responses are standing by. In 
addition, restorative mechanisms could help firms move to a new and better status after 
major SCS disruptions because these SCS disruptions provide opportunities for effective 
changes that otherwise would have faced strong resistance (Thong et al., 1996). In this 
sense, restoration-oriented mechanisms inform managers about the status of their supply 
chain and potentially make hidden supply chain problems more visible to the 
organization leaders.  
H14a: Restoration-oriented SCSM mechanisms are positively associated with 
supply chain security performance, supply chain cost performance, supply chain 
responsiveness, supply chain resilience, and supply chain visibility. 
 
As far as the differential effect is concerned, restorative mechanisms are likely to 
exhibit a stronger effect on supply chain resilience than on other performance 
dimensions. The reason is that restoration-oriented mechanisms are “post-hoc” practices 
that generally take place on the aftermath of a SCS breach. While they help a firm to 
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restore normal operations, their “post-hoc” nature determines that they will have little 
impact on SCS breaches a priori. Firms should not expect to utilize restorative 
mechanisms to significantly reduce the number of SCS breaches, effectively facilitate 
early intervention, or effectively improve supply chain visibility. Unsurprisingly, the 
effect of restoration-oriented mechanisms on cost performance is also unlikely to be 
superior. While many people believe that restorative mechanisms can reduce overall cost 
when considered as a whole (Peleg-Gillai and Bhat, 2006; Rice and Spayd, 2005), even 
more people would probably also agree that some restorative practices, such as 
maintaining strategic inventory, actually increase operational cost (Sheffi, 2005; Voss et 
al., 2009b). Taken together, I propose: 
H14b: The effect of restoration-oriented SCSM mechanisms on supply chain 
resilience will be stronger than those on supply chain security performance, 
supply chain cost performance, supply chain responsiveness, and supply chain 
visibility. 
 
3.2.5 Impact of SCSM Mechanisms as A Portfolio  
While it is clear that all four classes of SCSM mechanisms boost firm 
performance respectively, it remains unclear how the four classes may potentially 
interact to enhance performance. The presumption is that if the four classes function 
collaboratively as many sub systems in the human immune system do, then theoretically 
the firms with uniform-high SCSM ability (i.e., they score high in all four classes, 
uniform-high hereafter) would perform better than other firms. In reality, however, do 
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these firms actually outperform their peers with mixed (i.e., firms that score high in at 
least one of the classes but not all classes, mixed hereafter) or uniform-low (i.e., firms 
that, for whatever reasons, score low in all classes, uniform-low hereafter) SCSM 
ability? 
The answer to this question is important as it allows us to look at the impact of 
SCSM mechanisms on firm performance from a different perspective. For instance, what 
is the value of implementing other classes of SCSM mechanisms if the most essential 
class is already implemented to improve the most critical performance dimension that a 
firm desires? Can the stimulus generated by adopting/implementing additional strategies 
and practices in other classes justify the investment? For example, two firms may have 
implemented detection-oriented SCSM mechanisms to the same level. According to my 
previous arguments, one can expect that the two firms may gain similarly in terms of 
supply chain visibility. Yet, the supply chain visibility of one firm could be higher than 
the other firm’s simply because it implements more mechanisms in other classes and 
those mechanisms interact with detection practices in a way such that the compound 
effect on supply chain visibility becomes stronger.  
The human immune system is again a fair analog to help us understand this 
phenomenon. Many different proteins and antibodies in the human immune system need 
to work together to achieve their maximal effects. These different forms of proteins and 
antibodies, while have specific functions to perform, become more effective when 
working as an integrated entity to destroy invading antigens. The example of 
complement proteins presents an exemplar case. Complement plays a remarkable role in 
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the human immune system. Complements are a group of special protein molecules. They 
have been given the odd name of complement because, when they were first discovered, 
it was mistakenly assumed their job was to help or assist antibodies rather than destroy 
invading antigens. Scientists later learned that it was exactly backward. It is the 
antibodies that help or assist the complement molecules to fit together and transform 
them into a powerful bacteria-killer.  
There are at least nine different forms of molecules that have been found in this 
particular family of proteins. They are somewhat “harmless” to invading bacteria 
individually. Imagine that a powerful rifle is lying on the table as separate pieces. Any 
one, or two of the pieces, taken alone or together, are perfectly harmless. All nine pieces 
are literally harmless if they are lying separately on the table. It is only when all those 
pieces have been assembled in the right way, in the right order, that the rifle becomes a 
commanding weapon. The nine complement proteins work much like the pieces of the 
rifle. They are not as effective as the “assembled” complement complex when working 
separately. 
The four classes of SCSM mechanisms work alike to those complement 
molecules and their assisting antibodies. Each class functions like an individual form of 
complement molecule. They positively affect SCS performance and have differential 
effects on other performance dimensions. However, the optimal security/supply chain 
performance may not be achieved if the implementation of these classes of SCSM 
mechanisms is not aligned. For example, lack of prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms 
may impose too much pressure on the focal firm to effectively detect and react to SCS 
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breaches. Likewise, lack of reaction-oriented ability forces the focal firm to invest 
heavily in prevention and detection so that they can identify SCS breaches and resolve 
them at the early stage. None of the four classes of SCSM mechanisms alone can ensure 
the security of the supply chain. In addition, the four classes are likely to enhance each 
other. For instance, in order to prevent SCS breaches, firms need to have high detection 
ability so that potential security glitches will be identified beforehand. As such, the 
deployment of preventive SCSM mechanisms would positively affect the 
implementation of detective SCSM mechanisms. In a similar vein, the reaction class and 
the restoration class are interacting in a positive way. Effective reaction is arguably the 
first step of restoration. In order to recover from a SCS disruption, firms have to react to 
it first. In this sense, uniform-high firms would outperform uniform-low or mixed firms 
along different performance dimensions. 
H15a: Uniform-high firms outperform uniform-low/mixed firms on supply chain 
security performance, supply chain cost performance, supply chain 
responsiveness, supply chain resilience, and supply chain visibility. 
 
Yet, the observations from the human immune system also warn us that applying 
an excessive effort to fight antigens is not necessarily a good thing for the human body. 
Consider the complements as an example. Once the complement complex “riffle” has 
been correctly assembled, it is not very safe to have around. For example, it may 
accidentally go off or be fired in the wrong direction instead of at its chosen target. 
Indeed, experiments show that the complement complex does not really care which cell 
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it attacks (Nourse, 1982). The human immune system must send the right “command” to 
the bacteria-killer so that self-cells won’t be killed mistakenly (Nourse, 1982). A similar 
example relates to allergies. People are allergic not because their human immune system 
is not working but because their system is working too hard (Nourse, 1982; Schindler, 
1991). The immune responses are triggered by false alarms. Normally harmless 
substances, such as grass pollen or house dust, are perceived as threats and are attacked 
by the human immune system. Consequently, the human beings have to suffer 
unnecessary pains. 
The lessons of excessive human immune responses can be applied to the SCSM 
system as well. Additional inspections for detection purposes may slow down the 
movement of products and thus hurt supply chain responsiveness. These inspections also 
increase operational costs and administrative costs. In addition, when a firm decides to 
implement all four classes of practices at a high level, more coordination among 
different parties and organization functions is required. Effective management of the 
implementation of the four classes is not an easy task (Closs and McGarrell, 2004) and 
ineffective coordination may cause problems which can negate the rents generated by 
implementing these classes. For example, as discussed in the case studies, Retail Guru 
faces cargo delays every month due to its strict security screening policy. An alternative 
view would thus suggest that, while the SCS performance is improved, other 
performance dimensions could be compromised when firms invest aggressively in all 
four classes.  
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Therefore, I propose two competing hypotheses against H15a:       
H15b: Uniform-high firms outperform uniform-low firms/mixed firms on supply 
chain security performance.  
 
H15c: Uniform-high firms perform at least as well as uniform-low/mixed firms 
on supply chain cost performance, supply chain responsiveness, supply chain 
resilience, and supply chain visibility. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH METHODS AND RESULTS 
 
The previous chapter laid out a set of hypotheses. To test these hypotheses, I 
collected data and performed respective analyses. 
 
4.1 Research Design and Research Methods 
A survey-based approach was employed for this dissertation. In addition, this 
work has benefited greatly from four case studies from diverse industries. Since the 
institutional theory and the tenets of the human immune system used in the present study 
are well developed, this study is essentially testing a variance theory model based on 
mature theories. Thus, the data collection methods can be primarily quantitative 
(Edmondson and McManus, 2007). Survey is an attractive method of data collection as it 
has the potential to afford the researcher a large amount of information that can be 
analyzed to test relationships between two or more variables (Miller, 1991). Survey is 
also attractive owing to its ability to generate generous amounts of information from a 
large sample of subjects under study (Kerlinger, 1986). This presents the opportunity to 
increase the generalizability of findings (Dobrzykowski et al., 2010).  
Nevertheless, the survey-based method faces challenges. Currently, a major 
challenge faced by researchers when using the survey method is low response rate. This 
is a serious concern for researchers because response rate is critical to the 
generalizability of a study’s findings (Malhotra and Grover, 1998). Observations show 
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that the response rate in academic studies has declined steadily in recent decades 
(Baruch, 1999). This challenge has been exacerbated in the context of SCS owing to the 
sensitivity of the topic: SCS information, measures, and strategies are considered 
confidential and the data are not publicly available (Williams et al., 2009b).  
Recognizing this challenge, I subscribe to the recommendations of Erdos (1970) 
and Blankenship and Breen (1992) to improve the response rate to the survey. The 
survey had a simple appearance and was designed to be easily read with black letters that 
are highly visible. The study also implemented the use of incentives, which is 
recommended by Erdos (1970). Benchmark reports were prepared for participants free-
of-charge. In addition, two Amazon Kindle Fire tablets were granted to two individual 
respondents randomly selected from the sample pool. To further improve response rate, I 
administrated a personalized notice before sending out the survey. Therefore, when 
possible, phone calls were placed to potential respondents, not only explaining the 
purpose of this study and assuring the anonymity, but also informing the importance of 
the study. It was anticipated that this action also helped to mitigate another threat to 
survey-based research: “that the questionnaire may be answered by someone other than 
the addressee (Erdos, 1970, p. 125).”  
Paralleled with the survey administration, I conducted four field studies based on 
a qualitative approach. There are three reasons why the qualitative approach is important 
and necessary to this study. First, adopting multiple methods is an effective way to 
enhance the research validity. Ethnographic interviews help discover what is meant by 
specific concepts or whether there is a misunderstanding between practitioners and 
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academics (Flynn, Sakakibara, Schroeder, Bates, & Flynn, 1990). The interviews are 
thus critical to the present study as they helped to define concepts, such as supply chain 
security, more effectively. Second, these interviews afforded me the opportunity to 
refine the proposed hypotheses. The four companies reside in different industries (i.e., 
food and beverage, IT & electronics, and high technology manufacturing) and are all 
sensitive to SCS breaches, though their sensitivity varied. Their understanding of SCS is 
invaluable and allows me to fine-tune/refine the theoretical relationships proposed in 
chapter III. A multiple-case design was adopted in order to fully extract the information 
from the four field visits. Supply chain managers from these companies were 
interviewed. Besides the interviews, information was collected from archival data (e.g., 
documents, historical records, and organizational charts) and observations (e.g., plant 
tour, attendance at meetings). Third, the qualitative approach is utilized because of the 
need to verify the content domain of the four classes of SCSM mechanisms proposed in 
chapter II. The four case studies involve interviews with practitioners who were familiar 
with their firms’ SCS affairs. These case studies were used to determine the content 
domain of the four classes of SCSM mechanisms respectively. Establishing the content 
domain of each construct is vital for content validity. 
 
4.2 Survey Data Collection 
4.2.1 Pre-testing 
In an endeavor to further refine the measurement scales, a pre-testing was 
conducted. A total of 15 academics and practitioners were interviewed following the 
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rigorous instrument development approach proposed by Swink and Song (2007). The 
participating academics were considered experts in the field of supply chain 
management and had published papers in leading academic journals. Each participating 
practitioner had many years of experience in manufacturing firms, and especially in the 
purchasing area.   
The overall theoretical model was first introduced during the interviews. The 
experts were then solicited for their opinions regarding the model and the construct 
definitions. The author also probed them to share any relevant experiences. The subjects’ 
perceptions with respect to the relevance and completeness of the measurement scales 
were solicited as well. Each expert’s feedback was analyzed to assure consistency 
between construct definition and operationalization. The pre-testing resulted in minor 
changes of the survey questionnaire.  
 
4.2.2 Sample and Procedures 
The final questionnaire included survey items which were based on a seven point 
Likert type scale to obtain necessary variance, where 1: Not at all and 7: A great deal. 
The target population is primarily composed of manufacturing firms operating in the 
United States and Italy. The questionnaire was translated and back-translated into Italian 
in line with the procedures proposed by Brislin (1980). A group of operation managers 
from three large Italian organizations were also involved to increase clarity and avoid 
misunderstanding of survey questions. High ranking supply chain executives of targeted 
firms were asked to respond to the questionnaire because they were the people who had 
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the knowledge of supply chain strategies, manufacturing practices, and respective 
performance. 
Due to the sensitivity of the topic and subsequently the potential low response 
rate, we solicited endorsement from leading professional SCM organizations. The U.S. 
based Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP) agreed to support 
this research. The cover letter to U.S. respondents was signed by the CSCMP director of 
public relations to encourage participation. The potential U.S. respondents of the survey 
were selected from the member list provided by CSCMP. Members of the Institute for 
Supply Management (ISM) were also targeted. Two academics with extensive 
experience in O&SCM selected 1,855 potential respondents from an initial list of more 
than 6,000 supply chain/logistics/operations professionals. They sought the participation 
of high- and middle-level executives because (1) they would possess knowledge of the 
SCSM mechanisms and, (2) they would have sound knowledge of the institutional 
environment where their firms reside. As mentioned before, when possible, I provided 
advanced personalized notice by phone calls before sending the potential respondents the 
survey. Roughly, 400 phone calls were placed. The initial list of potential respondents 
from Italy was obtained from Associazione Italiana Acquisti e Supply Management 
(ADACI), the Italian association of Supply Chain Managers. My Italian colleague 
selected 1,125 potential respondents using the same criteria used for the U.S. sample. 
The Italian researcher also provided advanced personalized notice by phone calls 
whenever possible.  
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The target population was composed primarily of manufacturing firms for both 
countries. We selected firms from various industries with different firm sizes because 
this allowed us to generalize the research findings. The final survey was administrated in 
both countries via both mailings and emails (i.e., mixed-mode survey, Dillman, Smyth, 
and Christian, 2009), along with a cover letter explaining the study’s purpose and 
assuring the anonymity of each participating firm. The mixed-mode survey allows 
potential respondents to choose the communication medium they like and may 
potentially improve their willingness to respond to the survey (Dillman et al., 2009).  
The data-collection process yielded 261 responses from the U.S. with a response 
rate of 14.1% (261/1855). Responses from 32 companies were not utilized because they 
did not provide sufficient information for meaningful analysis. This led to 229 usable 
responses, with an effective response rate of 12.3% (229/1855). As for the Italian 
sample, complete responses from 233 companies were collected with an effective 
response rate of 20.7% (223/1125). Both effective response rates compared favorably 
with other survey studies in SCS research (e.g., Williams et al., 2009b). The overall 
effective response rate is 15.5% (462/2980). 
In order to assess that the samples obtained from the two countries were 
comparable, I tested for measurement invariance following the procedures recommended 
by Koufteros and Marcoulides (2006). The equivalence of measures was assessed using 
confirmatory factor analysis via Mplus version 6.2.1. For each theoretical construct, a 
base model (model 1) was first specified without adding any constraints on it. Good 
model fit was necessary to establish that the number of factors is the same across 
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countries. Then a second model (model 2) was specified where the factor loadings 
between the U.S. group and the Italian group were constrained to be equal. A non-
significant difference between the chi-square values of the two models (model 1 and 
model 2) suggests measurement invariance. The chi-square differences for all theoretical 
constructs were non-significant (p>0.05), suggesting that the measurement items are 
invariant across the two considered groups. Therefore, I combined the two samples to 
test hypotheses.   
Note that when the interest is to assess the difference of path coefficients 
between groups, further assessment for equal measurement errors, equal correlations, 
and equal structural coefficients are required (Koufteros and Marcoulides, 2006). 
Nevertheless, a test of equal loading is sufficient for examining measurement invariance 
between two samples collected using the same instrument (Kirkman et al., 2009).  
 
4.2.3 Sample Characteristics 
Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, 87 firms opted not to provide any 
information regarding their industry affiliation or other identifying information and thus 
I was unable to classify these firms into industry clusters. Nevertheless, I divided the 
remaining 384 firms into six industry sectors which were widely used for research 
purposes in the O&SCM literature (e.g., Villena et al., 2009): Food & Beverage, 
Chemical & Pharmaceutical, Automotive, IT & Electronics, Other Manufacturing, and 
others.  
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Table 12 displays the sample characteristics of participating firms in terms of 
number of employees, annual sales, respondent position, and industry membership. 
 
 
Table 12. Sample characteristics 
Firms by Size:    
Number of employees  Frequency  Percentage  
Less than 100  65 17% 
100 to 499  100 26% 
500 to 999  35 9% 
1,000 to 9,999  84 22% 
Over 10,000  100 26% 
 Total  384 100% 
    
Annual sales  Frequency  Percentage  
Less than 10 million  59 15% 
10 to 99.9 million  84 22% 
100 to 999.9 million  92 24% 
1 to 10 billion  88 23% 
More than 10 billion  61 16% 
 Total 384 100% 
    
Respondents by position:   
Position  Frequency  Percentage  
President/Chairman 
CEO/COO 
Director 
Managers  
16 4% 
38 10% 
100 26% 
211 55% 
Others  19 5% 
 Total 384 100% 
    
Firms by industry membership:    
Industry  Frequency Percentage 
Food  38 10% 
Chemical & Pharmaceutical  56 15% 
Automotive  23 6% 
IT & Electronics  30 8% 
Other Manufacturing  160 42% 
Others  77 20% 
 Total 384 100% 
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Firm size was measured by two relevant indices: number of employees and 
annual sales (Pagell et al., 2004; Villena et al., 2009).  As shown in table 12, about 57% 
of firms in the sample were medium to large firms and had more than 500 employees 
(Wu and Choi, 2005). In terms of sales, 63% of firms had $100 million or more in 
annual sales. As far as management position is concerned, 95% of respondents held at 
least a managerial level position in their company. Typical titles of respondents were 
vice president of supply chain, supply chain security manager, and procurement 
manager. About 80% of participating firms were from manufacturing, which was not 
surprising as the target population was primarily manufacturing firms. 
 
4.3 Measurement Scales Operationalization 
4.3.1 Institutional Pressures 
The first group of variables captures different institutional antecedents of SCSM 
mechanisms. The institutional theory is a mature theory with well-development 
constructs (Heugens and Lander, 2009). Thus, this dissertation adapted existing manifest 
variables of institutional pressures from a recent literature review of the institutional 
theory research by Heugens and Lander (2009) and several classic studies (e.g., 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001). Minor changes were made to ensure the 
manifest variables were well accommodated with the research context. Specifically, five 
institutional pressures were included: government, customer, peer, normative, and 
performance pressure. Measurement items for institutional pressures are listed in table 
13 along with their factor loadings based on exploratory factor analysis, extracting 
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factors using principal axis factoring coupled with direct oblimin specification for 
rotation. Using the eigen-value-greater-than-one criterion, I found only one factor 
emerged from each group.  
 
Table 13. Measurement items for institutional pressures 
Government pressure: eigen value = 2.437, percentage of variance explained = 60.93%  Factor loading 
There is definite pressure from our government to meet security standards .83 
We will receive significant benefits if we adopt security standards prescribed by our government .70 
Our government takes an active role on security matters .80 
We cannot take security lightly as our government will hold us accountable .78 
  
Customer pressure: eigen value = 2.70, percentage of variance explained = 75.45%    
Our customers pressure us to do better on security .78 
We have to meet standards for security as our customers are demanding us to do so .88 
Our customers hold us accountable for security .80 
Our customers are monitoring our security practices/performance .83 
  
Peer pressure: eigen value = 1.89, percentage of variance explained = 74.63%  
We feel that we have to adopt security practices because everybody else does it .66 
We feel the pressure to adopt security practices as most of our peers have done so .82 
We feel that we have to adopt security practices as most of our rivals have done so .88 
  
Normative pressure: eigen value = 1.84, percentage of variance explained = 72.99%  
We employ risk & security practices in order to conform to professional norms .82 
We implement supply chain security practices to conform to industry norms .89 
We employ supply chain security practices to conform to cultural norms .61 
  
Performance pressure: eigen value = 2.23, percentage of variance explained = 82.88%  
We implement security practices because they can improve performance .86 
We implement security practices because they can lead to competitive advantage .86 
We implement security practices because we see operational benefits .87 
 
 
4.3.2 Four Classes of SCSM Mechanisms 
The second group of variables involves constructs that capture the four classes of 
SCSM mechanisms. The present study first operationalizes various SCSM measures 
based on prior SCS research (e.g., Lee and Whang, 2005; Mena et al., 2009; Sheffi 2001, 
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2005; Williams et al. 2009a, 2009b), industry-oriented reports (the IBM special report 
series for supply chain security), and a number of SCS initiatives/programs developed by 
either governments or international organizations (e.g., C-TPAT, AEO, etc.). A large 
number of SCSM measures (100 measures) were selected, representing a rather broad 
spectrum of strategies and practices firms implemented to improve SCS and mitigate 
risk. Then these measures were categorized into four groups to capture the four classes 
of SCSM mechanisms proposed in the taxonomy.  
There are a few techniques that can be deployed to categorize SCSM 
mechanisms. For example, exploratory factor analysis can be used to find out how many 
SCSM mechanism clusters “naturally” emerge or underlie the data. Yet, exploratory 
factor analysis exhibited several trivial factors or generated several cross-loadings that 
were hard to interpret even when different extraction/rotation methods and robust 
estimators were used. This is understandable and can be explained by the immunology 
literature. When discussing how the human immune system operates, immunology 
authors state that a particular lymphocyte cell can serve as both a detection and reaction 
mechanism (Parham, 2005). Similarly, security personnel who detect a SCS breach 
could also be the first ones who react to that security breach. In this sense, a security-
oriented mechanism may be ascribed to more than one class of mechanisms in the 
proposed taxonomy. In addition, the SCSM mechanisms may cross-fertilize each other 
as well. For example, high detection ability grants more time for effective reaction. As a 
result, purely data-driven clustering techniques, such as exploratory factor analysis, may 
not yield useful results. Thus, this study opted first to incorporate subjective clustering 
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methods to tackle this issue. The purpose of the subjective clustering method is to 
capture the extent of agreement among people in how they employ concepts, in our case 
how people treat a SCSM mechanism as preventive, detective, reactive, or restorative.  
The classic Q-Sort method (Stephenson, 1953) which has been widely used in the 
social sciences research was employed in this dissertation. The use of ranking, rather 
than rating numerically in Q-Sort, is meant to acknowledge that people think about ideas 
in relation to other ideas, rather than in isolation. The key concern with this method is 
that the Q-sorter (the individual who actually does the sorting) may frequently 
experience doubt, indecision, and despair over the actions requested of him or her. 
Nevertheless, Frank (1956) shows that the behavior of the Q-sorter is highly repeatable: 
test-retest reliabilities range from .93 to .97 in his study. The skepticism over this type of 
reliability is unwarranted (Thomas and Baas, 1992).  
Forced Q-sorting was used (i.e., the number of classes was constrained to be five, 
including one N/A class for items that the Q-sorters believe do not belong to any of the 
four classes) because (1) unforced Q-sorting provides lower discrimination and suffers 
from the Barnum effect (Meehl, 1956); (2) the unforced Q-sorting is not more reliable 
than the forced one (Block, 1961); and finally (3) the five-class setting is consistent with 
the taxonomy proposed in the second chapter.  
Three O&SCM professors and three practitioners who had extensive experience 
in supply chain management and were cognizant of the SCS issues served as the Q-
sorters. Since the interest of the Q-sort method is the extent to which viewpoints are 
converging or not, the number of sorters, fundamental to most social research, is 
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rendered relatively unimportant (Brown, 1980). A Q methodological process requires 
only a limited number of Q-sorters. The reason for this is that increasing the number of 
Q-sorters will introduce unnecessary variation and potentially taint the Q-sorting results. 
As Brown put it, “…all that is required are enough subjects to establish the existence of 
a factor for purposes of comparing one factor with another” (Brown 1980, p. 201). In 
addition, the sorters are not randomly drawn. This is because Q-sorters are drawn from a 
sample of judges who are knowledgeable about and theoretically relevant to the problem 
under investigation (Brown, 1980, 1993).  
The objectivity of the Q-sorting process should not be a concern for this study. 
One of the most important characteristics of Q-sorting is that the results are highly 
replicable, i.e., the same condition of instruction should lead to factors that are 
schematically reliable. According to Brown (1980), only a limited number of distinct 
viewpoints exist on any topic and these viewpoints will be revealed when the Q sample 
is administrated to different sets of Q-sorters. Based on the findings of two pairs of 
tandem studies, Thomas and Baas (1992) endorsed this idea and concluded that 
skepticism over replicability/generalizibility is unwarranted.  
A brief of the proposed taxonomy was provided to the six Q-sorters. The six Q-
sorters then individually sorted the SCSM measures based on the proposed taxonomy. 
The Q-sorting results were then collected and analyzed. The results were quite consistent 
among Q-sorters. About 72% of the SCSM measures were sorted into the same class by 
at least four of the six Q-sorters. In addition, only 1.4% of the SCSM measures were 
marked under the N/A class. The Q-sorting results are reported in Appendix B. 
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While the Q-sorting exercise provided a valid categorization, a practical problem 
before moving to hypothesis testing still existed. Each class of SCSM mechanisms 
entailed a fairly large number of measures. In essence, sampling from the domain of 
each construct is necessary. Thus, this present study opted to utilize a qualitative 
approach to identify the most important SCSM measures that represent each of the four 
classes of SCSM mechanisms. Toward this end, the four case studies proved invaluable. 
The author conducted semi-constructed interviews with supply chain managers from 
these firms. The taxonomy of SCSM mechanisms was first introduced and then the 
interviewees were solicited to elaborate on what their firm (or even other manufacturing 
firms they know of) has implemented to prevent (detect, react to, and restore from) SCS 
breaches (see Tables 9 and 10). The interviewees were also requested to discuss SCSM 
mechanisms that are most critical to their firm and why.  
Building upon the case studies, I was able to select a representative sample of 
SCSM measures from the Q-sorted measures to reflect each of the four classes proposed 
by the taxonomy. The final set of indicators is reported in Table 14. Exploratory factor 
analysis using principal axis factoring extraction and direct oblimin rotation was 
performed to each block of selected items. Using the eigen-value-greater-than-one 
criterion, I found only one factor emerged from each group.  
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Table 14. Measurement items for SCSM mechanisms 
Prevention: eigen value = 3.95, percentage of variance explained = 56.40% Factor loading 
We secure containers at our facilities to assure they are not compromised .68 
Our supply chain strategy spells out security priorities .82 
Our supply chain risk management strategy can be characterized as proactive .83 
When it comes to supply chain security, our strategy focuses on prevention .76 
We hold all suppliers accountable for supply chain security .72 
We only approve suppliers (irrespective of tier) that have a risk management program in place .68 
We educate suppliers about supply chain security practices .74 
  
Detection: eigen value = 5.73, percentage of variance explained = 57.30%  
We have the ability to track and trace our cargo in real time .63 
We use active measures such as video and sensors to be able to detect security breaches .61 
We monitor the loading/unloading process of cargo to identify potential security breaches .73 
We use sophisticated technologies to detect if containers have been compromised .79 
We monitor and synthesize information regarding security breaches .83 
We do conduct periodic assessments of our supply chain security .82 
We have procedures to detect supply chain security failures or near failures .69 
We have procedures to detect near misses in supply chain security .81 
We monitor our supplier network to identify suppliers at risk .81 
We have a process that notifies supply chain partners across tiers if the supply chain is threatened .80 
  
Reaction: eigen value = 6.96, percentage of variance explained = 57.97%  
We pre-position resources to deal with crises effectively .79 
We know what to do when we encounter supply chain security breaches or crises .88 
We have designated a group of employees as first respondents in case of a crisis .72 
There is effective communication across our supply chain when a crisis hits .86 
There is a definite chain of command in case of an emergency .75 
We have protocols for communication when a crisis arises .77 
We have a well-defined contingency plan to react to serious supply chain security breaches .84 
We have a quick reaction force to deal with a crisis or a serious disruption in our supply chain .76 
We use interchangeable or generic parts as a strategy to deal with potential disruptions in the supply chain .54 
We cross-train our employees as a mechanism to deal with potential supply chain disruptions .81 
We have backup processes that can assist us at times of crises .80 
We have flexible capacity contracts with suppliers in order to improve our ability to react to a crisis .53 
  
Restoration: eigen value = 3.51, percentage of variance explained = 58.44%  
We do have a disaster recovery plan .75 
We have a specific process to reinstate operations in case of a major crisis/disruption .72 
We maintain strategic inventory stocks to deal with potential crises .56 
We have strategies for recovery action after supply chain disruptions .88 
We have strategies to use more standard parts to reduce the risk of supply chain disruptions .71 
We developed alternative material sources in case of supply chain disruptions .61 
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4.3.3 Organizational Performance  
The third group of variables measures different dimensions of organizational 
performance. Five performance constructs were included in this study in order to capture 
a broad performance spectrum. Such selection was consistent with the findings from the 
four case studies. Specifically, these dimensions encompass supply chain security 
performance, supply chain cost performance, supply chain responsiveness, supply chain 
resilience, and supply chain visibility. The last four performance measures were labeled 
as collateral benefits of SCSM mechanisms in the literature (Closs and McGarrell, 2004; 
Peleg-Gillai and Bhat, 2006; Rice and Spayd, 2005). 
 Supply chain security performance measures the extent to which there is (1) an 
improvement in SCS; (2) a reduction/less potential for theft/loss; (3) a reduction/less 
potential for smuggling of drugs; and (4) an improved capability to detect counterfeit 
parts/products over the last three years (Closs and McGarrell, 2004; Lee and Whang, 
2005; Mena et al., 2009; Peleg-Gillai and Bhat, 2006; Rice and Spayd, 2005; Sheffi 
2001, 2005; Williams et al., 2009a). Supply chain cost performance measures the extent 
to which the adoption of SCSM mechanisms results in reductions in overall cost, excess 
inventory, insurance premiums, or costs associated with SCS disruptions (Lee and 
Whang, 2005; Mena et al., 2009; Peleg-Gillai and Bhat, 2006; Rice and Spayd, 2005; 
Williams et al., 2009b). Supply chain responsiveness measures the extent to which firms 
gain an improved ability for early intervention, faster response to problems, and efficient 
problem resolution (C-TPAT, 2001; Closs and McGarrell, 2004; Peleg-Gillai and Bhat, 
2006; Rice and Spayd, 2005). Supply chain resilience is operationalized as the extent to 
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which firms are capable of withstanding serious SCS breaches and capable of restoring 
operations to normal conditions (Mena et al., 2009; Peleg-Gillai and Bhat, 2006; Rice 
and Spayd, 2005; Sheffi 2001, 2005). Finally, supply chain visibility denotes the extent 
to which firms obtain better access to supply chain data such as timely shipping 
information or tracking the location of cargo at any given time (Closs and McGarrell, 
2004; Peleg-Gillai and Bhat, 2006; Rice and Spayd, 2005). Measurement items for 
performance measures are listed in Table 15 along with their factor loadings based on 
exploratory factor analysis using principal axis factoring and direct oblimin rotation. 
 
 
 
Table 15. Measurement items for performance measures 
All items have “in the last three years, our company has experienced” in front of them  
Supply chain security performance: eigen value = 1.79, percentage of variance explained = 57.88% 
Factor 
loading 
An improvement in security .52 
A reduction/less potential for theft/loss .64 
A reduction/less potential for smuggling of drugs .76 
An improved capability to detect counterfeit parts/products .76 
  
Supply chain cost performance: eigen value = 2.26, percentage of variance explained = 56.45%  
A reduction in overall cost .78 
A reduction in excess inventory .71 
A reduction in insurance premiums .67 
Reduced costs associated with supply chain disruptions .84 
  
Supply chain responsiveness: eigen value = 2.00, percentage of variance explained = 77.51%  
Faster response to problems in the supply chain .87 
An improved ability for early intervention .81 
More efficient problem resolution .76 
  
Supply chain resilience: eigen value = 2.55, percentage of variance explained = 72.37%  
An increase in our ability to deal with serious crises .83 
An increase in our ability to restore operations .88 
An improved ability to recover from serious security breaches .67 
An increase in our ability to cope with disruptions .79 
  
Supply chain visibility: eigen value = 3.12, percentage of variance explained = 62.33%  
Gains in tracking where our goods are at any given time .81 
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Table 15. continued 
Gains in our knowledge of the state of our goods .78 
Higher supply chain visibility .74 
Better access to supply chain data .82 
More timely shipping information .79 
 
 
4.3.4 Boundary Conditions 
The boundary condition variables were adapted from the strategic management 
and the O&SCM literature. The construct items of top management commitment are 
adapted from the top management team literature (a.k.a., the upper echelon theory 
literature, Floyd and Lane, 2000; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007; Mangan 
and Christopher, 2005; Wooldridge et al., 2008) and early work about top management 
commitment in the O&SCM literature (Ahire & O’Shaughnessy, 1997; Senge, 1990). 
The measurement scales of shared supply chain security perception were adapted from 
the organizational culture and SCS literature, including Barret et al. (2005), Gutierrez 
and Hintsa (2006), Khripunov (1999), Lv (2004), Sonsbeek (2004). The two constructs 
reflect on factors that may potentially moderate the relationships between institutional 
pressures and SCSM mechanisms. Measurement items for top management commitment 
and shared SCS perception are listed in Table 16 along with their factor loadings based 
on exploratory factor analysis using principal axis factoring extraction and direct 
oblimin rotation. 
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Table 16. Measurement items for moderating factors 
Top management commitment: eigen value = 3.33, percentage of variance explained = 73.14% Factor loading 
Our top management has assumed a leadership role in risk management .84 
Our top mgmt allocates proper levels of resources to enhance the security of our supply chain .80 
Our top management provides clear objectives for securing the supply chain .84 
Top management has an active oversight over supply chain risk management .87 
Top mgmt is aware of the risks and consequences associated with supply chain disruptions .73 
  
Shared SCS perception: eigen value = 3.20, percentage of variance explained = 53.34%  
Putting supply chain security first is a sentiment widely shared within the organization .76 
Emergency preparedness is widely endorsed by organizational members .67 
We believe that supply chain security is the responsibility of everyone in the organization .85 
We believe that supply chain security concerns should be viewed with respect .80 
We believe that there are considerable security threats that can impact us .58 
We believe that even minor security breaches in our supply chain will be devastating to our company .70 
 
 
4.4 Analysis and Results 
4.4.1 Pre-test Assessments  
An array of tests was conducted to ensure the integrity of the data.  
4.4.1.1 Normality 
Normality was examined through the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Smirnov, 
1948). The null-hypothesis of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test states that the data is 
normally distributed. Failure to reject the null-hypothesis suggests normality. The results 
showed that the majority of variables used in this study passed the test with a p-value 
greater than 0.05. Because the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is regarded as sensitive to 
violations of normality (Smirnov, 1948), especially for a large sample, I further 
examined the respective histograms and normality plots to assess potential distribution 
problems. A visual assessment of the P-P and Q-Q plots (Gibbons and Chakraborti, 
2003) of the 83 variables suggested that all variables in this sample were normally 
distributed. I also examined potential outliers via P-P and Q-Q plots. No outlier was 
 169 
 
found. Finally, I examined the skewness and kurtosis of the variables (Cramer, 1997). A 
value of skewness (or kurtosis) between -2σ and +2σ suggests that the assumption of 
normality is not violated (Kendall and Stuart, 1969). All manifest variables met this 
criterion. These results suggested that the data met the normality assumption.  
 
4.4.1.2 Non-response Bias 
Non-response bias was assessed by comparing firm characteristics of the first 
quartile of the respondents and the last quartile of the respondents via an ANOVA 
procedure (Krause, 1999). This method is based on the assumption that the opinions of 
late respondents are somewhat representative of the opinions of non-respondents 
(Armstrong and Overton, 1977). A number of t-tests were performed to examine the 
difference of firm characteristics of early respondents and late respondents. Specifically, 
the results showed that there was no statistical difference between early respondents and 
late respondents in terms of number of employees (p=0.15), annual sales (p=0.38), and 
net profit (p=0.18). These results provided confidence that the sample represented the 
larger population from which it was drawn.  
 
4.4.1.3 Common-method Bias 
Common-method bias was assessed through two methods. The first one relies on 
Harman’s single-factor test (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986; Podsakoff et al., 2003). A 
study that has significant common method bias is one in which a majority of the variance 
can be explained by a single factor. An exploratory factor analysis using principal axis 
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factoring extraction and direct oblimin rotation was performed with all 83 manifest 
variables. Using the eigen-value-greater-than-one criterion, I examined the number of 
distinct factors that emerged and the variance those factors explained. The results 
showed that 11 substantive factors emerged from the analysis and the first factor only 
captured a small portion of the total variance (25%), suggesting that common-method 
bias was not an issue. An alternative way to perform the Harman’s single-factor test is to 
constrain the number of factors extracted in the exploratory factor analysis to be just one 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). If common-method bias is an issue, a single factor will account 
for the majority of the variance in the model. This test was also performed using 
principal axis factoring and direct oblimin rotation and the single factor only accounted 
for 26% of the variance in the model. 
Another method to assess common-method bias is the Common Latent Factor 
approach which compares the model fit of two models (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In the 
first model, all manifest variables are loaded to a single common-method factor. In the 
second model, all manifest variables are assigned to their theoretical factors. The 
respective model fit of the two models is then compared with each other. If the model fit 
of the second model is better than the first model, then it is safe to conclude that the 
existence of common-method bias would not be a concern (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The 
common latent factor test was performed respectively to institutional pressure constructs, 
SCSM mechanism constructs, performance constructs, and moderating constructs. The 
results (Table 17) showed that the model fit of the second model was indeed better than 
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the first model. Therefore, common method bias should not be a concern in the present 
study. 
 
Table 17. Tests for common method bias 
 Common Latent Factor Model Fit Theoretical Factor Model Fit 
Institutional pressure 
constructs 
χ2(114)=1259.86, RMSEA=0.15, 
CFI=0.78, TLI=0.73, SRMR=0.08. 
χ2(104)=341.08, RMSEA=0.07, 
CFI=0.95, TLI=0.94, SRMR=0.04. 
   
SCSM mechanism 
constructs 
χ2(555)=1714.19, RMSEA=0.09, 
CFI=0.87, TLI=0.85, SRMR=0.07. 
χ2(549)=1432.18, RMSEA=0.06, 
CFI=0.91, TLI=0.90, SRMR=0.05. 
   
Performance constructs χ
2
(169)=727.33, RMSEA=0.09, 
CFI=0.88, TLI=0.87, SRMR=0.07. 
χ2(159)=597.47, RMSEA=0.07, 
CFI=0.92, TLI=0.90, SRMR=0.05. 
   
Moderating constructs χ
2
(42)=119.53, RMSEA=0.09, 
CFI=0.83, TLI=0.84, SRMR=0.06. 
χ2(41)=119.53, RMSEA=0.06, 
CFI=0.97, TLI=0.96, SRMR=0.04. 
 
 
4.4.2 Assessment of Measurement Model  
4.4.2.1 Unidimensionality 
The unidimensionality of the 16 constructs was tested by examining the fit 
indices values from confirmatory factor analysis via Mplus 6.2.1. Measurement models 
were constructed for each of the 16 constructs. The fit of the measurement model was 
assessed using the following fit indices: chi-square (χ2) and its ratio to the model degrees 
of freedom (χ2/df), comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), Root Mean 
Square Error Approximation (RMSEA), and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 
(SRMR). In summary, it is generally recognized that to support model fit, a consensus 
among the following criteria is needed: a χ2/df < 3, a CFI > 0.90, a TLI > 0.90, a 
RMSEA < 0.08, and a SRMR < 0.08. A good model fit is an indication of scale 
unidimensionality (Bollen, 1989). Almost all model fit indices for each construct 
 172 
 
exceeded the expected values and therefore provided strong support for scale 
unidimensionality (Table 18).  
 
Table 18. Summary of individual measurement models 
Construct χ2 χ2/df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
Government pressure 0.02 0.01 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Customer pressure 2.60 1.30 0.99 0.99 0.03 0.01 
Peer pressure 0.00 N/A
1
 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Normative pressure 0.00 N/A 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Performance pressure 0.00 N/A 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Prevention 55.35 3.95 0.97 0.96 0.07 0.03 
Detection 166.24 4.75 0.94 0.92 0.08 0.04 
Reaction 158.56 2.94 0.96 0.95 0.06 0.04 
Restoration 29.35 3.26 0.97 0.95 0.07 0.04 
Supply chain security performance 1.61 0.81 1.00 0.99 0.04 0.01 
Supply chain cost performance 3.21 1.61 0.99 0.97 0.07 0.02 
Supply chain responsiveness 0.00 N/A 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Supply chain resilience 0.64 0.32 1.00 1.01 0.00 0.00 
Supply chain visibility 0.07 0.01 0.99 0.98 0.06 0.01 
Top management commitment 16.65 3.33 0.99 0.97 0.08 0.01 
Shared SCS perception 18.08 2.01 0.99 0.98 0.06 0.03 
1
: A measurement model with three indicators is just identified. In other words, df = 0.  
 
4.4.2.2 Convergent Validity  
Convergent validity refers to the degree to which two measures of a construct 
that should be theoretically related, are in fact related. One way to assess convergent 
validity is to look at the corrected item-total correlations (CITC) of items that are 
assigned to the same theoretical construct. High CITC values suggest good convergent 
validity. The CITC values were requested by using SPSS for each of the 16 constructs. 
All of the CITC values were above 0.6. Convergent validity can also be assessed by 
factor loadings. I constructed confirmatory factor analytic measurement models for each 
group of factors respectively using Mplus 6.2.1. The model fit indices for all four models 
suggest good model fit (Tables 19-22). All items in my data illustrated high factor 
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loadings except for three (0.53, 0.50, and 0.52) respectively. See also Tables 19-22 
which illustrate that all factor loadings were greater than 0.6 and were statistically 
significant. 
   
 
Table 19. Factor loadings, Cronbach's α values, AVEs, and CRs for institutional 
pressure constructs 
Factor and scale items  Measurement items
 
 
Std.  
loading 
S.E. t-
value 
Government pressure: CR=0.86, AVE=0.61, α=0.86    
There is definite pressure from our government to meet security standards 0.80 0.02 38.17 
We will receive significant benefits if we adopt security standards prescribed by our government 0.73 0.03 28.06 
Our government takes an active role on security matters 0.79 0.02 36.14 
We cannot take security lightly as our government will hold us accountable 0.80 0.02 38.32 
    
Customer pressure: CR=0.89, AVE=0.68, α=0.89    
Our customers pressure us to do better on security 0.78 0.02 37.29 
We have to meet standards for security as our customers are demanding us to do so 0.87 0.02 57.88 
Our customers hold us accountable for security 0.81 0.02 41.98 
Our customers are monitoring our security practices/performance 0.83 0.02 46.74 
    
Peer pressure: CR=0.83, AVE=0.64, α=0.83    
We feel that we have to adopt security practices because everybody else does it 0.67 0.03 22.68 
We feel the pressure to adopt security practices as most of our peers have done so 0.84 0.02 42.67 
We feel that we have to adopt security practices as most of our rivals have done so 0.87 0.02 47.49 
    
Normative pressure: CR=0.80, AVE=0.58, α=0.82    
We employ risk & security practices in order to conform to professional norms 0.76 0.03 28.05 
We implement supply chain security practices to conform to industry norms 0.76 0.03 27.88 
We employ supply chain security practices to conform to cultural norms 0.72 0.03 24.98 
    
Performance pressure: CR=90, AVE=0.75, α=0.90    
We implement security practices because they can improve performance 0.86 0.01 52.16 
We implement security practices because they can lead to competitive advantage 0.86 0.02 50.56 
We implement security practices because we see operational benefits 0.87 0.02 54.98 
Model fit: χ2(104)=341.08, RMSEA=0.07, CFI=0.95, TLI=0.94, SRMR=0.04 
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Table 20. Factor loadings, Cronbach's α values, AVEs, and CRs for SCSM mechanism 
constructs 
Factor and scale items  Measurement items
  
Std.  
loading 
S.E. t-
value 
Prevention: CR=0.90, AVE=0.58, α=0.90    
We secure containers at our facilities to assure they are not compromised 0.68 0.03 21.91 
Our supply chain strategy spells out security priorities 0.85 0.02 52.71 
Our supply chain risk management strategy can be characterized as proactive 0.85 0.01 59.26 
When it comes to supply chain security, our strategy focuses on prevention 0.79 0.02 41.69 
We hold all suppliers accountable for supply chain security 0.70 0.03 27.60 
We only approve suppliers (irrespective of tier) that have a risk management program in place 0.70 0.03 27.96 
We educate suppliers about supply chain security practices 0.72 0.02 29.58 
    
Detection: CR=0.93, AVE=0.57, α=0.93    
We have the ability to track and trace our cargo in real time 0.63 0.04 17.50 
We use active measures such as video and sensors to be able to detect security breaches 0.62 0.04 17.04 
We monitor the loading/unloading process of cargo to identify potential security breaches 0.79 0.02 34.66 
We use sophisticated technologies to detect if containers have been compromised 0.71 0.03 23.71 
We monitor and synthesize information regarding security breaches 0.85 0.02 53.10 
We do conduct periodic assessments of our supply chain security 0.82 0.02 42.25 
We have procedures to detect supply chain security failures or near failures 0.81 0.02 45.67 
We have procedures to detect near misses in supply chain security 0.79 0.02 39.79 
We monitor our supplier network to identify suppliers at risk 0.79 0.02 41.02 
We have a process that notifies supply chain partners across tiers if the supply chain is threatened 0.71 0.03 28.91 
    
Reaction: CR=0.94, AVE=0.56, α=0.94    
We pre-position resources to deal with crises effectively 0.78 0.02 33.87 
We know what to do when we encounter supply chain security breaches or crises 0.85 0.02 50.11 
We have designated a group of employees as first respondents in case of a crisis 0.73 0.03 26.63 
There is effective communication across our supply chain when a crisis hits 0.83 0.02 44.24 
There is a definite chain of command in case of an emergency 0.76 0.03 29.94 
We have protocols for communication when a crisis arises 0.77 0.02 33.43 
We have a well-defined contingency plan to react to serious supply chain security breaches 0.86 0.01 55.34 
We have a quick reaction force to deal with a crisis or a serious disruption in our supply chain 0.75 0.03 29.57 
We use interchangeable or generic parts as a strategy to deal with disruptions in the supply chain 0.50 0.04 12.47 
We cross-train our employees as a mechanism to deal with potential supply chain disruptions 0.76 0.02 33.69 
We have backup processes that can assist us at times of crises 0.80 0.02 41.10 
We have flexible capacity contracts with suppliers in order to improve our ability to react to a 
crisis 
0.53 0.04 14.53 
    
Restoration: CR=0.86, AVE=0.52, α=0.85    
We do have a disaster recovery plan 0.80 0.02 37.18 
We have a specific process to reinstate operations in case of a major crisis/disruption 0.82 0.02 43.60 
We maintain strategic inventory stocks to deal with potential crises 0.69 0.05 13.84 
We have strategies for recovery action after supply chain disruptions 0.81 0.02 42.84 
We have strategies to use more standard parts to reduce the risk of supply chain disruptions 0.65 0.03 22.23 
We developed alternative material sources in case of supply chain disruptions 0.52 0.04 13.70 
Model fit: χ2(549)=1432.18, RMSEA=0.06, CFI=0.91, TLI=0.90, SRMR=0.05 
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Table 21. Factor loadings, Cronbach's α values, AVEs, and CRs for performance 
constructs 
Factor and scale items  
(All items have “in the last three years, our company has experienced” in front of them) 
Measurement items
 
 
Std.  
loading 
S.E. t-
value 
Supply chain security performance: CR=0.77, AVE=0.51, α=0.79    
An improvement in security 0.73 0.03 26.72 
A reduction/less potential for theft/loss 0.69 0.03 23.19 
A reduction/less potential for smuggling of drugs 0.63 0.04 15.28 
An improved capability to detect counterfeit parts/products 0.64 0.04 16.04 
    
Supply chain cost performance: CR=0.77, AVE=0.52, α=0.74    
A reduction in overall cost 0.66 0.03 19.98 
A reduction in excess inventory 0.62 0.04 16.67 
A reduction in insurance premiums 0.63 0.04 16.25 
Reduced costs associated with supply chain disruptions 0.79 0.03 28.43 
    
Supply chain responsiveness: CR=0.80, AVE=0.57, α=0.63    
Faster response to problems in the supply chain 0.83 0.02 39.78 
An improved ability for early intervention 0.62 0.04 16.03 
More efficient problem resolution 0.80 0.02 37.65 
    
Supply chain resilience: CR=0.87, AVE=0.64, α=0.87    
An increase in our ability to deal with serious crises 0.82 0.02 46.53 
An increase in our ability to restore operations 0.86 0.02 54.50 
An improved ability to recover from serious security breaches 0.69 0.03 25.14 
An increase in our ability to cope with disruptions 0.81 0.02 43.99 
    
Supply chain visibility: CR=0.89, AVE=0.62, α=0.89    
Gains in tracking where our goods are at any given time 0.79 0.02 37.58 
Gains in our knowledge of the state of our goods 0.79 0.02 37.73 
Higher supply chain visibility 0.75 0.03 30.79 
Better access to supply chain data 0.83 0.02 46.15 
More timely shipping information 0.78 0.02 37.65 
Model fit: χ2(159)=597.47, RMSEA=0.07, CFI=0.92, TLI=0.90, SRMR=0.05. 
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Table 22. Factor loadings, Cronbach's α values, AVEs, and CRs for moderating 
constructs 
Factor and scale items  Measurement items
 
 
Std.  
loading 
S.E. t-
value 
Top management commitment: CR=90, AVE=66, α=0.91    
Our top management has assumed a leadership role in risk management 0.80 0.02 41.05 
Our top mgmt allocates proper levels of resources to enhance the security of our supply chain 0.82 0.02 44.98 
Our top management provides clear objectives for securing the supply chain 0.85 0.02 54.68 
Top management has an active oversight over supply chain risk management 0.87 0.01 59.13 
Top mgmt is aware of the risks and consequences associated with supply chain disruptions 0.70 0.03 26.10 
    
Shared SCS perception: CR=0.87, AVE=0.53, α=0.87    
Putting supply chain security first is a sentiment widely shared within the organization 0.78 0.02 32.05 
Emergency preparedness is widely endorsed by organizational members 0.65 0.04 18.45 
We believe that supply chain security is the responsibility of everyone in the organization 0.83 0.02 40.56 
We believe that supply chain security concerns should be viewed with respect 0.79 0.02 34.12 
We believe that there are considerable security threats that can impact us 0.64 0.04 17.96 
We believe that even minor security breaches in our supply chain will be devastating to our 
company 
0.66 0.03 19.35 
Model fit: χ2(41)=119.53, RMSEA=0.06, CFI=0.97, TLI=0.96, SRMR=0.04. 
 
 
4.4.2.3 Discriminant Validity  
A confirmatory factor analysis based χ2 difference test via Mplus 6.2.1 was used 
to assess discriminant validity (Bagozzi et al., 1991). Measurement models were 
constructed for all possible pairs of the 16 theoretical constructs. A total of 120 models 
were thus constructed. These models were tested by first allowing for the correlation 
between the two constructs to be freely estimated and then fixing the correlation between 
the constructs at 1.0. A significant difference in Chi-square values for the freely 
estimated model and the constrained (i.e. fixed) model indicates the distinctiveness of 
the two constructs (Bagozzi et al., 1991). A χ2 difference values greater than 3.84 (df=1) 
suggests good discriminant validity. Table 23 reports these χ2 difference values. All 
differences between the fixed and free solutions were greater than 3.84 (i.e., 
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Δχ2(1)>3.84), thus providing strong evidence of discriminant validity among the 16 
constructs. 
 
Table 23. Summary of discriminant validity testing (χ2 difference values) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Government pressure                
2. Customer pressure 228               
3. Peer pressure 122 238              
4. Normative pressure 224 258 95             
5. Performance pressure 200 212 391 185            
6. Prevention 276 227 389 159 206           
7. Detection 277 206 386 178 265 4.20          
8. Reaction 174 121 441 253 291 62 134         
9. Restoration 145 130 422 195 159 34 81 9.97        
10. SCS performance 70 49 339 207 188 85 111 141 183       
11. Cost performance 51 48 322 262 230 234 230 206 198 81      
12. Responsiveness 48 60 313 224 197 164 180 139 112 33 34     
13. Resilience 92 82 502 359 467 284 338 252 186 13 78 44    
14. Visibility 80 61 520 365 475 421 478 427 285 41 88 78 72   
15. Top Mgmt          
      commitment 
207 523 426 212 277 12 37 63 33 100 262 114 111 457  
16. Shared SCS  
      perception 
177 173 134 86 83 8.40 35 61 34 164 225 92 84 294 6.38 
 
 
4.4.2.4 Reliability 
Reliability was assessed through Cronbach’s α, average variance extracted 
(AVE), and composite reliability (CR) (see Table 19-22). Cronbach's α is a coefficient of 
internal consistency (Cronbach, 1951; Raykov, 1997). It is commonly used as an 
estimate of the reliability of a psychometric test for a sample of examinees. Cronbach’s 
α is most appropriately used when the items measure different nuances within a single 
construct (Cortina, 1993; Schmitt, 1996). A Cronbach’s α value of 0.6 or above is 
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considered acceptable (DeVellis, 1991). The Cronbach’s α values of the 16 constructs 
were calculated and all of them were greater than 0.6.  
While Cronbach’s α was widely used in the literature as a measure of reliability, 
some researchers argued that Cronbach’s α is not an effective estimate of the reliability 
of a scale. For example, Bollen opposed using Cronbach’s α because “[Cronbach’s α] 
makes no allowances for correlated error of measurements” (Bollen, 1989, p.221). As 
such, the present study also assessed scale reliability through AVE and CR. AVE 
measures the amount of variance that is captured by the construct in relation to the 
amount of variance due to measurement error (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). If the AVE is 
less than 0.50, then the variance due to measurement error is greater than the variance 
due to the construct. In this case, the reliability of a construct is questionable. On the 
other hand, an AVE value of 0.5 or above suggests good reliability (Fornell and Larcker, 
1981). AVEs were calculated for all 16 constructs and all of them were greater than 0.5, 
suggesting reliability. CR estimates the extent to which a set of manifest indicators share 
in their measurement of a construct (Hair et al., 1998). A CR value of 0.7 or above 
suggests acceptable scale reliability (Hair et al., 1998). The CR values of the 16 
constructs were calculated and all of them were greater than 0.75, suggesting good 
reliability. 
Collectively, the Cronbach’s α values, the AVE values, and the CR values 
provide sufficient evidence of reliability for each of the constructs.   
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4.4.3 Assessment of Structural Models 
Hypotheses were tested using Covariance-based Structural Equation Models 
(CBSEM) via Mplus 6.2.1. CBSEM has proven to be a very useful statistical method for 
structural models. CBSEM allows for the structural model to relate the constructs to 
each other and test their effects on each other simultaneously (Jarvis et al., 2003). The 
foundation of CBSEM lies in two multivariate techniques: factor analysis and multiple 
regression (Hair et al., 2006). Specifically, “it examines the structure of 
interrelationships expressed in a series of equations, similar to a series of multiple 
regression equations” (Hair et al., 2006: p. 711). Owing to these traits, CBSEM was 
selected as the data analysis technique for the assessment of the structural models under 
study. 
The fit of the structural model is evaluated first, followed by close examination 
of individual structural coefficients (i.e., Gamma - γ and Beta - β) and their respective t- 
and p-values. The overall structural model-to-data fit was assessed via fit indices: chi-
square (χ2) and its ratio to the model degrees of freedom (χ2/df), comparative fit index 
(CFI), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), Root Mean Square Error Approximation (RMSEA), 
and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). If there appears to be 
consistency between the posited structural model and the data, structural coefficients and 
their respective p-values can then be used to test hypotheses. 
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4.4.3.1 Institutional PressureSCSM Mechanism Model 
The institutional pressureSCSM mechanism model (H1-H4) was first tested 
(Figure 4). The data analysis for the structural model used raw data as input for Mplus. 
All variables were centered to avert potential multicollinearity problems. The highest 
VIF score was less than 5.0. Firm size, firm past performance, market share, and 
industry membership were used as control variables. The following fit criteria were 
determined: χ2(50)=157.03, χ2/df=3.14, RMSEA=0.07, CFI=0.96, TLI=0.95, 
SRMR=0.04. There appears to be consistency between the posited structural model and 
the data. The results are shown in Table 24 (std. coefficients & p-values).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The institutional pressureSCSM mechanism model 
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Table 24. Institutional pressure  SCSM mechanism model results 
Paths Std. Coeff. p-value Results 
Hypothesis 1: Institutional pressures  
Prevention 
  
Partly 
supported 
Government pressure  Prevention .083 .211  
Customer pressure  Prevention .112 .135  
Peer pressure  Prevention -.236 .050  
Normative pressure   Prevention .432 .005  
Performance pressure  Prevention  .292 .007  
    
Hypothesis 2: Institutional pressures  
Detection 
  
Partly 
supported 
Government pressure  Detection .109 .128  
Customer pressure  Detection .071 .485  
Peer pressure  Detection -.154 .050  
Normative pressure   Detection .242 .015  
Performance pressure  Detection  .191 .002  
    
Hypothesis 3: Institutional pressures  Reaction   
Partly 
supported 
Government pressure  Reaction -.051 .330  
Customer pressure  Reaction -.108 .102  
Peer pressure  Reaction -.175 .048  
Normative pressure   Reaction .447 .000  
Performance pressure  Reaction .262 .001  
    
Hypothesis 4: Institutional pressures  
Restoration 
  
Partly 
supported 
Government pressure  Restoration -.018 .461  
Customer pressure  Restoration .159 .043  
Peer pressure  Restoration -.164 .025  
Normative pressure   Restoration .506 .002  
Performance pressure  Restoration .217 .021  
Model fit: χ2(50)=157.03, RMSEA=0.07, CFI=0.96, TLI=0.95, SRMR=0.04. 
 
 
The institutional pressures are purported to positively impact the prevention 
mechanisms. The results showed, however, that not all of the institutional pressures were 
conducive to prevention. Specifically, the effects of government pressure (γ = 0.08, p > 
0.05) and customer pressure (γ = 0.12, p > 0.05) were trivial. Also, while the effects of 
normative pressure (γ = 0.43, p < 0.01) and performance pressure (γ = 0.29, p < 0.01) 
were positive and statistically significant, the effect of peer pressure was negative and 
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statistically significant (γ = -0.24, p < 0.05). The results suggest that norms and 
performance needs are the major sources that motivate firms to implement prevention 
mechanisms. H1 was only partly supported. 
The effects of institutional pressures on detection mechanisms were also 
assessed. Specifically, government pressure (γ = 0.11, p > 0.5) and customer pressure (γ 
= 0.07, p > 0.5) did not manifest a significant impact on detection mechanisms. The 
statistically significant effects from normative pressure (γ = 0.24, p < 0.05), and 
performance pressure (γ = 0.19, p < 0.01) attested to the positive linkage between 
institutional pressures and detection mechanisms. However, the effect of peer pressure 
was negative and statistically significant (γ = -0.15, p < 0.05). This finding contradicts 
my hypothesis and suggests that peer pressure has adverse effect on detection 
mechanisms. Overall, H2 was partly supported as well. 
The institutional pressures were also specified to positively affect the reaction 
mechanisms. Again, not all institutional pressures exhibited sizable effects on reaction. 
The impact from government (γ = -0.05, p > 0.5) and customer (γ = -0.11, p > 0.5) 
appeared to be negligible. The effect of peer pressure (γ = -0.18, p < 0.05) was negative 
and statistically significant. The effects of normative pressure (γ = 0.45, p < 0.001) and 
performance pressure (γ = 0.26, p < 0.01) were positive and statistically significant. In 
short, H3 was not fully supported. The results suggest that firms implement reaction 
mechanisms mainly because they need to conform to norms and improve performance. 
Finally, the effects of institutional pressure on restoration mechanisms were 
examined. The results showed that government pressure (γ = -0.02, p > 0.5) again 
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revealed no significant association with restoration. However, the impact of peer 
pressure was rather strong and negative (γ = -0.16, p < 0.05) while customer pressure (γ 
= 0.16, p < 0.5), normative pressure (γ = 0.51, p < 0.01), and performance pressure (γ = 
0.22, p < 0.05) exhibited significant and positive association with restoration. H4 was 
again partly supported. The findings are in line with the results of previous hypotheses 
and suggest that government pressure is somewhat negligible whereas peer pressure has 
rather consistent negative impact on SCSM mechanisms. 
 
4.4.3.2 Differential Effect of Institutional Pressures on SCSM Mechanisms 
H5 through H8 posit that the coefficients relating the institutional pressures and a 
given class of SCSM mechanism are different. A specific institutional pressure is 
hypothesized to exhibit a stronger effect on a given class of SCSM mechanisms than 
other institutional pressures. Specifically, I hypothesize that government pressure is the 
strongest predictor of prevention- (H5) and detection-oriented (H6) SCSM mechanisms; 
customer pressure is the strongest predictor of reaction- (H7) and restoration-oriented 
(H8) SCSM mechanisms. In these hypotheses, there are five different independent 
variables (i.e., five institutional pressures) but only one dependent variable (i.e., one 
SCSM mechanism).   
In order to compare the differences in coefficients between the institutional 
pressures and a given class of SCSM mechanism, a set of regressions were performed. 
For example, in order to test whether government pressure is the strongest predictor of 
prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms, one has to show that the effect of government 
 184 
 
pressure is greater than the effect of the other four institutional pressures. One way to 
make this determination is to examine the significance levels and the corresponding p-
values of the coefficients in an equation in which the dependent variable is the 
prevention-oriented SCSM mechanism while the independent variables (i.e., regressors) 
are the five institutional pressures. Under two scenarios the conclusion can be easily 
drawn: (1) government pressure is the only positive and statistically significant 
regressor; (2) government pressure reveals insignificant association with the dependent 
variable and at least one of the other four institutional pressures is statistically associated 
with the dependent variable. Given scenario one, it is safe to conclude that government 
pressure is the strongest predictor among the institutional pressures. In scenario two, 
there exists at least one institutional pressure whose effect is stronger than government 
pressure. However, more frequently researchers may find that there is more than one 
estimated Beta coefficient (Beta hereafter) that is positive and statistically significant. 
Under such circumstances, additional rigorous analyses are required, because simply 
comparing the p-values of the Betas is not a reliable test (Cramer, 1997). 
Assuming the Betas of all five institutional pressures are positive and statistically 
significant, the comparisons of the coefficients can then be made by assessing four pairs 
of relationships (i.e., government v.s. customer, government v.s. peer, government v.s. 
normative, and government v.s. performance). If the effect of government pressure is 
stronger in all four comparisons, then government pressure is indeed the strongest 
institutional predictor of prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms.  
 185 
 
The comparison between government pressure and customer pressure can be 
performed as follows (Cramer, 1997). First, the prevention-oriented SCSM mechanism 
(DV) was regressed on government pressure (IV1) and customer pressure (IV2). The 
standard error of the two Betas (i.e., SE1 and SE2) and the covariance of the two Betas 
(i.e., COV12) were attained from the SPSS output using the syntax command 
“STATISTICS=BCOV”. Second, the joined standard error of β1 and β2, SE12, was 
calculated. Because both regressors were from the same sample, the joined standard 
error was calculated using the formula:          
     
        . Third, since 
     
    
  follows a t distribution with (n-k-1) degrees of freedom, the value of the t-statistic, 
     
    
 , was calculated and assessed against the values listed in the t distribution table 
(Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, and Li, 2004). Because the degrees of freedom is greater 
than 120 in my case, a t-statistic value of 1.96 or above would suggest a significant 
difference between β1 and β2 (at α=0.05 level), that is, the effect of government pressure 
is greater than the effect of customer pressure. The same analysis was repeated for the 
comparison of other three pairs of pressures.  
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Table 25. Test of differential effect-1 
Hypothesis Results 
H5: Government pressure is the strongest predictor of prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms 
 
Step 1 Regression results  
(DV: prevention) 
Government Customer Peer Normative Performance 
 .083 .112 -.236* .432** .292** 
      
Step 2 Pair-wise comparisons Not performed as government pressure is not significantly 
associated with prevention mechanisms. H5 is rejected 
      
      
H6: Government pressure is the strongest predictor of detection-oriented SCSM mechanisms 
 
Step 1 Regression results  
(DV: detection) 
Government Customer Peer Normative Performanc
e 
 .109 .071 -.154† .242* .191** 
      
Step 2 Pair-wise comparisons Not performed as government pressure is not significantly 
associated with detection mechanisms. H6 is rejected 
      
      
H7: Customer pressure is the strongest predictor of reaction-oriented SCSM mechanisms 
      
Step 1 Regression results  
(DV: reaction) 
Government Customer Peer Normative Performanc
e 
 -.051 -.108 -.175* .447*** .262** 
      
Step 2 Pair-wise comparisons Not performed as customer pressure is not significantly associated 
with reaction mechanisms. H7 is rejected 
      
      
H8: Customer pressure is the strongest predictor of restoration-oriented SCSM mechanisms 
      
Step 1 Regression results  
(DV: restoration) 
Government Customer Peer Normative Performanc
e 
 -.018 .159* -.164* .506** .217* 
 
Step 2 Pair-wise comparisons 
(t-values are reported) 
customer v.s. 
government 
customer v.s. peer customer 
v.s. 
normative 
customer 
v.s. 
performanc
e 
 2.04 4.51 1.15 -3.72 
  †p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Coefficients reported are standardized. 
 
 
As shown in the Table 25 above, H5-H7 were rejected as the variable of interest 
was not statistically significant when all institutional pressures were tested as a group. 
H8 was rejected because (1) the effect of customer pressure was not significantly 
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different from the effect of normative pressure (t-value < 1.96) and (2) the effect of 
performance pressure on restoration is stronger than the effect of customer pressure (a 
negative and significant t-value). 
 
4.4.3.3 Moderation Effect Hypotheses 
Shared SCS perception (H9) and top management commitment (H10) were 
postulated to strengthen the relationships between institutional pressures and SCSM 
mechanisms. Before testing the moderation hypotheses, I centered all independent 
variables in order to minimize the potential multicollinearity that can be present when 
computing the square terms (Aiken and West, 1991). I did not use Mplus to directly test 
the hypotheses because it employs a rather complicated algorithm (“xwith” command) to 
calculate the interaction terms of any two latent factors. Such an algorithm imposes 
tremendous computational burdens when multiple latent interaction terms are included 
in a model. Plus, when the “xwith” command is used, Mplus does not produce model fit 
indices because there is a debate as to which baseline model should be used to compute 
fit indices (Mplus User’s Guide, 2011). Thus, I used SPSS to perform data analysis. 
Table 26 and Table 27 display the results.  
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Table 26. Moderation effects of shared SCS perception 
 Prevention Detection Reaction Restoration 
Variables     
Control variables     
Firm size .057 .099 .174† .176* 
Past performance (profit margin) -.038 -.023 -.001 .017 
Market share .116† .030 .130 .177* 
Food & Beverage .119 .102 -.192† -.177† 
Chemical .107 .089 -.096 -.043 
Auto .071 .140† .035 -.052 
IT .062 -.030 -.002 -.014 
Other Manufacturing .059 .012 -.129 -.039 
Main effects     
Government pressure .164 .291† .514** .443** 
Customer pressure .379* .081 -.397† -.104 
Peer pressure .116 .098 -.329† -.380* 
Normative pressure .069 .067 .143 -.003 
Performance pressure .035 .173 .196 -.082 
Shared SCS perception .211† .185 .501* .629** 
Interaction effects     
Government x SSP .028 -.016 -.170 -.232 
Customer x SSP -.109 -.064 .021 -.150 
Peer x SSP -.098 .093 .587* .617* 
Normative x SSP .347† .276 -.264 -.344 
Performance x SSP -.123 -.238 -.103 .164 
R
2
 (adjusted) 83.7% 79.1% 80.8% 85.7% 
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Coefficients reported are standardized. 
 
 
With respect to H9, the results showed that shared SCS perception interacted 
with peer pressure to positively affect reaction (β=0.587, p<0.05) and restoration 
(β=0.617, p<0.05). The results suggest that the effects of peer pressure on reaction- and 
restoration-oriented SCSM mechanisms will be stronger when shared SCS perception is 
high compared to when shared SCs perception is low. Shared SCS perception also 
interacted with normative pressure to positively affect prevention (β=0.347, p<0.1) 
However, shared SCS perception did not reveal any statistically significant interaction 
effect on other pressure-mechanism relations.  
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Table 27. Moderation effects of top management commitment 
 Prevention Detection Reaction Restoration 
Variables     
Control variables     
Firm size .043 .060 .095 .069 
Past performance (profit margin) -.012 .023 .060 .090 
Market share .142† .046 .114 .186* 
Food & Beverage .110 .051 -.208* -.177* 
Chemical .099 .021 -.136 -.079 
Auto .047 .036 .144 .044 
IT .034 -.077 -.001 .002 
Other Manufacturing .093 .037 -.142 .038 
Main effects     
Government pressure .222 .318* .195 .030 
Customer pressure .369* .051 -.241 .132 
Peer pressure .067 .054 -.262† -.312* 
Normative pressure .075 .038 .274 -.140 
Performance pressure .038 .180 .209 .130 
Top management commitment .199 .371* .489* .598*** 
Interaction effects     
Government x TMC -.043 .018 -.414† -.495* 
Customer x TMC -.056 .023 .147 .044 
Peer x TMC .063 .018 .606* .603** 
Normative x TMC .112 -.004 -.059 -.166 
Performance x TMC -.0.39 -.010 -.231 -.065 
R
2
 (adjusted) 82.5% 79.3% 84.2% 89.3% 
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Coefficients reported are standardized. 
 
 
 
Regarding H10, the results showed that top management commitment only 
interacted with government pressure and peer pressure. Specifically, top management 
commitment interacted with government pressure to negatively affect reaction (β=-
0.414, p<0.1) and restoration (β=-0.495, p<0.05). Top management commitment also 
exhibited positive joint effects with peer pressure on reaction (β=0.606, p<0.05) and 
restoration (β=0.603, p<0.01).  The findings suggest that top management commitment 
may enhance or hamper the effects of institutional pressures on SCSM mechanisms. I 
plot these statistically significant interaction effects in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Interaction effect plots 
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4.4.3.4 SCSM MechanismPerformance Model 
The SCSM mechanismperformance model was then tested for hypotheses 11a, 
12a, 13a, and 14a (Figure 6). The data analysis was performed via Mplus using raw data 
as input. All variables were once again centered to avert potential multicollinearity 
problem. Firm size, firm past performance, market share, and industry membership were 
used as control variables. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The SCSM mechanism  performance model 
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While the literature suggests that the four classes of SCSM mechanisms 
positively affect supply chain performance, it is surprising that none of the relationships 
exhibited statistical significance when tested at the first-order level of abstraction. This 
can be a signal of multicollinearity in the model. I therefore assessed multicollinearity 
through VIF. The results showed that all VIF scores of the SCSM mechanisms were 
greater than ten, suggesting that multicollinearity did exist. There is no doubt that 
prevention, detection, reaction, and restoration are important nuances of SCSM. Most 
people would agree that each of the four latent variables is “different” and displays 
idiosyncratic attributes. From a measurement perspective, I already demonstrated that 
the constructs discriminated from each other. However, most people would also agree 
that a responsible firm who is good at prevention is also likely to be good at detection 
and can effectively respond to SCS breaches. The four latent factors would be expected 
to be highly correlated, which may inflate standard errors and result in insignificant 
results (Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price, 2000). Being aware of this issue, I examined the 
effect of each SCSM mechanism on performance on an individual basis. All classes of 
SCSM mechanisms exhibited significant impact on performance (Table 28). But when 
tested as a group, such effects were not manifested (Table 29).  
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Table 28. The SCSM mechanism  performance model when tested individually 
 Security Cost Responsiveness Resilience Visibility 
Control variables      
 Firm size -.089 -.031 .012 .024 .080 
 Past performance (profit margin) -.031 -.055 -.025 -.012 -.039 
 Market share -.028 .103 -.002 .014 -.026 
Main effect      
 Prevention .894*** .587*** .726*** .783*** .737*** 
Model fit: χ2(365)=640.42, RMSEA=0.07, CFI=0.91, TLI=0.90, SRMR=0.08. 
 
 Security Cost Responsiveness Resilience Visibility 
Control variables      
 Firm size -.023 -.011 .064 .083 .141* 
 Past performance (profit margin) .083 .045 .068 .083 .054 
 Market share .013 .104 .007 .037 -.016 
Main effect      
 Detection .867*** .599*** .689*** .779*** .706*** 
Model fit: χ2(456)=870.98, RMSEA=0.07, CFI=0.90, TLI=0.90, SRMR=0.08. 
      
 Security Cost Responsiveness Resilience Visibility 
Control variables      
 Firm size .108 .136 .053 .073 .031 
 Past performance (profit margin) .063 .028 .047 .059 .035 
 Market share -.178* -.138
†
 -.080 -.080 -.009 
Main effect      
 Reaction .806*** .695*** .787*** .858*** .806*** 
Model fit: χ2(516)=951.29, RMSEA=0.07, CFI=0.91, TLI=0.90, SRMR=0.08. 
      
 Security Cost Responsiveness Resilience Visibility 
Control variables      
 Firm size .071 .115 .021 .029 -.003 
 Past performance (profit margin) .060 .029 .048 .062 .036 
 Market share -.126 -.101 -.030 -.029 .041 
Main effect      
 Restoration .692*** .589*** .690*** .813*** .711*** 
Model fit: χ2(343)=654.74, RMSEA=0.07, CFI=0.90, TLI=0.90, SRMR=0.07. 
†
p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Coefficients reported are standardized. 
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Table 29. The SCSM mechanism  performance model when tested as a group 
 Security Cost Responsive-
ness 
Resilience Visibility 
 Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF 
Control variables           
 Firm size .027 1.52 .126 1.52 .023 1.52 .032 1.52 -.001 1.52 
 Past performance (profit margin) .005 1.03 .009 1.03 .007 1.03 .020 1.03 -.004 1.03 
 Market share -.085 1.56 -.083 1.56 -.027 1.56 -.015 1.56 .050 1.56 
Main effects           
 Prevention -1.861 10.30 3.987 10.30 0.198 10.30 2.074 10.30 .921 10.30 
 Detection 2.495 10.29 -3.377 10.29 -.023 10.29 -1.728 10.29 -.622 10.29 
 Reaction -.437 11.83 -1.179 11.83 .244 11.83 -.305 11.83 -.428 11.83 
 Restoration .696 10.21 1.128 10.21 .809 10.21 .759 10.21 .872 10.21 
χ2(1542)=5250.20, RMSEA=0.10, CFI=0.76, TLI=0.75, SRMR=0.11. 
†
p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Coefficients reported are standardized. 
 
 
 
While multicollinearity does not reduce the predictive power or reliability of the 
model as a whole, it affects calculations regarding individual predictors (Chatterjee et 
al., 2000; Farrar and Glauber, 1967). Researchers have proposed several remedial 
procedures for multicollinearity (Wang, 1996). Johnston (1972) introduced three 
methods which were widely used to tackle multicollinearity: (1) transformation of 
variable(s); (2) incorporation of prior information; and (3) dropping a variable or 
variables from the model. However, these remedial procedures do not come without a 
price. Transformation of variable(s) makes the results hard to interpret. Prior information 
regarding the value of coefficients may not be feasible, which is true in this case as the 
categorization of SCSM mechanisms is new to the literature. Dropping a variable or 
variables may heal the statistical problem but lacks theoretical support. Hence, I opted to 
use the more complicated higher-order latent variable approach to deal with 
multicollinearity (Li, 1992; Wen and Cook, 2007). Essentially, the higher-order method 
suggests that there is “synergy” among the first-order factors. By constructing a second-
order factor, the new model can not only alleviate numerous methodological problems 
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but also capture such synergy effects (Malhotra and Mackelprang, 2012). A higher-order 
model is also consistent with the case study results and the tenets of human immunology. 
As mentioned in section 2.4, the case study results suggested that only when all four 
classes of SCSM mechanisms were implemented, could firms effectively mitigate SCS 
breaches. Similarly, the human immunology literature suggests that various sub-systems 
of the human body need to work together to eliminate invading pathogens (Kaufmann et 
al., 2004; Parham, 2005; Playfair and Bancroft, 2004). The use of higher-order modeling 
seems to be theoretically justified for this study. 
In order to assess the soundness of using second-order factor specification 
analytically, I followed the paradigm for examining second-order factor models 
proposed by Koufteros et al. (2009). This paradigm suggests a careful examination and 
comparison of four measurement models. In the first model, all SCSM mechanism 
indicators were assigned to a single first-order factor (Figure 7). In the second model, the 
SCSM mechanism indicators were assigned to their theoretical factors respectively (i.e., 
prevention, detection, reaction, and restoration) but the correlations among the four first-
order factors were constrained to be zero (Figure 8). In the third model, SCSM 
mechanism indicators were also assigned to their theoretical factors respectively. 
However, the correlations among the four first-order factors were freely estimated 
(Figure 9). In the fourth model, a higher-order factor was constructed. It included four 
first-order factors: prevention, detection, reaction, and restoration (Figure 10).   
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Figure 7. One first-order factor model 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Four uncorrelated first-order factors model 
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Figure 9. Four correlated first-order factors model 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. One second-order factor model 
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To compare the four proposed models and examine whether or not a second-
order factor is plausible, various model fit indices can be compared. These indices serve 
as the “first-cut”. Only models that exhibit good model fit ought to advance to the next 
stage of scrutiny. Therefore, model 1 and model 2 were eliminated for further 
consideration (see Table 30). Notice that a measurement model that generates the best 
model fit does not automatically secure itself as the best model. A first-order factor 
structure which includes correlated first-order factors always produces a better model fit 
than a second-order factor structure (Marsh and Hocevar, 1985; Arnau and Thompson, 
2000). This advantage does not necessarily rule out the second-order factor model as an 
attractive candidate. In my case, the second-order model (model 4) is well-fitting and its 
model fit varies insignificantly from the fit generated by the first-order correlated model 
(model 3). The final selection should rest on theoretical soundness and methodological 
feasibility (Koufteros et al., 2009; Malhotra and Mackelprang, 2012). The second-order 
model captures the synergy effect suggested by the managers from the case studies. In 
addition, because only one independent variable (i.e., the second-order factor) exists in 
the second-order model, multicollinearity becomes a trivial issue in higher-order model 
specification. Owing to these merits, the second-order model was selected as the best 
measurement model. Table 31 reports the factor loadings of the higher-order model. 
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Table 30. Alternative measurement model structures 
 
Model 1 
One first-order 
factor 
Model 2 
Four uncorrelated 
first-order factors 
Model 3 
Four correlated 
first-order factors 
Model 4 
Four first-order 
factors and one 
second-order factor 
χ2(df) 1714.19(555) 3558.78(555) 1432.18(549) 1436.84(551) 
χ2/df 3.09 6.41 2.61 2.61 
CFI 0.87 0.68 0.91 0.91 
TFI 0.86 0.66 0.90 0.90 
RMSEA 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.06 
SRMR 0.06 0.46 0.05 0.05 
 
 
 
Table 31. Factor loadings of the second-order factor model 
Factor and scale items  Measurement items
  
Std.  
loading 
S.E. t-
value 
Prevention:     
We secure containers at our facilities to assure they are not compromised .68 .03 21.78 
Our supply chain strategy spells out security priorities .85 .02 53.53 
Our supply chain risk management strategy can be characterized as proactive .85 .01 58.90 
When it comes to supply chain security, our strategy focuses on prevention .79 .02 41.63 
We hold all suppliers accountable for supply chain security .70 .03 27.49 
We only approve suppliers (irrespective of tier) that have a risk management program in 
place 
.70 .03 27.91 
We educate suppliers about supply chain security practices .72 .02 29.73 
    
Detection:     
We have the ability to track and trace our cargo in real time .63 .04 17.43 
We use active measures such as video and sensors to be able to detect security breaches .62 .04 17.01 
We monitor the loading/unloading process of cargo to identify potential security breaches .71 .03 23.76 
We use sophisticated technologies to detect if containers have been compromised .78 .02 34.37 
We monitor and synthesize information regarding security breaches .85 .02 53.05 
We do conduct periodic assessments of our supply chain security .82 .02 41.87 
We have procedures to detect supply chain security failures or near failures .71 .03 29.00 
We have procedures to detect near misses in supply chain security .81 .02 46.12 
We monitor our supplier network to identify suppliers at risk .79 .02 39.75 
We have a process that notifies supply chain partners across tiers if the supply chain is 
threatened 
.79 .02 40.83 
    
Reaction:     
We pre-position resources to deal with crises effectively .78 .02 33.87 
We know what to do when we encounter supply chain security breaches or crises .85 .02 5.19 
We have designated a group of employees as first respondents in case of a crisis .73 .03 26.87 
There is effective communication across our supply chain when a crisis hits .83 .02 44.37 
There is a definite chain of command in case of an emergency .76 .03 30.08 
We have protocols for communication when a crisis arises .77 .02 33.28 
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Table 31. continued 
We have a well-defined contingency plan to react to serious supply chain security breaches .86 .02 55.32 
We have a quick reaction force to deal with a crisis or a serious disruption in our supply 
chain 
.75 .03 29.50 
We use interchangeable or generic parts as a strategy to deal with disruptions in the supply 
chain 
.59 .04 12.41 
We cross-train our employees as a mechanism to deal with potential supply chain disruptions .76 .02 33.77 
We have backup processes that can assist us at times of crises .80 .02 41.06 
We have flexible capacity contracts with suppliers in order to improve our ability to react to 
a crisis 
.53 .04 14.52 
    
Restoration:     
We do have a disaster recovery plan .80 .02 37.34 
We have a specific process to reinstate operations in case of a major crisis/disruption .83 .02 44.65 
We maintain strategic inventory stocks to deal with potential crises .59 .05 10.87 
We have strategies for recovery action after supply chain disruptions .80 .02 42.08 
We have strategies to use more standard parts to reduce the risk of supply chain disruptions .65 .03 22.16 
We developed alternative material sources in case of supply chain disruptions .51 .04 13.62 
    
Second-order factor:    
Prevention 0.93 0.01 81.54 
Detection 0.91 0.01 73.55 
Reaction 1.02 0.01 164.89 
Restoration 1.00 0.01 120.12 
Model fit: χ2(551)=1436.84, RMSEA=0.06, CFI=0.91, TLI=0.90, SRMR=0.05 
 
 
After selecting a measurement model, I then specified a structural model using 
the same control variables to test substantive hypotheses (Figure 11).  The model fit of 
the structural model, χ2(1373)=2841.52, RMSEA=0.05, CFI=0.91, TLI=0.90, 
SRMR=0.05, suggested that the model fit the data appropriately. Thus, the structural 
coefficients could be used to test the research hypotheses. Table 32 reports the structural 
coefficients. The results showed that the second-order factor revealed significant effects 
on all performance measures. Although I did not test the original hypotheses proposed in 
chapter III, the results highly suggest that SCSM mechanisms are conducive to better 
performance.  
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Figure 11. The second-order factor structural model 
 
 
 
 
Table 32. SCSM mechanism  supply chain performance model results 
Paths Std. Coeff. p-value Results 
SCSM mechanisms  Performance   Fully 
supported Second-order factor  Supply chain security performance 0.82 0.000 
Second-order factor  Supply chain cost performance 0.57 0.000 
Second-order factor  Supply chain responsiveness 0.70 0.000 
Second-order factor  Supply chain resilience 0.79 0.000 
Second-order factor  Supply chain visibility 0.73 0.000 
Model fit: χ2(1373)=2841.52, RMSEA=0.05, CFI=0.91, TLI=0.90, SRMR=0.05. 
 
 
4.4.3.5 Differential Effect of SCSM Mechanisms on Performance 
H11b, H12b, H13b, and H14b posit that the coefficients relating a given class of 
SCSM mechanism and performance measures are different. Unlike the first group of 
differential hypotheses, in the second group, there is only one independent variable (i.e., 
one SCSM mechanism) but five different dependent variables (i.e., five performance 
dimensions).  
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In order to assess whether the relationships between a given factor of interest 
(e.g. prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms) and the five performance dimensions are 
comparable, I ran several regression analyses. First, five regression models (one for each 
performance dimension) were conducted so that the effect of the variable of interest on 
performance can be assessed. The comparisons can be made by looking at the 
significance levels of Betas across equations, with the five performance dimensions as 
dependent variables.  
  While a difference in p-value for that factor’s Betas across the equations is 
relevant to the hypotheses, more rigorous analysis can be undertaken. The conclusion 
that one effect is greater than the other may only be drawn when one Beta is statistically 
significant while the others are statistically insignificant. This study opted to adopt the 
rigorous procedures proposed by Madjar et al. (2009). To test whether the magnitude of 
the relationship between a given class of SCSM mechanism and each performance 
dimension is indeed statistically different requires a test of the difference of Betas for 
different dependent variables from the same sample (Cramer, 1997). Specifically, in 
order to compare the effect of prevention-oriented SCSM mechanism on supply chain 
security performance (prevention supply chain security performance) with the effect 
of prevention-oriented SCSM mechanism on supply chain visibility 
(preventionvisibility), the standardized predicted value of one of the two performance 
variables must first be derived by using prevention-oriented SCSM mechanism as an 
independent variable. Assuming that the standardized predicted value of supply chain 
security performance is acquired, the difference between the observed value of supply 
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chain visibility and the standardized predicted value of supply chain security 
performance is then calculated (e.g., diff = supply chain visibility – standardized 
predicted value of supply chain security performance). Finally, another regression is 
performed with prevention-oriented SCSM mechanism as the independent variable and 
the calculated difference (i.e., diff) as the dependent variable. Whether the difference in 
magnitude is statistically significant or not can be ascertained by examining the 
significance of the Beta coefficient in the last equation. In this example, if the Beta of 
prevention-oriented SCSM mechanism is negative and statistically significant in the 
final equation, then it is concluded that the effect of prevention-oriented SCSM 
mechanism on supply chain security performance is greater than its effect on supply 
chain visibility.   
 Following the procedures above, several sets of equations were analyzed. Owing 
to the aforementioned multicollinearity issue, only the second-order factor was examined 
as the synergy of the four classes of SCSM mechanisms. Since all SCSM mechanisms 
are essentially deployed to mitigate SCS breaches, I test a new hypothesis that the effect 
of the second-order factor on supply chain security performance will be stronger than its 
effect on other performance measures. As shown in table 33 below, the effect of the 
higher-order factor on supply chain security performance is indeed greater than its effect 
on any other performance measures.  
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Table 33. Test of differential effect-2 
Variable of interest: the second-order factor 
Std. 
Beta 
t-value 
p-
value 
SC cost v.s. SC security (i.e., cost-security) -.414 -6.841 .000 
SC responsiveness v.s. SC security (i.e., responsiveness-security) -.297 -4.684 .000 
SC resilience v.s. SC security (i.e., resilience-security) -.272 -4.268 .000 
SC visibility v.s. SC security (i.e., visibility-security) -.255 -3.980 .000 
 
 
4.4.3.6 Portfolio Hypothesis 
 The last hypothesis posits that firms with uniform-high SCSM levels outperform 
their peers with mixed or uniform-low SCSM levels. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, this hypothesis is exploratory in nature. In order to test this hypothesis, the 
present study first conducted latent class analysis (LCA) to examine whether or not the 
firms in my sample can be appropriately categorized as uniform-high, uniform-low, and 
mixed (Lazarsfeld and Henry, 1968; Dillon and Mulani, 1984).  
Several methods can be applied to categorize companies in my sample. One 
method is cluster analysis. However, cluster analysis is not based on a statistical model 
(Cramer, 1997). It assigns companies into groups, but it does not provide information 
such as the probability that a given company is a uniform-high (or uniform-low) 
company. Plus, cluster analysis does not provide information such as: given that a 
company reports high prevention ability, what is the probability that the company will be 
classified as a uniform-high company.  
Another method is factor analysis. Factor analysis is a technique widely used 
with latent variables. However, one critical assumption of factor analysis is that the 
latent variable is continuous and normally distributed. In our case, the latent variable, 
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class membership, is categorical. It includes only three possible values: uniform-high, 
uniform-low, and mixed. Compared to the two methods, LCA is more appropriate for 
this study. LCA uncovers unobserved heterogeneity in a sample and aims to identify 
meaningful groups of subjects that are similar in their responses to measured variables 
(Hagenaars and McCutcheon, 2002). It allows for a latent categorical factor and provides 
additional information that may generate meaningful insights.   
The first step of LCA is to identify the number of classes that is present in the 
data. I used the Vuong-Lo-Mendell-Rubin likelihood ratio test and Lo-Mendell-Rubin 
adjusted LRT test (Lo, Mendell, and Rubin, 2001) via Mplus 6.2.1 to identify the 
appropriate number of classes. The two tests are based on previous work by Vuong 
(1989). They compare the improvement in model fit between neighboring class models 
and produces a p-value to determine if statistically significant improvement exists for the 
inclusion of one more class (Lo, Mendell, and Rubin, 2001). Specifically, the process to 
determine the best number of classes is iterative. It begins by fitting a set number of 
classes and then iteratively adding more classes. It compares an estimated model with a 
model with one less class (K-1). The null hypothesis states that a model with the smaller 
number of classes is adequate to describe the data. Thus, if there is sufficient evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis (i.e., p<.05), a model with the higher number of classes (e.g., 
K) may be more adequately describing the data. Table 34 displays the results. Both tests 
suggested that two classes were not enough to capture the variability of the companies 
whereas three classes are deemed sufficient to represent the companies in my sample.  
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Table 34. V-L-M-R likelihood ratio test and L-M-R adjusted LRT test results 
 2 (H0) Versus 3 Classes  3 (H0) Versus 4 Classes 
V-L-M-R Likelihood Ratio Test  p-value=0.000 p-value=0.158 
L-M-R Adjusted LRT Test  p-value=0.000 p-value=0.168 
 
 
I then performed LCA while setting the number of classes equal to three. The 
first 15 cases of the LCA are demonstrated in table 35. Columns 2 to 5 display each 
firm’s scores on prevention, detection, reaction, and restoration respectively. The next 
three columns report the probability of being in class 1, class 2, or class 3 respectively. 
The last column reports the final class a firm is assigned to. For example, based on its 
score on the four classes of SCSM mechanisms, firm 1 has a 0.0% chance of being in 
class 1 (99.4% in class 2, 0.6% in class3). For this company, class 2 is the most likely 
class, and Mplus indicates this information in the last column.  
 
 
 
 
Table 35. LCA outputs of first 15 observations 
 Prevention Detection Reaction Restoration %(C1) %(C2) %(C3) Class 
Firm 1 5.00 4.50 4.75 4.50 0.0% 99.4% 0.6% 2 
Firm 2 3.00 2.75 4.00 4.50 43.7% 56.3% 0.0% 2 
Firm 3 4.40 4.50 3.75 3.75 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 2 
Firm 4 2.20 1.50 2.25 2.75 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1 
Firm 5 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.25 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 3 
Firm 6 5.00 5.25 5.00 5.25 0.0% 15.6% 84.4% 3 
Firm 7 5.20 4.75 5.00 4.75 0.0% 60% 40% 2 
Firm 8 5.00 4.75 4.75 6.00 0.0% 28.4% 71.6% 3 
Firm 9 4.60 4.50 3.75 4.50 0.0% 99.9% 0.1% 2 
Firm 10 4.20 3.75 4.25 5.00 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 2 
Firm 11 2.60 2.75 3.25 4.50 96.5% 3.5% 0.0% 1 
Firm 12 6.60 4.75 4.00 4.50 0.0% 25.7% 74.3% 3 
Firm 13 2.80 3.25 3.00 4.50 82.7% 17.3 0.0% 1 
Firm 14 3.00 2.50 3.25 3.00 99.8% 0.2% 0.0% 1 
Firm 15 5.20 4.00 5.25 4.50 0.0% 94.6% 5.4% 2 
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I further re-arranged the results based on class membership (Table 36) and 
plotted the mean scores on SCSM mechanisms of each class (Figure 12). The scores 
suggest that class 1 maps to the uniform-low class, class 2 maps to the mixed class, 
while class 3 maps to the uniform-high class. The results justified my prediction that 
firms can be characterized as uniform-high, uniform-low, or mixed. 
 
 
Table 36. LCA outputs of first 15 observations—organized by class membership 
 Prevention Detection Reaction Restoration %(C1) %(C2) %(C3) Class 
Firm 4 2.20 1.50 2.25 2.75 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1 
Firm 11 2.60 2.75 3.25 4.50 96.5% 3.5% 0.0% 1 
Firm 13 2.80 3.25 3.00 4.50 82.7% 17.3 0.0% 1 
Firm 14 3.00 2.50 3.25 3.00 99.8% 0.2% 0.0% 1 
Firm 1 5.00 4.50 4.75 4.50 0.0% 99.4% 0.6% 2 
Firm 2 3.00 2.75 4.00 4.50 43.7% 56.3% 0.0% 2 
Firm 3 4.40 4.50 3.75 3.75 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 2 
Firm 7 5.20 4.75 5.00 4.75 0.0% 60% 40% 2 
Firm 9 4.60 4.50 3.75 4.50 0.0% 99.9% 0.1% 2 
Firm 10 4.20 3.75 4.25 5.00 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 2 
Firm 15 5.20 4.00 5.25 4.50 0.0% 94.6% 5.4% 2 
Firm 5 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.25 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 3 
Firm 6 5.00 5.25 5.00 5.25 0.0% 15.6% 84.4% 3 
Firm 8 5.00 4.75 4.75 6.00 0.0% 28.4% 71.6% 3 
Firm 12 6.60 4.75 4.00 4.50 0.0% 25.7% 74.3% 3 
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Figure 12. Mean scores of each class 
 
 
H15 was then tested via ANOVA across all five performance dimensions. Table 
37 displays the results. Consistent with my prediction, uniform-high companies achieved 
better performance in all performance measures when compared against mixed 
companies. So did mixed companies when compared against uniform-low companies. 
The results, thus, favor H15a against H15b and H15c.   
 
 
Table 37. Tests of between group differences 
 SC Security  SC visibility Cost 
performance 
SC 
responsiveness 
SC resilience 
Class 1: Uniform-low 3.231 3.71 3.68 3.91 3.38 
Class 2: Mixed 4.07 (0.84***)2 4.69(0.98***) 4.40(0.72***) 4.79(0.88***) 4.45(1.07***) 
Class 3: Uniform-high 4.99 (1.76***) 
        (0.92***)3 
5.69(1.98***) 
       (1.00***) 
5.11(1.43***) 
        (0.71***) 
5.76(1.85***) 
        (0.97***) 
5.52(2.14***) 
        (1.07***) 
1: the mean score. 
2: the mean difference when uniform-low class is used as the base class. 
3: the mean difference when mixed class is used as the base class. 
Sample size of class 1 is 90 (class 2, 187; class 3, 124). 
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
Prevention Detection Reaction Restoration
Class 1: Uniform Low
Class 2: Mixed
Class 3: Uniform High
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4.5 Discussion of Results 
Drawing on the institutional theory and the tenets of the human immune system, 
I proposed that five institutional pressures affect the four classes of SCSM mechanisms, 
and these SCSM mechanisms, in turn, impact supply chain performance. Two 
moderators, top management commitment and shared SCS perception, were 
hypothesized to moderate the institutional pressure-SCSM mechanism relations. I also 
postulated a differential effect between institutional pressures and a given class of SCSM 
mechanisms. The potential differential effect between a given class of SCSM 
mechanisms and performance measures was also explored. The results suggest that not 
all hypotheses are fully supported. Some of the findings are rather intriguing and 
counter-intuitive and, therefore, merit further investigation. I discuss these findings in 
detail below. 
The results first show that not all institutional pressures are conducive to SCSM 
mechanisms (H1-H4). While many supply chain security studies reference government 
pressure as one of the strongest drivers that lead to the implementation of SCSM 
mechanisms, the results show that government pressure surprisingly reveals trivial 
effects on all classes of SCSM mechanisms. This is rather counter-intuitive because it is 
extremely difficult for companies to operate without compliance to government 
regulations. Thus, I believe this finding needs to be interpreted with caution. One 
possible and reasonable explanation for this result is that government pressure does have 
a sizable impact but such impact is not statistically manifested. To verify my speculation, 
I carefully examined the data again. I find that government pressure has the highest 
 210 
 
mean and the second lowest standard deviation when compared with other institutional 
pressures. The paired sample t-tests further indicate that the mean of government 
pressure is statistically different from the means of other pressures. Therefore, the 
findings may simply suggest that the majority of firms have conformed to government 
pressure. The effect of government pressure does exist. But because the standard 
deviation is very small, such effect is not statistically manifested. 
Second, the results illustrate that peer pressure has a consistent inverse effect on 
all classes of SCSM mechanisms. While the strategic management literature suggests 
that mimicking peers is one of the most predominant drivers of many organizational 
behaviors, my findings perhaps disclose the dark side of the mimicking process. 
Companies may not always benefit from the modeled processes as many peers’ 
operational details are not clear or even imitable. This situation seems to echo the case of 
total quality management (TQM). Since the CEOs of IBM, P&G, Ford, Motorola, AEC, 
and Xerox announced that “we are absolutely convinced that TQM is a fundamentally 
better way to conduct business” (in an open letter sent to Harvard Business Review in 
1991), firms just stopped thinking and blindly mimicked the so-called TQM philosophy. 
However, after waves of implementations of TQM across industries, many firms found 
themselves lost in the quality quandaries with little performance gains (Zbaracki, 1998). 
As a result, companies may intentionally avoid the bandwagon effect. My findings thus 
suggest that companies seem to be very cautious and prudent as it relates to the 
implementation of SCSM mechanisms. They do not simply surrender to peer pressure 
but rather treat it as a warning sign due to the potential downsides associated with it.  
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Regarding the differential effect of coefficients relating institutional pressures 
and a given class of SCSM mechanisms (H5-H8), the results suggest that government 
pressure does not exhibit a stronger impact on prevention- and detection-oriented SCSM 
mechanisms than other pressures. Indeed, as I discussed above, the effect of government 
pressure did not even manifest a statistically significant effect. Customer pressure, on the 
other hand, exhibits significant association with restoration-oriented SCSM mechanisms. 
However, further assessments show that the impact of customer pressure is weaker than 
the impact of performance pressure. The results suggest that companies do care about 
performance more when making decisions with respect to restoration mechanisms.  
As far as the moderation effects are concerned (H9-H10), I find that shared SCS 
perception (SSP) only interacts with normative pressure and peer pressure to affect 
SCSM mechanisms. Specifically, the joint effect of SSP and normative pressure is found 
to enhance the implementation of prevention-oriented SCSM mechanisms whereas the 
joint effect of SSP and peer pressure is found to enhance the implementation of reaction- 
and restoration-oriented SCSM mechanisms. In other words, the results suggest that the 
effects of peer/normative pressure on SCSM mechanisms will be stronger when shared 
SCS perception is high compared to when shared SCS perception is low. Top 
management commitment (TMC), on the other hand, reveals significant interaction 
effects with government pressure and peer pressure. Contrary to my prediction, the joint 
effect of TMC and government pressure is found to negatively affect reaction- and 
restoration-oriented SCSM mechanisms. The result is understandable though. Whether 
or not a company can survive SCS breaches is not a major concern for a government. As 
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the Master Baker manager disclosed during our interview, “[government] only focuses 
on prevention and detection practices, at least from the seminars I’ve attended.” In this 
sense, when government pressure is high, top managers would direct available resources 
toward prevention and detection, and, therefore, have less support to improve reaction 
and restoration. 
In terms of the impact of SCSM mechanisms on performance (H11a, H12a, H13a, 
and H14a), the results provide strong empirical evidence that high levels of SCSM result 
in better supply chain performance. The higher-order construct reveals rather strong 
positive associations with all five performance measures included in this study. While 
the individual effect of each class of SCSM mechanisms cannot be demonstrated in an 
integrated structural model due to multicollinearity concerns, these effects may be 
manifested through post-hoc analyses. Specifically, I ran a set of regression models for 
each mechanism-performance pair. After controlling for firm size, firm past performance 
(net profit margin in the past year), market share and industry membership, all four 
classes of SCSM mechanisms reveal statistically significant association with 
performance measures. 
Owing to the same multicollinearity issue, the differential effect of coefficients 
relating a given class of SCSM mechanisms and performance measures (H11b, H12b, 
H13b, and H14b) was assessed though the second-order factor as well. The results show 
that the effect of SCSM on supply chain security performance is stronger than its effect 
on other performance measures. This is somewhat intuitive because SCSM mechanisms 
are designed to secure the supply chain and mitigate SCS breaches.  
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Finally, the portfolio hypothesis (H15) was assessed via LCA and ANOVA 
procedures. The results show that uniform-high companies outperform their uniform-low 
or mixed peers across all five performance dimensions investigated. It is not surprising 
that uniform-high companies achieve better performance than uniform-low companies. 
But it is intriguing that uniform-high companies also dominate mixed companies across 
all performance measures. It suggests that excellence in only one or two classes of 
SCSM mechanisms does not help a company to achieve the best performance possible. It 
also appears that the “more is not necessarily good” rule (over reaction to SCS breaches 
may actually hurt performance) does not apply to the participating firms in my sample. 
The findings perhaps suggest that better SCS does drive business value. Gains in supply 
chain security do not compromise other performance measures. Alternatively, it is 
possible that companies who invest more in SCSM are also those who are the leaders in 
their respective market segment. They already built up competitive advantage against 
their competitors and thus demonstrate better performance. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter first discusses the key contributions of this dissertation. It then 
highlights the implications for both academics and practitioners. This chapter ends by 
presenting some of the study’s limitations along with future research opportunities.   
 
5.1 Contributions 
By integrating the institutional theory and the tenets of the human immune 
system, this study attempts to explore the antecedents as well as the consequences of 
four classes of SCSM mechanisms. I first define supply chain security based on a 
thorough literature review of various relevant research streams. Having SCS defined, I 
next propose a taxonomy of SCSM mechanisms. This taxonomy is then applied to 
develop a set of testable hypotheses which link institutional pressures to SCSM 
mechanisms and then relate SCSM mechanisms to supply chain performance. This 
present dissertation is the first large-scale empirical study that aims to test both the 
antecedents and the consequences of SCSM mechanisms. A more detailed discussion of 
this study’s contributions follows.    
The first contribution of this study is the formal conceptualization of supply 
chain security. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to define this 
critical term in the supply chain security research stream. While a few related concepts, 
such as supply chain security management, were defined in the past, there was no widely 
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recognized definition of supply chain security. The lack of a clear and formal definition 
of SCS results in several difficulties for the development of SCS research. As Autry and 
Bobbitt (2008) summarized, the literature contains ambiguous definitions and 
terminology, and reveals inconsistency in theoretical development. After contrasting the 
meaning of “security” from the criminology, risk management, psychology, and strategic 
management literatures, I adopt the “end” perspective (relative to the “mean” 
perspective) and define supply chain security as the absence of breaches in the supply 
chain. I further list seven potential sources of supply chain security breaches: theft, 
product adulteration, smuggling, counterfeit products, sabotage, terrorist attacks, as well 
as the illicit acquisition and use of data. This definition was then validated through four 
case studies. It appears that practitioners also believe this is a valid definition of supply 
chain security. The proposed definition is neat and specific in terms of what the potential 
sources of SCS breaches are, and, therefore, eliminates unnecessary ambiguity and 
makes the concept easy to understand and measure. 
The second contribution refers to the taxonomy of SCSM mechanisms. The 
broad scope of SCS involves necessarily numerous SCSM mechanisms which are 
advocated by various interest groups. Those mechanisms are discrete and scattered with 
various foci. A comparison of the most publicized SCS programs suggests that even 
governments and leading professional organizations have different perceptions of what 
constitutes best supply chain security management practices (Gutierrez and Hintsa, 
2006). The literature has not produced a theoretical framework that can organize the 
SCSM mechanisms into different taxons and has failed to advocate propositions based 
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on theoretical argumentation. In its current status, the SCS literature is like a literature of 
security programs; there are many lists of what to do, but no formal guide of how to do. 
Leveraging the human immune system as a metaphor of a SCSM system, I posit that we 
can theoretically categorize SCSM mechanisms into four classes based on their intent: 
prevention, detection, reaction, and restoration. Such a taxonomy not only allows 
researchers to explore some under-studied areas (e.g., comparison of effects relating 
different classes of SCSM mechanisms and performance measures) but also helps 
managers to review their company’s SCSM system and identify areas (e.g., restoration 
ability) that need improvement the most. This taxonomy may also apply to other 
research streams to help researchers generate interesting hypotheses.  
The third contribution of this study is the development and validation of four 
SCSM mechanism constructs based on the taxonomy. This study has made a 
considerable effort to identify a rather broad list of SCSM mechanisms. I first employed 
the Q-sort method to sort various SCSM mechanisms into four classes: prevention, 
detection, reaction, and restoration. I next utilized four case studies to further select the 
most relevant mechanisms to represent each class. The four theoretical constructs were 
then empirically validated through a large sample collected in the U.S. and Italy. In 
doing so, this study conceptualizes and provides empirical evidence in support of four 
SCSM dimensions drawing on the human immunology literature (Kaufmann et al., 2004; 
Parham, 2005; Playfair and Bancroft, 2004; Segel and Cohen, 2001). As such, 
researchers have a new set of constructs to study SCS issues that have been shown to 
influence supply chain performance.   
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The fourth contribution rests at the empirical examination of the antecedents as 
well as the consequences of SCSM mechanisms. Empirical research on SCS is scant 
(Martens et al., 2011). Observations have shown that some firms are very proactive in 
implementing SCSM mechanisms while others are lagging (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; 
Martha and Subbakrishna, 2002), suggesting that the drivers of SCSM mechanisms are 
complex. Drawing on the institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Powell, 1991; Scott and Meyer, 1983; Scott, 1987; Zucker 1987), this 
study theoretically proposes and empirically assesses five underlying antecedents of 
SCSM mechanisms. The results show that some institutional pressures act as 
predominantly powerful explanatory variables of SCSM mechanisms while other 
pressures appear to have negligible or even adverse effects. These findings advance our 
understanding in terms of what really motivates firms to support SCSM endeavors. This 
study also empirically examines the effects of SCSM mechanisms on supply chain 
performance using a large scale empirical dataset. Given the difficulty of obtaining SCS 
related data, few large scale empirical studies exist. I respond to this issue and provide 
strong evidence to support the positive effects of SCSM mechanisms as suggested by the 
literature (Giunipero and Eltantawy, 2004; Jüttner et al. 2003; Kleindorfer and Saad, 
2005; Knemeyer et al., 2009; Speier et al., 2011;Sheffi, 2005). 
The fifth contribution is to identify top management commitment and shared 
SCS perception as two important factors that shape the effect of institutional pressure on 
SCSM mechanism. My findings point out that the interactions between top management 
commitment and institutional pressures have mixed effects on SCSM mechanisms. For 
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example, while enhancing the effect of government pressure on prevention-oriented 
SCSM mechanisms, top management commitment also weakens the effect of 
government pressure on restoration-oriented SCSM mechanisms. Shared SCS perception, 
on the other hand, only interacts with peer pressure to enhance reaction- and restoration-
oriented SCSM mechanisms. These intriguing findings have meaningful managerial 
implications, because they identify means through which supply chain managers are 
more likely to succeed in their efforts to secure the supply chains. 
The sixth contribution relates to the assessment of differential effects. Two 
groups of differential effects were examined in this study. The findings show that 
coercive isomorphism (i.e., government pressure and customer pressure) does not 
necessarily exhibit stronger effects as the literature suggests (Williams et al., 2008) than 
other types of isomorphism pressures. Companies may adopt SCSM related practices 
because they face rather strong pressure to conform to industry norms or to improve 
performance. The findings also show that SCSM mechanisms reveal a stronger effect on 
supply chain security performance than on other performance measures. It appears that 
some companies attain improved cost performance (or responsiveness, etc.) because they 
achieve better security performance. Researchers can thus build on these results to 
further explore the potential mediating role of supply chain security performance. 
The seventh contribution relates to methodological variety. Following the 
suggestion of Singhal and Singhal (2012), I employed multiple empirical methods to 
enhance the validity of this research. I present an innovative use of psychometric 
techniques. In order to operationalize the four classes of SCSM mechanisms, I applied 
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Q-sort procedures to categorize SCSM mechanisms which may not be appropriately 
categorized via exploratory factor analysis effectively. Four in-depth case studies were 
then employed in order to select the most representative Q-sorted items and build up 
confidence in using the four constructed factors. After operationalizing the four classes 
of SCSM mechanisms, I empirically validated them through a large sample collected in 
the U.S. and Italy and tested related hypotheses. This study provides a prototypical 
example for empiricists who intend to make use of complementary methodologies.    
 
5.2 Implications 
5.2.1 Implications for Researchers 
This study presents several findings with scholarly implications. First, the 
institutional theory literature has a recent debate about the co-existence of institutional 
isomorphism and competitive isomorphism (Heugens and Lander, 2009). The old and 
dominant view in the literature avers that institutional isomorphism is the primary driver 
of organizational behaviors. The institutional environment determines what resources 
firms can attract by conforming to specific types of pressures, and, therefore, renders the 
effect of competitive isomorphism (Scott, 2001). However, recent studies suggest that 
competitive isomorphism is also impactful (Heugens and Lander, 2009). The new view 
is more acceptable to economists and organizational sociologists alike as it emphasizes 
that market competition weeds out less efficient practices in favor of more efficient ones. 
By integrating both types of isomorphism in the theoretical model, this study shows that 
the two types of isomorphism affect SCSM mechanisms simultaneously. In other words, 
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the findings suggest that institutional isomorphism and competitive isomorphism are 
commensal rather than mutually exclusive. They co-exist and affect firms collectively. 
The dissertation thus provides evidence for scholars to seriously consider including 
competitive isomorphism (i.e., performance pressure in this study) in future institutional 
theory related studies.  
Second, the present study is the first attempt to relate immunology theories to 
SCS research. By utilizing the human immune system as an analog to the SCSM system, 
I propose a taxonomy of SCSM mechanisms. I also rely on the principles regarding how 
the human immune system battles against invading pathogens in order to provide 
theoretical support for the differential effect hypotheses. As such, this study serves as a 
prototypical example of applying a natural science theory to solve a social science 
problem. It suggests that supply chain management scholars may find more useful 
theories by extending their search of good theories to a broader set of disciplines, 
including those that are generally considered as natural science disciplines.     
Third, the proposed taxonomy applies not only to SCSM mechanisms but also to 
other organizational strategies and practices. For example, the same taxonomy may also 
be useful to group quality management practices. Inspection of raw materials and 
finished products can be labeled as detection-oriented. Product recall, on the other hand, 
can be prescribed as reaction-oriented. These activities may have different financial 
implications to firms. Putting them into different categories is advantageous to reveal 
their differential effect on firm performance. In this sense, the taxonomy provides 
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researchers a new perspective to look at organizational practices and potentially generate 
new and interesting research questions.   
Finally, this study also carries a methodological implication. It presents an 
example of the innovative use of multiple empirical methods to enhance research 
validity. The Q-sorting method, which is widely used in the psychological literature, was 
employed to select appropriate SCSM mechanisms to underline each latent factor 
suggested by the taxonomy. A case-based qualitative approach was then deployed to 
justify that taxonomy and further select most representative items for each construct. 
Finally, a large sample was used to validate the four constructs and test substantive 
hypotheses. The combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods makes the 
findings of this study reliable as some drawbacks of using a single method are overcome.      
 
5.2.2 Implications for Practitioners 
This study provides several valuable insights to assist practitioners. First, while 
the literature suggests that conformity to government pressure may lead to performance 
gains (e.g., Closs and McGarrell, 2004; Peleg-Gillai et al., 2006; Rice and Spayd, 2005), 
firms must realize that these potential benefits are unlikely to transform into competitive 
advantage. As I discussed before, my results perhaps suggest that government pressure is 
omnipresent such that almost all firms have conformed to it. Subsequently, the 
implementation of government specified mechanisms will not lead firms to standout 
against competition. Alternatively, the results can be interpreted as a caveat. While 
Oliver (1991) argues that under some circumstances firms may employ strategies such as 
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avoidance and manipulation to indirectly disregard or change government requirements, 
my results suggest that in the context of supply chain security, these strategies will make 
firms less competitive as many other firms have acquiesced to the government demands. 
In other words, firms need to carefully adhere to government issued SCS regulations not 
only to stay legal but also to avoid falling behind competition. 
Second, the findings suggest that different stakeholders (e.g., government, 
customer, etc.) have different perceptions with respect to SCSM mechanisms. Customers 
(buying firms) seem to care more about restoration than the other three classes. On one 
hand, customers may agree that a supply chain disruption is by its very nature inevitable. 
On the other hand, they want the right products in the right place at the right time with 
low cost (Fisher, 1997). In some extreme conditions, customers are not willing to 
compromise their on-time delivery performance for better SCS performance (Voss et al., 
2009a). Smooth and stable material supply is rather critical to their own operations. As a 
result, the way suppliers respond to disruptions and restore normal operations on the 
aftermath of SCS breaches becomes rather important to their customers. Operations 
managers should utilize this finding in order to design specific strategies to satisfy 
customers well.  
Third, the interactions between top management commitment and institutional 
pressures raise several recommendations for supply chain managers to achieve better 
security performance. Top managers have more significant influence than supply chain 
managers in that these executives can decide which functional managers to reward, 
promote, or fire, as well as design the firm’s overarching strategies. However, supply 
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chain managers can also influence the top managers primarily by means of issue selling 
and initiative taking (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008 a, b). Our results show that top 
management commitment can interact with peer pressure and performance pressure to 
positively affect the adoption of SCSM mechanisms. As such, supply chain managers 
should advocate the importance of modeling after peers and promote the collateral 
benefits of SCSM mechanisms through their contacts with top managers to advance the 
implementation of SCSM mechanisms. Our results also show that shared SCS 
perception interacts with peer pressure to positively affect reaction and restoration 
SCSM mechanisms. It reveals that cultivating a security oriented organizational culture 
is conducive to high levels of SCS. Therefore, supply chain managers should again 
influence top managers through issue selling to promote shared SCS perception within 
their organization. 
Fourth, the taxonomy provides supply chain managers a new tool to evaluate the 
status of their SCSM system. The four classes of SCSM mechanism can be essentially 
used as four measures. Supply chain managers may use them to identify areas that their 
company needs to improve. For example, an evaluation may suggest that a firm has high 
levels of prevention but very low levels of reaction. Reaction-oriented SCSM 
mechanisms would thus become a focus for that firm to improve SCS performance next. 
The four mechanisms can also be used to compare companies operating in the same 
industry. Such comparison keeps supply chain managers informed about their 
company’s status relative to rivals. Note that while the taxonomy was proposed for 
SCSM mechanisms, it can also be used outside the SCSM arena. 
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Finally, this study somewhat demonstrates differential effects of SCSM 
mechanisms on supply chain performance. In practice, firms always face a situation 
where resources are scarce. They may not implement all practices they need simply 
because they cannot afford all of them. The results regarding differential effects can thus 
be used to support decision-making. Managers can intentionally and wisely focus on 
only one class of SCSM mechanisms at a time according to their firm’s specific resource 
constraints and that particular class’s effect on desirable performance outcomes.  
 
5.3 Limitations 
This study is not immune to limitations, which are discussed below in some 
detail. First, data were collected from one respondent from each participating firm. A 
single respondent approach may not be able to provide reliable information regarding 
complex organizational behaviors (Venkatraman and Grant, 1986). This approach also 
precludes me from examining inter-rater reliability. While I performed tests for common 
method bias and conducted case studies to enhance research validity, it would be useful 
if multiple responses can be collected from each company (McFadden et al., 2009). 
Second, because this research is cross-sectional, it only provides a “snapshot” of 
the operations of the participating firms. This inherent flaw renders my ability to 
evaluate how SCSM mechanisms actually get implemented, readjusted, or annulled over 
time. Certainly these themes are important topics for future longitudinal studies.  
Third, while the four SCSM mechanism constructs were empirically validated, 
the manifest variables of these constructs were selected based on subjective methods. A 
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Q-sort approach and qualitative interviews were employed to select these manifest 
variables. Although the objectivity of the Q-sort (Brown, 1980; Thomas and Baas, 1992) 
and case study (Wu and Choi, 2005) results should not be a concern for this study, I 
acknowledge that it is possible that some important manifest variables are missing. After 
all, the final manifest items were selected based on interviews with four companies and 
these companies may not have implemented an exhaustive array of SCSM mechanisms.  
Fourth, as discussed in chapters III and IV, different SCSM mechanisms could 
“fertilize” each other. This is somewhat “illustrated” by the multicollinearity issue of the 
four mechanism classes. The differential effect of SCSM mechanism on supply chain 
performance was, thus, assessed through a higher-order construct instead. The higher-
order construct did reveal a statistically significant association with performance 
measures. Nevertheless, it would be more informative if the four SCSM constructs can 
be individually examined as the results may generate meaningful insights regarding the 
mechanism-performance linkage. 
Finally, a survey-based method offers the advantage of collecting a large amount 
of data to identify relationships of interest. However, such information does not go 
deeply beyond the surface (Kerlinger, 1986). The data may be useful in demonstrating 
associations among variables, but it may not always answer “why” these associations 
exist. While the institutional theory and the tenets of human immunology are 
theoretically well-grounded, follow-up ethnographic studies would be worthwhile to 
explore the same phenomena in a real-life context (Yin, 1981). 
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5.4 Future Research 
This study provides several potential opportunities for future research. First, with 
regard to the limitations mentioned in section 5.3, there is a clear need to repeat this 
study in order to create longitudinal comparisons. The SCSM mechanisms are evolving, 
so is the institutional environment. It would be valuable to collect longitudinal data to 
assess how the relationships proposed in this study change over time.  
Second, a better understanding of how institutional pressures interact with 
contextual factors to affect SCSM mechanisms is necessary to advance the SCS 
literature. Although this study focuses on the moderating role of top management 
commitment and shared SCS perception, future studies might examine other important 
factors. For example, the effect of institutional pressure on SCSM mechanisms may vary 
under different ownership configuration. Depending on whom the dominant owner is 
(family, venture capitalist, pension plan, the public, etc.), the degree of security a 
specific firm needs may vary, and, thus, firms may respond to institutional pressures 
differently.  
Third, the statistical results suggest that the effect of SCSM mechanisms on 
supply chain security performance is stronger than its effects on other performance 
measures. The results perhaps suggest that SCS performance partly mediates the 
relationship between SCSM mechanisms and other supply chain performance 
dimensions. For example, the reduction of overall operational costs may be achieved in 
part because SCSM mechanisms help improve operational efficiency and in part because 
supply chain security performance is enhanced (e.g., fewer thefts). Future studies may 
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examine whether or not this mediation effect does exist and enhance our understanding 
of the SCSM mechanism-performance link.  
Fourth, future studies should explore the potential comprehensive role of SCSM 
mechanisms. While the results suggest that it is the synergy of the four classes of SCSM 
mechanisms that really matters, it does not completely rule out the possibility that SCSM 
mechanisms could substitute for each other. Theoretically, an extremely high level of a 
given class of SCSM mechanisms reduces the need of other classes. For example, if a 
company can effectively prevent potential SCS breaches from happening, it probably 
would not need to invest significantly to get ready to respond to SCS breaches. In this 
sense, SCSM mechanisms are comprehensive. Understanding with this regard would 
help practitioners to better manage their limited resources.  
Finally, the data were collected from companies within both the U.S. and Italy. 
Given the security policy differences among geographic regions, it would be meaningful 
to engage in comparative studies. For example, the Italian companies have to conform 
not only to supply chain security regulations issued by their government, but also to 
related legislations launched by the European Union. This fact may enable a comparative 
study that sheds light on the organizational responses to government pressure. In a 
similar vein, firms across diverse industries may be sensitized to SCS breaches 
differentially and therefore reveal various patterns when it comes to the implementation 
of SCSM mechanisms. This offers another opportunity to conduct a study providing 
useful insights into the effect of industry membership. 
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APPENDIX A 
A SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Step 1: Ice break 
Step 2: Briefly state the purpose of our research project—advance the 
understanding of SCS. Explain the benefits of participation—learn status of your firm 
and other firms across different industries; identify areas that your firm potentially needs 
to improve in order to manage supply chain security and risk.  
Step 3: Examining the background (e.g. why supply chain security is important, 
etc.). Assure the anonymity regarding the information provided. Plus, let the interviewee 
know we can sign a confidentiality agreement.  
Step 4: Ask the interviewee to provide basic information about his/her company 
(e.g., history, major products, etc.) and himself/herself (e.g., title, years with the firm, 
etc.).  
Step 5: Semi-constructed questions: 
1. Can you talk about what supply chain security is? 
2. What is the domain of supply chain security management? 
3. What strategies and practices [company name] has implemented to improve 
supply chain security?  
4. Based on an extensive review of academic literature, industry reports, and 
industry standards, we categorize SCSM mechanisms into four clusters based on 
their intent: prevention, detection, reaction, and restoration. We would like to 
hear from you whether this categorization of security practices is a valid 
representation.  
5. If you agree with the categorizations, what does [company name] (or even other 
manufacturing firms you know) do to prevent (detect, react to, and restore from) 
supply chain security events? 
6. Can you talk about your company’s understanding of SCSM? For example, what 
strategies or practices has your firm implemented and for what purposes?  
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7. Besides prevention, detection, reaction, and restoration, have your firm 
implemented any other mechanisms to enhance SCS?  
8. Do you think a systematic classification of SCSM mechanisms will be helpful for 
(1) effective implementation of those mechanisms and (2) decision making? 
9. Does [company name] see improved performance other than supply chain 
security due to the implementation of SCSM mechanisms?  
10. Which SCSM mechanism(s) is most conducive to specific performance 
dimensions (e.g., visibility, operational costs, responsiveness, resilience, etc.)? 
11. Can you talk a little bit about the supply chain security related governmental 
regulations in your industry? 
12. Can you talk a little bit about the influence your firm has perceived from the 
government when it comes to supply chain security? 
13. Do customers put specific supply chain security requirements in the contracts? 
14. Can you talk about your customers’ attitude towards supply chain security? 
15. Do customers require your firm to improve supply chain security through 
formal/informal communications?  
16. Have your competitors adopted supply chain security programs and initiatives? If 
yes, does this also drive your company to adopt similar programs? 
17. Can you talk about how your competitors respond to supply chain security 
needs? Did their responses influence your company’s decisions? 
18. Can you talk about industry/professional norms when it comes to supply chain 
security? 
19. Which institutional pressure is the most important one that drives your company 
to implement SCSM mechanisms? 
20. Do the top managers of your company treat supply chain security seriously? Do 
they assume an active role in enhancing SCS? Does this have an impact on the 
adoption and implementation of SCSM mechanisms? 
21. Do employees share the viewpoints that supply chain security is important? Do 
you think this has an impact on the implementation of SCSM mechanisms?    
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APPENDIX B 
Q-SORTING RESULTS 
 
1: Prevention; 2: Detection; 3:Reaction; 4:Restoration; 0: N/A 
 Q-Sorter 1 Q-Sorter 2 Q-Sorter 3 Q-Sorter 4 Q-Sorter 5 Q-Sorter 6 
Q1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Q2 1 1 1 2 2 1 
Q3 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Q4 1 2 1 2 1 1 
Q5 2 1 1 3 1 1 
Q6 1 1 1 3 1 1 
Q7 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Q8 3 3 3 3 3 1 
Q9 1 3 0 1 1 1 
Q10 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Q11 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Q12 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Q13 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Q14 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Q15 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Q16 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Q17 2 1 3 2 2 2 
Q18 3 4 4 4 4 0 
Q19 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Q20 3 3 3 3 2 2 
Q21 1 2 2 2 1 2 
Q22 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Q23 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Q24 1 4 4 3 1 1 
Q25 1 1 2 2 2 1 
Q26 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Q27 1 3 3 3 3 1 
Q28 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Q29 1 2 2 2 2 3 
Q30 1 1 2 2 2 3 
Q31 1 1 1 1 1 3 
Q32 1 2 2 2 2 3 
Q33 4 4 4 4 1 1 
Q34 4 3 3 2 2 3 
Q35 1 1 1 1 1 3 
Q36 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Q37 1 1 1 2 4 1 
Q38 4 4 3 3 3 3 
Q39 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Q40 4 4 3 4 4 3 
Q41 3 3 2 2 4 1 
Q42 3 3 3 3 4 1 
Q43 1 2 2 1 3 3 
Q44 4 4 3 4 4 2 
Q45 1 1 2 2 3 2 
Q46 4 3 4 4 3 3 
Q47 2 2 2 2 1 3 
Q48 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Q49 1 1 1 1 4 1 
Q50 1 4 3 2 4 1 
Q51 4 4 4 3 4 1 
Q52 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Q53 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Q54 1 3 1 1 1 1 
Q55 1 2 2 2 1 1 
Q56 1 0 4 1 1 1 
Q57 1 2 2 2 2 1 
Q58 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Q59 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Q60 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Q61 3 3 3 3 1 3 
Q62 3 3 3 3 1 1 
Q63 1 1 1 3 1 1 
Q64 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Q65 3 4 4 4 4 3 
Q66 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Q67 1 3 3 1 1 3 
Q68 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Q69 1 3 0 0 1 3 
Q70 3 4 4 3 4 3 
Q71 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Q72 2 1 2 2 2 1 
Q73 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Q74 1 3 4 4 4 3 
Q75 4 3 3 2 3 2 
Q76 3 3 3 2 1 3 
Q77 1 4 3 3 4 3 
Q78 2 2 2 2 2 2 
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Q79 3 3 3 3 4 3 
Q80 3 4 3 3 3 4 
Q81 2 2 1 3 1 1 
Q82 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Q83 3 3 3 3 1 1 
Q84 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Q85 1 4 3 3 2 1 
Q86 1 4 3 3 4 4 
Q87 2 1 1 1 2 1 
Q88 4 3 3 3 3 3 
Q89 4 4 1 4 3 1 
Q90 1 4 1 0 4 3 
Q91 1 1 4 1 1 1 
Q92 3 3 0 0 3 0 
Q93 4 3 3 4 3 4 
Q94 3 4 4 3 4 4 
Q95 4 3 4 3 4 4 
Q96 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Q97 4 4 4 3 4 1 
Q98 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Q99 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Q100 1 4 1 1 1 1 
 
 Statement 
Q1 Our strategy emphasizes an ability to detect security breaches early 
Q2 We conduct unannounced security assessments of our logistics systems 
Q3 We have visibility of supplier practices across all tiers  
Q4 We regularly audit the security of our IT systems 
Q5 We simulate supply chain disruptions to assure our readiness 
Q6 Our supply chain risk management strategy can be characterized as proactive 
Q7 The supply chain risk management strategy reflects the scale of the firm’s operations 
Q8 We have designated a group of employees as first respondents in case of a crisis  
Q9 We have a well defined supply chain security strategy 
Q10 We secure containers at our facilities to assure they are not compromised 
Q11 We are actively managing suppliers across all tiers of our supply network  
Q12 All of our employees are trained for security and risk mgmt whenever they assume new roles 
Q13 We have systems that provide good cyber protection 
Q14 Supplier security is an important criterion when selecting our suppliers 
Q15 When it comes to supply chain security, our strategy focuses on prevention 
Q16 We offer incentives to our suppliers to enhance supply chain security 
Q17 We regularly assess supplier security performance against security standards 
Q18 We have complete and accurate documentation of our processes for an effective recovery effort 
Q19 We use sophisticated technologies to detect if containers have been compromised 
Q20 We have protocols for communication when a crisis arises 
Q21 Performance indicators for supply chain security are tracked 
Q22 We use RFID or other similar technology for tracking purposes throughout our supply chain 
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Q23 We have well defined supply chain security objectives/targets 
Q24 We are building redundancies in our supply chain systems in case of a crisis 
Q25 Our supply chain strategy ensures that threat and risk assessments are conducted regularly  
Q26 We encourage suppliers to constantly enhance supply chain security 
Q27 We delegate authority so that teams/individuals can take necessary action in case of a crisis  
Q28 We have procedures to detect near misses in supply chain security  
Q29 We actively evaluate the significance of various supply chain threats 
Q30 We verify that all shipments are legitimate 
Q31 We have positioned our facilities in separate locations to minimize risks of disruption 
Q32 We examine all tiers in our supply chain to identify potential security vulnerabilities 
Q33 
Our supply chain  strategy specifies the selective use of slack resources in anticipation of 
disruptions 
Q34 We do conduct in-depth analysis of supply chain security breaches 
Q35 We require comprehensive security capabilities from carriers 
Q36 We mandate that suppliers adhere to established supply chain security standards 
Q37 We segment and manage suppliers according to their risk profile 
Q38 
We use interchangeable or generic parts as a strategy to deal with potential disruptions in the 
supply chain 
Q39 We have IT procedures for system lockout if violations/intrusions are detected 
Q40 
We have flexible capacity contracts with suppliers in order to improve our ability to react to a 
crisis 
Q41 We have a mechanism to manage suppliers that are more vulnerable to disruptions 
Q42 We have a well defined contingency plan to react to serious supply chain security breaches 
Q43 We make use of anti tampering technologies on containers 
Q44 We have a process to preserve knowledge in case of a crisis 
Q45 We have metrics for evaluating supplier security 
Q46 We have corrective procedures when security lapses are detected  
Q47 We maintain an incident data base of supply chain security breaches 
Q48 We have systems that ensure secure data exchange with partners 
Q49 Our supply chain strategy spells out security priorities 
Q50 Our strategy prioritizes efforts based on the magnitude of potential supply chain disruptions 
Q51 Our supply chain strategy includes building knowledge redundancy in case of a crisis 
Q52 We monitor our supplier network to identify suppliers at risk 
Q53 We do background checks before we hire employees 
Q54 We hold all suppliers accountable for supply chain security 
Q55 We visit supplier facilities to assure the integrity of their supply chain security practices 
Q56 We share our knowledge about supply chain security and risk management with suppliers 
Q57 We do conduct periodic assessments of our supply chain security 
Q58 We use technology to monitor facility access 
Q59 We have procedures to detect supply chain security failures or near failures 
Q60 Our supply chain risk management strategy has realistic objectives/targets 
Q61 We pre-position resources to deal with crises effectively 
Q62 We cross-train our employees as a mechanism to deal with potential supply chain disruptions 
Q63 We educate suppliers about supply chain security practices 
Q64 We monitor and synthesize information regarding security breaches 
Q65 We do have a disaster recovery plan 
Q66 There is effective communication across our supply chain when a crisis hits 
Q67 Our strategy assigns clear responsibilities for security matters 
Q68 We have the ability to track and trace our cargo in real time 
Q69 The supply chain security strategy is consistent with the type of threats to the organization 
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Q70 We build flexibility in our manufacturing/assembly plants to reduce the impact of disruptions  
Q71 We have a process that notifies supply chain partners across tiers if the supply chain is threatened 
Q72 We evaluate whether any suppliers across tiers are financially vulnerable 
Q73 We use active measures such as video and sensors to be able to detect security breaches 
Q74 We have strategies for recovery action after supply chain disruptions  
Q75 We spell out what to do in the event of a security breach or crisis 
Q76 Our supply chain partners help us craft our response to a crisis 
Q77 We established alternative carrier arrangements for use in case of supply chain disruptions 
Q78 We actively assess whether our critical suppliers are at risk of business failure 
Q79 We have a quick reaction force to deal with a crisis or a serious disruption in our supply chain  
Q80 We have redundant communication systems which can be used if a crisis arises 
Q81 We identify vulnerabilities so we can prepare ourselves in case of a crisis 
Q82 We evaluate the risk related to potential terrorist attacks on our supply chain  
Q83 We have a specific crisis management room that is appropriately equipped 
Q84 We have strategies to simplify product design as part of our risk management strategy   
Q85 We operate parallel or mirrored IT systems in order to deal with potential crises 
Q86 We have contracted with suppliers that can provide additional capacity at times of emergency 
Q87 We have access restrictions in our IT systems 
Q88 We know what to do when we encounter supply chain security breaches or crises 
Q89 We back-up our data to withstand potential disruptions 
Q90 We have strategies to use more standard parts to reduce the risk of supply chain disruptions  
Q91 We cooperate with suppliers to assure higher levels of supply chain security 
Q92 Decisions to handle a crisis are planned to be made at the proper level of authority 
Q93 We have backup processes that can assist us at times of crises 
Q94 We developed alternative material sources in case of supply chain disruptions 
Q95 We have a specific process to reinstate operations in case of a major crisis/disruption 
Q96 There is a definite chain of command in case of an emergency 
Q97 We maintain strategic inventory stocks to deal with potential crises 
Q98 We only approve suppliers (irrespective of tier) that have a risk management program in place  
Q99 We monitor the loading/unloading process of cargo to identify potential security breaches 
Q100 In order to reduce supply chain risk we design products where suppliers can easily be replaced 
 
 
